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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Was the farm crisis of the 1980s just another bad episode in agriculture that can be 
traced back to colonial days? Or, can it be demonstrated that an ideological battle over 
policy in this country (going back to its founding) has been taking place? As the political 
forces on each side of this ideological battle have struggled for control over policy and its 
resulting legislation, the periodic uprisings of farmers has provided testimony that many in 
the farm sector were not happy with some of the policies. The ideological battle influenced 
agriculture policy, land policy, banking, monetary policy, and trade policy, as well as the 
response to natural disasters that have plagued farmers. The political forces for one of these 
policies finally gained sufficient strength to carry out its planned restructuring of the 
agriculture sector in the 1980s, in the belief that this would ultimately be in the best interest 
of a "more efficient" market system. It was the imposition of this policy that caused the farm 
"crisis" of the 1980s. When reading accounts and interpretations of the crisis, the ideology of 
the writer should be known in order to understand the perspective of the narrative. 
Historians generally agree that thinkers of the Enlightenment influenced the founders 
of the United States. The list includes Montesquieu, Locke, Hume, Grotius, Bolingbroke, 
Plato, Rousseau, and others. The Enlightenment began approximately 100 years before the 
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American Revolution. The ideas, therefore, being discussed and developed by the thinkers in 
and around this movement were coming to fiuition at a time when the American colonists 
were discussing forms of government, the responsibilities of government, and how people 
and governments relate. One of the members of the European group of philosophes (as they 
called themselves), Benjamin Franklin, (acting as American representative) started a similar 
group of philosophes in the colonies that included Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. 1 
With the relatively small number of intellectuals in the colonies, to say that they probably 
interacted would not be out of line. This is not to assert that they agreed on everything 
(anymore than the European philosophes agreed on everything), but merely to say that they 
exchanged ideas. While Alexander Hamilton, for example, is not mentioned as being a part 
of the Franklin circle ofphilosophes, it can be shown that he was familiar with their writings. 
In an editorial rebutting a Tory who had expounded on natural rights and the right of the 
Parliament to tax the colonies, Hamilton stated: "I would recommend to your perusal, 
Grotius, Puffendorf, Locke, Montesquieu, and Burlemaqui. ,,2 
Ideas both act upon, and are acted upon by, people and events. The American 
colonies, therefore, presented a unique opportunity to be a laboratory in several ways. There 
were vast resources that were mostly untapped, although various countries (through royal 
courts) laid claim. These royal courts were composed of an aristocratic elite who (as 
historians have written) fought with each other over resources, and who parried for positions 
of wealth and influence within their own hierarchy. The developed parts of the world, up to 
1 Thomas 1. Schlereth. The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought: Its Form and Function in 
the Ideas~of Franklin. Hume. and Voltaire. 1694-1790 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977). 
- Alexander Hamilton, Selected Writings and Speeches of Alexander Hamilton. eel Morton 1. Frisch 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1985), 19. 
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the discovery and settlement of the American colonies, were already divided among this 
group of elite aristocrats. This allowed them to maintain their power over the masses, who 
did not have access to these resources due to the political power, the economic power, and 
the social customs (one of which was that the elite were elite by divine providence -- that was 
the natural order of the world). The resources of the American colonies were sufficient to 
potentially cause shifts in this established balance of power, depending on who would 
actually gain control over them. If one assumes that the object of people in power is to 
maintain their positions of power, then it becomes more understandable why efforts would be 
expended to prevent the rise of a potentially rival power. 
During the time of the Enlightenment (generally the 100 years leading up to the 
American Revolution), the American colonists were increasingly asserting more independent 
control over their domain. Their independence from Britain would offer the opportunity to 
chose a fonn of government and decide which philosophy would provide the basis for their 
form of government. Whoever exercised political control through this new government 
would also exercise control economically over the distribution and/or the use of resources, 
thus causing a social impact. Independence from the royal court (and the aristocratic elite 
who maintained their positions through that court and had been benefiting from the colonies 
through the mercantile system) would create another source of power outside of the hierarchy 
already in place. In other words, this would change the geometry of the power structure then 
in place in the world. It would be redefined to accommodate the addition of more people 
with access to resources and political power. If the new government was structured to allow 
a large number of people access to political power, and if it adopted a policy that meant 
larger numbers of people could (potentially) have access to resources for their own use, that 
4 
would have an impact on the world stage. Recognition of this potential power shift was 
behind the well-known observation that the American Revolution was the shot heard around 
the world. There were already peasants in Europe who were upset with the status quo. It 
must have been very scary for the aristocracy to have the peasant revolts happening on their 
own soil (as opposed to across an ocean). 
For most ofthe eighteenth century, capitalism had already taken root in Europe. 
Because the American colonies were a part of the British mercantile system, they were not 
yet experiencing capitalism and its effects, as were the countries in Europe. Mercantilism 
functioned through the aristocracy, who owned the businesses operating around the world. 
In the middle of the eighteenth century, Europe and colonial America were still dominated by 
the traditional land owning classes.3 These classes controlled the politics, which, of course, 
were designed to keep them in power. With the spread of the industrial revolution (coupled 
with capitalism), some of the ruling class lost their fortunes (as well as their hold on power). 
The ensuing transfer and redistribution of wealth allowed the bourgeoisie to gain some 
economic power. There was a recognizable opening of opportunity that some recognized and 
used. Some agricultural reforms (that resulted in increased food production) freed some 
workers for other employment. With the development of a market economy, and the 
expansion of those who could take advantage of it, a middle class grew. This middle class 
(unlike the aristocracy) had an interest in investing its new capital in new industries. 
With the growth of bourgeoisie power, came the formation of the Bank of England in 
the seventeenth century. This powerful group of financiers was willing to underwrite the 
3 Bill Risebero, Modem Architecture and Design (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983). 
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debts of the government in return for the exclusive right to print bank notes. With each 
uccessive war or crisis that increased the national debt, the strength of the Bank of England 
thus increased. (The bank depended, of course, on the ability of those in debt to service the 
debt.) 
The Age of Enlightenment developed along with these power shifts. The philosophes 
(generally members of the bourgeoisie) believed, and outwardly expressed, that all men were 
alike, even though some of them secretly harbored personal biases. They looked for a moral 
code of ethics by which the people of the world could live in harmony.4 This pursuit is 
similar in nature to that done by Plato 2100 years previously, when he wrote his RepUblic. In 
the case of the philosophes, their quest for knowledge took a different path from that of Plato 
because they rejected Plato's abstraction of ideas and his metaphysical natural laws of how 
the earth was created to function. 
Metaphysics is the belief that all of creation has an interconnectedness governed by 
natural laws. To make this interconnectedness function properly (something like a well-oiled 
machine), it is necessary to pursue the discovery of, and the knowledge of, these underlying 
natural laws. When Plato wrote about this, he called it pursuing the Good.5 This 
metaphysical idea surfaced again during the Renaissance (fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth 
centuries), where the educated elite (encouraged by the Church) developed it as if the Good 
was God (or derived from God). 
When the idea surfaced again in the Enlightenment, the philosophes changed some 
things. They redefined natural laws in terms of an ideal that they determined by examining 
4 Schlereth, Enlightenment Thought. 
S The writers of the New Testament of the Bible were platonists who wrote about this platonic concept 
of the Good as God. 
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the various cultural elements that could be observed around the world. These observed man-
made customs became, for them, II natural law. 116 This differed from Plato's concept of a 
natural law based on how creation was designed to function by virtue of the fact that Plato 
was talking about an abstract (unseen) higher order above mankind, and the philosophes were 
looking at man-made observed customs.7 
The philosophes tended not to like the abstract reasoning embraced by Plato, 
preferring a sense-certainty approach based on observed experimentation that was easier to 
verify. Many subscribed, therefore, to a scientific method developed by Isaac Newton that 
was based on experimentation and observation, rather than abstract hypothesis. It was their 
belief that this method could establish a logical and universal analysis in the study oflaw, 
ethics, psychology, politics, history, and aesthetics. In this manner they hoped to analyze 
human society and propose a method of operating, something Plato had done 2100 years 
earlier when he made such a search and wrote his Republic. To do this, they made some 
assumptions about the nature of man and his universe, based on their concept of the ideal, 
which was themselves. 8 
Through their rejection of religion in favor of philosophy, the philosophes became 
relativists who took what they believed to be best from other cultures and tried to create an 
ideal for society (in the belief that there was a homogeneity of man). In rejecting religion as 
the basis for a morality common to all mankind, however, they shifted responsibility from the 
6 Schlereth. Enlightenment Thought, 34. 
7 Plato had an ongoing disagreement with Aristotle over being able to know something, and understand 
it. using abstract thought skills versus a more sense-certain type of approach based on what could be known 
through observation. (plato's concept of the Good was a higher level abstract thought that could not be seen.) 
Several chapters in his Republic discuss this, but in chaJXer xxiv. he discusses cognitive skills, and how to move 
to higher levels of thought. 
8 Schlereth. Enlightenment Thought. 
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hierarchy of the Church (which they did not like nor trust because of its poor behavioral 
history) to the conscience of the secular individual. This made man the highest authority. It 
also required a unity and a uniformity to mankind that, in reality, did not exist. 
This eclectic approach to philosophical systems allowed them to be unconcerned 
about logical inconsistency with the natural laws of the earth that Plato had recognized. They 
measured mankind by their own criteria, and erected their moral theories on this concept of 
human unity. While personal conduct had to be justified in terms of social good, the 
philosophes made themselves the authorities on this by believing, and promoting, themselves 
as the intellectual elite. For them, mankind's morality rested ultimately on various moral 
senses, or mental tastes (a sense-certainty rather than an absolute natural law of creation). 
What was most useful for society would be most useful for men in all countries because there 
was a tendency to view human nature as being essentially the same at all times and among all 
nations. 9 
Because the philosophes were an eclectic group of intellectuals, at least one member 
of this group (which had generally rejected the basic premise of Plato) was a platonist --
Gottfreid Leibnitz (the developer of calculus). Leibnitz believed that all ethics, hence all 
human society, were expressed in a metaphysical1y based natural law, something the general 
Enlightenment Movement rejected. Leibnitz's approach meant that the laws of nature and the 
natural law of mankind merge; they are premised on eternal norms that are part of creation; 
this pre-established harmony results from the reason that permeates the world; this reason 
comes from God. Hence, Leibniz maintained that the law of nature was based upon an 
9 Ibid 
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eternal idea of justice that could be derived both logically and deductively (as Plato included, 
and as the thinkers of the Renaissance concluded). Natural law, thus defined, becomes an 
expression of reason rather than personal will~ wisdom, is the best use of God's goodness. 
Rational souls, in this system, seek perfection (in the Good) in obedience to God's precepts 
(the natural law}. 10 He wrote a rebuttal to philosophe John Locke on these precepts that is 
generally overlooked today, and yet it is key to understanding the difference between many 
of those of the Enlightenment and Plato. I I 
A member of this eclectic group of philosophes was Adam Smith, who submitted 
excerpts of his Wealth of Nations to members of the group for comment prior to publication 
in 1776. Benjamin Franklin and David Hume were two of those selected. The philosophes 
developed a political economy that was international in its outlook. Their basis for this 
economy was free international market relations, predicated on the assumption that each 
individual and each country would be operating on an equal basis because all were 
essentially alike. This penchant of theirs to use themselves (their merchant middle class 
background) as the ideal and rejecting any deviance as just an abnormality, has been cited by 
some historians as a weakness in their writing of history, as well as their other projects. 12 
This same weakness is present in their theory of political economy because it assumes equal 
bargaining power and equal access to resources - something that did not exist then and does 
not exist now. 
10 Gottfried Leibnitz. Human Understanding. ed. George S. Morris, (Chicago: S.C. Griggs and 
Company, 1888), chapter 10. 
11 Ibid 
12 Schlereth.. Enlightenment Thought. 71. 
9 
They advocated laissez-faire economic relations between individuals and states as a 
way to reject mercantilism, something they saw as benefiting the aristocracy. 13 Many of 
them saw the merchant class (from which they came) as the obvious promoters of this new 
economic outlook, possibly because they were then benefiting from the growth of capitalism 
and industrialism at the expense of the aristocracy. The philosophes, therefore, would not 
want to see restrictions placed on the ability of this class to improve its position. They saw 
this improvement as promoted by individualism (something that Plato would see as working 
contrary to the societal contract of responsibility to others). 
Because their political thought began with men as equal individuals, not as citizens of 
states, they looked at governments as "necessary evil" man-made arrangements. For this 
reason, they wanted to do away with nation-states and make all people citizens of the world 
functioning in a free market system; everyone on an equal basis. They assumed that all men 
had the same interests and obligations, participated in the same human experiences, and 
shared the same truths, values, and rights if they were equally liberated, enlightened and 
free. 14 They, therefore, saw the world as a potential federal republic, based on the 
homogeneity of men (which does not exist in reality). These assumptions form the basis of 
Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. 
The reason for including Leibnitz in this discussion of the philosophes, and their 
influence on thought at the time of the American Revolution, and Adam Smith, is to show 
that some people recognized the flaws in the thinking then taking center stage. While there is 
no proof that any of the founders of the American Republic read Leibniz or were influenced 
\3 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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by him, Plato does show up as an influence. When examining the political writings in 
America from 1760 to 180515 it becomes obvious that there was an intellectual thought that 
did not completely embrace that of the Enlightenment. There were also the 
recommendations of Alexander Hamilton, as the first Secretary of the Treasury for the new 
Republic taking its place in the world capitalist market, that were at odds with Enlightenment 
thought. 16 
The difference in ideologies formed the basis for the political battle in this country 
over control of policy. This can be seen in the struggle to write the Articles of 
Confederation. 17 It can be seen in the writings of the debates at the Constitutional 
Convention. 18 It can be seen in the fight over ratification of the Constitution. 19 It can be seen 
in the decisions of Congress as they decided the course of the new Republic. 2o One of the 
participants in this controversy over economic policy was economist Matthew Carey, writing 
in 1819: 
As a preliminary step, we propose to establish the utter fallacy of some maxims, 
supported by the authority of the name of Adam Smith, author of The Wealth of 
Nations, but pregnant with certain ruin to any nation by which they may be carried 
into operation .... And in the present instance, the most cogent and conclusive facts 
bear testimony against the political economist, great as his reputation?1 
Carey then went on to cite ideas put forth by Adam Smith, and discuss examples of 
each that had not worked the way Smith had said they would. Carey's son, Henry C. Carey, 
15 Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz. American Political Writing during the Founding Era 
1760-1805 (Indianapolis: Liberty Press. 1983). 
16 Hamilton. Selected Writings. 
)7 Harry M. Ward. The American Revolution (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) 54. 
18 Richard D. Brown. Major Problems in the Era of the American Revolution 1760-1791 (Lexington: 
D.C. Heath and Company, 1992), chapter 12. 
19 Ibid, chapter 13. 
20 Members from southern states (that relied on imports to meet their needs) generally favored free 
trade policies while those from the northern states (with developing manufacturers) generally favored tariffs. 
:1 Matthew Carey, Addresses (philadelphia: M. Carey and Son, 1819), 11. 
11 
wrote several books on this same topic.22 Former President William McKinley wrote on this 
topic.23 The writings that are studied today are those of Adam Smith and others of his 
philosophy. This has resulted in the tendency to view American history as the development 
of free trade capitalism, rather than as a struggle between ideologies that influenced who 
were the haves and who were the have nots. 
In studying the various farm problems throughout the history of this country, the farm 
crisis of the 1980s was another chapter in the ongoing history of agricultural unrest, going 
back to the colonial period. As sociologist Carl Taylor wrote: 
The American Farmers' Movement has therefore continued and still continues. It is 
not so much a social structure as it is a body of ideologies and sentiments about a 
continuing set of issues. These were the issues of an evolving social order, society, or 
economy. The movement has been, and is most precisely observed in, the dramatic 
episodes marking its course, because they clearly reveal the issues about which it 
revolves and the ideologies and sentiments which constitute its norms. These 
ideologies and sentiments did not arise anew with each farmer upheaval~ they have 
been in existence in all of the periods between episodes and are still in existence.24 
Whether scholars discuss Shays Rebellion, the Whiskey Rebellion, the tobacco 
farmers' rebellion, the Populist Movement, the Nonpartisan League, the farmer and farm 
worker movement, or the farm problems of the last sixty years, the common thread running 
through each of these various crises was individual and group grievances. Their expectations 
of what should be happening were not being met. Those expectations were based on 
~:! Matthew Carey, Essay on the Rate of Wages (philadelphia: 1. S. Skinner, 1835), The Past. the 
Present & the Future (philadelphia: 1. s. Skinner, 1848), Principles of Political Economy 3 vols. (philadelphia: 
1. S. Skinner, 1837-1840), The Harmony of Interests (philadelphia: J. S. Skinner, 1851), Principles of Social 
Science 3 vols. (philadelphia: 1. S. Skinner, 1858-1859), The Slave Trade Domestic & Foreign (Philadelphia: J. 
S. Skinner. 1853), The Unity of Law (philadelphia: J. S. Skinner, 1872). Reprinted New York: Augustus M. 
Kelley, 1967. 
23 William McKinley, The TarifJin the Days of Henry Clay and Since: An Exhaustive Review of our 
TarijJLelf!slationjrom 1812 to 1896 (New York: Henry Clay Publishing Co., 1896) . 
.. 4 Carl C. Taylor. The Farmers'Movement 1620-1920 (New York: American Book Company, 1953), 
500. 
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something. What was it? Why did they have these expectations? They looked at their 
economic situation and believed it should be different. The farm crisis of the 1980s was no 
d'fli . h' 25 1 erent m t IS respect. 
But from another respect, the farm crisis of the 1980s was different because it was 
more than the problems involved with establishing a monetary and banking system that 
would accommodate the farming sector, as had frequently been part of previous farm crises 
up through the 1930s. The last great farm crisis of the 1930s had seen the expansion of the 
Farm Credit System from its original land bank inception of 1916 to the Production Credit 
Association for short term lending and the Bank for Cooperatives to finance farmer 
cooperatives. By 1968, the last of the government capital that had established that system 
had been retired, removing the government from some control over the "purse strings." If the 
farmers finally had a lender that could handle their financial needs and erratic income, and 
the major monetary and banking problems had been worked out, what was it that was 
different about the farm crisis of the 1980s? The answer goes back to the beginning of the 
country, as do aspects of the other major farmer protests. 
The American Revolution has been called the shot heard around the world. This was 
the opening up of resources to a multitude of people, former subjects of the British royal 
crown and aristocracy, at a time when capitalism and the industrial revolution were greatly 
25 David Satzmary, Shays'Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian Insurrection (Amherst: University of 
MassachUsetts. 1980); Thomas Slaughter. The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American 
Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press. 1986): Christopher Waldrep, Night Riders: Defending 
Community in the Black Patch 1890-1915 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993); Lawrence Goodwyn. The 
Populist Movement: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1978): Robert L. Morlan. Political Prairie Fire: The Nonpartisan League. 1915-1922 (St. Paul: Minnesota 
Historical Society, 1985); Patrick H. Mooney and Theo 1. Majka. Farmers' and Farmworkers' Movements: 
Social Protest in American Agriculture (New York: Twayne, 1995). 
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expanding opportunities for the middle class in Europe. The immediate questions became: 
who would be in control of the government, and who would be favored with the policies? 
The Constitutional Convention, and the various state conventions, began addressing 
who should be in control of the government.26 This debate immediately developed into an 
ideological battle between the Federalists and the Antifederalists. Policy struggles went on 
from there. 
One of the first questions for the new American government, while still operating 
under the Articles of Confederation, was what should be done with the large areas of land 
claimed by six of the states. In an agreement forced by the seven states that did not hold 
large land claims, the six states ceded their western lands to the federal government. This 
land became public domain. The federal government, after surveying and platting this land, 
opened it up to settlement. 
Did the opening of public domain to settlement, coupled with both the ideas of the 
Revolution concerning freedom and the change from mercantilism to capitalism, provide 
opportunities advantageous to farmers? Were they like the serfs freed from the manors in 
England with the advent of capitalism and pushed into a monetized system to fend for 
themselves; were they pushed into the emerging industrial system; or, were they like the 
southern slaves, freed from bondage with unclaimed resources available but with no access to 
the means with which to take advantage of the opportunity? What land-use planning did the 
new country, as a whole, do? 
The federal survey system demonstrated a recognition of, and an attempt to, plan. 
~6 Ward American Revolution. chapter 18. 
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However, speculators took advantage of the situation to drive up prices for their own 
profit potential, thus interfering with the ability of farmers to access resources for farming 
and to expect a market price for debt servicing while providing a means to meet their basic 
needs. This was additionally complicated by the sometimes nonexistent credit terms, and 
sometimes severe credit terms (such as payment in specie or total balance due in a short 
period of time). When the government closed the remaining public domain to settlement, 
with the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, after just over 140 years, the resulting closed system 
created the potential for additional pressure on land prices as the population increased. While 
the public domain was being settled, the politicians and the bureaucrats struggled to organize 
and stabilize the banking and monetary systems. All the while, there was a continuing policy 
fight over which approach to use with capitalism: free market or protection.27 
Iowa was a part of the Louisiana Territory purchased from France in 1803. Squatters 
started settling the land before it was surveyed and opened for settlement. Believing they had 
a natural right to develop undeveloped land, they formed Claim Associations to protect their 
claims until the land could be platted by the government and opened to settlement. Claim 
Associations were strong social compacts, organized in Iowa by township, that announced 
publicly who was laying claim to which land. Members of these associations threatened to 
physically dissuade anyone bidding against the land they had developed when it came up for 
public auction. Some farmers could manage the credit terms and some could not. Money 
was scarce, lenders were scarcer. Those coming to settle the public domain had usually 
::7 McKinley, Tariffs 1812-1896. 
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liquidated their assets to make the trip and to buy land?8 The Panic of 1837 was hard on 
those with heavy debt loads. Iowa settlers were familiar with the banking problems other 
parts of the country had experienced. When they held a constitutional convention to prepare 
for statehood, the delegates became mired down in debate over the chartering of banks. A 
committee finally worked out an agreement to prohibit corporate banking. This allowed the 
territory oflowa to complete work on its proposed constitution and become a state in 1846.29 
By the time of the Greenback Movement, Iowa farmers were heavily indebted for the 
purchase ofland and improvements. There had been large losses during the Panic of 1857 
and again during the 1870s. The partial crop failure of 1894 was followed by abnormally 
low prices in 1896. Without enough income to service the debt, lenders foreclosed. 30 
President Theodore Roosevelt established the Country Life Commission in 1908 to 
study the rural problems and make recommendations. One of the recommendations that 
resulted from the Commission was the congressional creation of the Land Banks in 1916.31 
As the new system of Land Banks was getting organized nationally into territories to provide 
credit to qualified farmers, the United States entered World War I. Commodity prices were 
high during the war, and stayed high until 1922 when the government stopped loaning money 
to Europe to purchase food. Farmers began getting behind in their loan payments and 
foreclosures increased.32 
In 1923, the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks were formed for short term lending, 
28 Howard H. Preston. History of Banking in Iowa (Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa. 1992). 
~~ . 
30 Ibid. 
31 W. Gifford Haag, The Farm Credit System A History of Financial Self-Help (Danville: Interstate 
Printers & Publishers. Inc .. 1976),211. 
32 Ibid 
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as well as the Funding Corporation to handle the sale of securities for the newly forming 
Farm Credit System. After the stock market crashed in 1929, prices declined even more. By 
1933, the federal government took further action to help the farm sector. The system of Land 
Banks received an infusion of$125 million (nationally) to purchase farm loans from other 
lenders. Their associated Production Credit Associations were created as the distribution 
system of the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks to finance short term operating expenses, 
thus completing the basic form of the new national farm lender: the Farm Credit System. 
Also in 1933, Congress passeci the Agricultural Adjustment Act to put a floor under 
commodity prices so farmers could service their debts. This same year the governor ofIowa, 
Daniel W. Turner, issued a moratorium on the foreclosure of farm mortgage loans.33 
Foreclosures still took place, but they slowed, and the expanded Farm Credit System took on 
the lion's share of the farm debt by refinancing loans held by other farm lenders. 
An aspect to the ongoing debate over policy was whether to protect income. 
Alexander Hamilton's, Report on the Subject of Manufactures, had recommended a 
protective tariff in order to prevent Britain (and other countries) from dumping cheap goods 
in America while efforts were underway to establish the manufacturing sector, its currency 
and banking, and its credit for trading.34 In order to pay its debts, the new Republic needed 
income. If another country could dump cheap goods, thus forcing down prices, generating 
income would be a problem. The tariffs would also provide income to the federal 
government for operating. 
33 Preston. Banking in Iowa. 
34 Alexander Hamilton. Report on the Subject of Manufactures submitted to the House of 
Representatives January 15, 1790. 
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As the ideas of Adam Smith and free trade became more widely known, the debate 
over protection played out in an almost schizophrenic approach to tariffs. 35 This policy 
debate, coupled with the ongoing problems of establishing a stable banking system and a 
currency, was reflected in the financial situation of the farm sector. The Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 was a compromise settlement of both policies. It provided a floor 
price for enumerated commodities, but the price would be maintained by the entrance of the 
government into the market to purchase commodities sufficient to maintain the floor price. 
The last time this thinking prevailed in farm policy was 1948. 
By 1953 the policy of supporting farm prices with a minimum price that would 
attempt to cover the average costs of production (as calculated by the USD A) was being 
overridden (or not allowed to operate as it was originally written into law) by successive 
farm bills. These farm bills were written to support a minimum price that was less than the 
USDA-calculated average cost of production, and would sunset after a few years (five was 
the average). This practice of sun setting legislation serves to bring the matter before 
Congress from time to time so it can be examined. Congress can choose to continue the 
legislation as it is written, or it can choose to write something else. In the case of farm 
prices, Congress chose to continue to pass farm bills that would reduce the minimum support 
prices to farmers for enumerated commodities. This practice continued to override what 
came to be called the permanent farm legislation. 36 By the time the 1996 farm bill was being 
written to continue to override the permanent farm legislation, only the strong lobbying 
attempts of some farm groups -- the American Agriculture Movement being one of them --
35 See the works ofHenrv C. Care.,. and William McKinley. 
36 Title 7 United States Code Annotated. 
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prevented a complete repeal of what remained of the permanent farm legislation. The 
permanent farm legislation through 1948 still partially remains in Title 7 United States Code 
Annotated, but it is not in force (to support a minimum price to farmers that would cover the 
average cost of production) as long as there is a farm bill in effect whose language says it 
takes precedence over the permanent legislation. 
The permanent farm legislation was enacted to help farmers service their debts. The 
logical question would be: why override such legislation? The answer has to do with 
ideology. In 1944, the Committee for Economic Development (CED), comprised of 
representatives from the two hundred largest companies, was formed to plan the economy for 
after World War ll. To the present time, they continue to issue policy recommendations. 
They issued recommendations for agriculture policy in 1944, 1955, 1957, and 1962. Each of 
these policy statements made the same recommendation: resources (including people) should 
be removed from farming by lowering the income and forcing people out. Farm,ers learned 
of these reports and lobbied against them. Then, in 1971, the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
issued what has come to be called the Young Executive Report. This report, written by a 
committee of young executives chaired by then Under Secretary Richard Lyng, echoed the 
policy wishes of the CED by saying a few corporate farms could meet the food needs of the 
country.37 This was an indication that the USDA was now in favor of the policy of reducing 
the number of farmers. (Copies of the report were so difficult to obtain that Rep. Melcher 
entered it into the Congressional Record so it would be available to others.) 
Succeeding farm bills continued to lower the support prices for enumerated 
31 Congressional Record-House. June 21. 1972. 
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commodities. By the time of the 1996 farm bill, more of the permanent farm legislation (that 
had supported commodity prices) had been repealed, and the rest of the permanent farm 
legislation had been overridden completely. A summary of the 1996 bill, released by the 
USDA, stated that this represented a reversal of previous farm policy to support prices (even 
though the support had been gradually reduced). Now the prices would be completely 
subject to the market. Iowa farm income (and national farm income), tracked from 1949 to 
1997, reflects the steady downhill trend of the decreasing price supports. 
In addition to the Young Executive Report of 1971, Congress passed a major piece of 
legislation that revised the Farm Credit System for the first time since 1933. One of the 
changes was the manner of appraisal for assets. Market value would now be used, increasing 
the amount to be borrowed during an up market. Another major change was the amount that 
could be borrowed against this new appraisal method: an increase from 65 percent to 85 
percent.38 The 1970s saw other changes for the Farm Credit System. Loss sharing 
agreements were implemented between banks within districts and the districts themselves, 
making each entity in the system liable for losses anywhere in the system. In 1978, 
regulations were approved for Consolidated Systemwide Bonds.39 With this change, each 
entity in the system was now liable for the entire debt of the system nationally, not just its 
own. (Land prices at the time were 78 percent higher than five years earlier.tO 
After 1980, the Farm Credit System began using a tiered interest rate system. Under 
this system, the loans were segregated according to risk (as calculated in a worksheet). 
38 Hoag. Farm Credit System. 
39 45th Annual Report of the Farm Credit Administration and the Cooperative Farm Credit System 
1977-78 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978). 
40 Ibid. 
20 
Those with the lowest perceived risk accrued interest at the lowest rate, while the 
other categories of loans accrued interest at progressively higher rates. 41 All of this was 
happening as the interest rates generally were going up due to efforts by the Federal Reserve 
to wring inflation out of the economy. Farmers could not cash flow this expense, so they 
borrowed against the rising equity of their land (as the value was going Up).42 Congress 
increased the percentage that could be loaned to 97 percent. This time, instead of supporting 
farm income as had been done in the 1930s, Congress took other actions. 
In 1983, Congress passed the International Lending and Supervision Act. This act 
mandated an accounting change for Savings and Loans, banks, and the Farm Credit System 
in the method of accounting for potential loan losses. New regulations for the Savings and 
Loans were written first and implemented. Regulations for the Farm Credit System were 
completed and implemented in the summer of 1985. When these new accounting procedures 
were implemented (and accompanied with new loan analysis forms that doubled the expenses 
in the calculation), the estimates for potential losses began rising quickly. As these estimated 
potential losses were booked, they had the effect of increasing the operating expenses of the 
system. As the operating expenses went up, so did all of the interest rates to the borrowers. 
Because farmers were already having trouble paying their interest expense due to low 
incomes, the increased rates resulted in an increase in farm liquidations. An interesting post 
script to this period of time can be found in a1992 book published by the Farm Credit System 
Assistance Board: Anatomy of an American Agricultural Credit Crisis. It contends: "The 
41 As an employee of the Fann Credit System from 1971 to 1986, I saw associations within the system 
go to this tiered interest rate method at different times. but they all eventually used it. 
42 4lJh Annual Report The Farm Credit Administration and the Cooperative Farm Credit System 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983). 
21 
FCS adopted an aggressive campaign to push delinquent borrowers into foreclosure. ,,43 They 
were delinquent because of their low income and their increasing expenses, neither one of 
which they could control. 
Land values began going down. Because the Farm Credit System was the largest 
holder of farm mortgages, their actions influenced what other farm lenders did. When the 
Land Bank began devaluing their benchmark farms, and foreclosing, the land values began 
coming down. Free trade economists will provide a number of reasons for the value of 
farmland declining, but they also acknowledge that the glut of foreclosed property was a 
depressing factor. 
The 1985 farm bill further lowered support prices for commodities and created the 
Conservation Reserve Program and the Wetlands Preserve Program to take land out of 
agriculture. The 1990 farm bill lowered support prices more. The 1996 farm bill eliminated 
them. 
The Farm Credit System continued to book its rising potential losses and aggressively 
push its borrowers into foreclosure into 1987. By the end of 1987, Congress ordered the 
Farm Credit System to transfer $196 million from the Reserve for Loss account back into 
their income account because the actual losses had not been as great as the new accounting 
methods and the new loan analysis forms had calculated. Those loans that were already in 
the process of being foreclosed were liquidated. As the farm borrowers of the system (who 
were also the stockholders) were being liquidated, no security holders (investors) of the 
system lost any money, and all payments to them were timely. 
43 Kenneth L. Peoples. et aI .• Anatomy of an American Agricultural Credit Crisis (Lanham: Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers. Inc .. 1992). 42. 
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Iowa Farm Trends. compiled by the Iowa State University Agriculture and Home 
Economics Experiment Station Cooperative Extension Service, indicates that from 1964 to 
1987, Iowa lost 32 percent of its farm operators. All age categories showed a decline. 
Personal income data for the state shows that between 1969 and 1997, personal income rose 
548 percent (not adjusting for inflation). Farm income in the same timeframe rose 152 
percent (not adjusting for inflation). Farm income in 1980 was lower than in 1969 by over 
50 percent. Farm income in 1983 was negative. Rural areas thus experienced a loss of 
buying power. When farm income statistics are adjusted for constant dollars in 1989 
equivalents, there is a net income loss of38.03 percent. The reduction in crop income was 
50.78 percent and the loss in livestock income was 37.38 percent. When the farm expenses 
from 1970 to 1989 are adjusted in terms of 1989 dollar equivalents, the largest change was in 
real estate interest (up 124.29 percent}.44 
As farmers experience financial problems, so do other businesses in rural areas. A 
1985 report on the farm crisis, prepared for the Iowa Legislature, anticipated a loss of 25 
percent of the firms in the agribusiness sector.45 For rural areas that do not have a lot of 
businesses because of the sparser population, losing 25 percent of their businesses can be 
devastating. There could be additional losses due to factors not considered in the report. Not 
taken into account in the report was the land taken out of production through the 
Conservation Reserve Program and the Wetlands Preservation Program. Less land in farm 
production would reduce the expense of inputs for farmers, but would also generate less 
business for agribusinesses. 
44"Iowa Farm Trends" (Ames: &1ension Publications and Distribution, 1991). 
45 James Schwab. The Farm Credit Crisis in Iowa (Oakdale: The Legislative Extended Assistance 
Group The University of Iowa, 1985). 
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Rural Iowa counties, more dependent on agriculture than urban counties, showed a 
population loss in all age categories between 1980 and 1990, just as the farm census showed 
reduced numbers in all age categories for the same timeframe. The more urban counties and 
the state as a whole also showed population loss, but two of the categories did not show a 
decline: 25-44 and 65 & older.46 
In 1989, the Iowa Business Council in conjunction with Iowa State University issued 
a report on the future of livestock production in Iowa. It recommended a combination of 
production systems: farm family production, farm family production as part of co-ops or 
contracting operations, and farm families as part of integrated operations. The report 
expressed concern that Iowa was not doing all it could to attract meat processing jobs to the 
state. The report contended that these new jobs could be expected to pay $18,000 (including 
benefits).47 (The poverty line for a family of two was around $16,000.) 
Also released in 1989, by the Iowa Newspaper Association, was the Iowa Future Plan 
to restructure the state economy to enable it to participate in the newly emerging world 
market. The position of this report was that these emerging markets would be developing 
quickly, and Iowa needed to be prepared.48 Congress passed the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) the 
following year. These free trade agreements provide the structure envisioned by the 
philosophes of the Enlightenment for a world wide free trade market. 
46 Department of Commerce, Census Bureau. Census of Population Social and Economic 
Characteristics of Iowa, 1980 and 1990 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990). 
47 Carol Elliot and Kurt James, Job Creation in Animal Agriculture in Iowa (Ames: Iowa State 
University Press, 1989),3. 
48 "Iowa's Future A quality economy for tomorrow: A Six Point Action Plan" (Menlo Park: Center for 
Economic Competitiveness, 1989),3. 
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An examination of the different ideologies that can be found in the farm sector casts 
light on the basis for disagreement in farm policy. Authors Christopher Hamlin and Philip T. 
Shepard examined ideologies in the farm sector in their book Deep Disagreement ill U.S. 
Agriculture: Making Sense of Policy Conflict. They classified the ideologies and the 
motivations into three categories: conventional productivist, ecological progressivist, and 
radical humanist. 49 According to the authors, conventional productivists are an outgrowth of 
the Enlightenment free market system. Ecological progressivists want more expert 
management of all aspects of society because the compromises required of free markets fail 
to assure wise use of resources. Radical humanists are linked to ecological progressivists in 
their critique of the industrial revolution, but humanists are more concerned with the effect 
on people and culture. In other words, both radical humanists and ecological progressivists 
diverge from conventional productivists on the point of free markets. This is the point of 
divergence that has been at work in this country since its founding. 
Hamlin and Shepard saw this divergence of ideology as a fracturing of the societal 
contract to the point that the state would become increasingly unable to govern because a 
consensus could not be reached. They appeared to assume that there would be an effort to 
reach a consensus. If the proponents of one ideology can gain sufficient political power, then 
a consensus would not necessary. There will, however, be unrest as long as there are 
individuals that believe in a different ideology than the one in power. 
These authors pointed out the extent to which people in each of these categories 
differed from the others. These differences can be seen in the various farm movements in 
49 Christopher Hamlin and Philip T. Shepard, Deep Disagreement in Us. Agriculture Making Sense of 
Policy Conflict (Boulder: Westview Press. 1993). 
25 
this country since colonial days. They can be seen at work during the 1980s. And they can 
be seen at work today.50 This makes it very important to understand the basis for each 
(which will be discussed in Chapter Five). 
Both secondary sources as well as primary sources were used in this thesis. The 
primary sources included Farm Credit System documents and records, statistics from the 
Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture, Code of Federal 
Regulations, and writings of Alexander Hamilton, and Gottfried Leibnitz, among other 
historical figures. Secondary sources included historic, economic, and sociological analyses 
of prior farm movements as well as a time line of American history. 
The farm crisis of the 1980s appears to be the culmination of the political battle for 
control over policy, based on differing ideologies. All of the recommendations for 
restructuring agriculture (beginning in 1944 with the first CED report) were carried out, with 
the expected result of reducing the number of farmers because this was seen as being 
efficient under the free trade approach to capitalism. Analyses of the situation by those who 
were educated in free trade economics can be expected to follow the reasons for the 
restructuring in the terms of free trade economics. Their ideological beliefs are such that they 
see this as the only rational course for agriculture. As the 1993 Hamlin and Shepard book 
explains, those who disagree with this belief have become, for all practical purposes, 
disenfranchised. As agriculture finishes its restructuring, the differences in these beliefs need 
to be recognized and dealt with. At the very least, this policy struggle needs to be included in 
school curriculums in order for students of American government and history to understand 
its agricultural economic problem. As Hamlin and Shepard point out in their work, this is not 
50 Ibid 
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a case of accepting the other side once one has been sufficiently "educated" to it~ the 
differences involve very deeply-held ideologies. The situation is very serious. More work 
needs to be done in this area. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HOW DO LOAN FUNDS ENTER THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR 
Were loan funds always necessary 
Land planning used to be simple: there was a group of aristocratic elites who 
controlled the resources (and up through medieval times provided protection for the others), 
and there were the rest who did the work and survived as best they could. The discovery and 
settlement of America marked an opening in the opportunity to acquire resources, such as 
land, because it was outside of the closed system that had existed. The question became one 
of how to accomplish this acquisition. 
In addition to putting the land up for sale, there was a question of cash or credit. 
Even when credit was allowed to acquire land, it was not always available. Farmers 
especially had a problem. The availability of land and the development of a banking system 
to serve the needs of farmers were pertinent to the ability of agriculture to develop beyond 
the self-sufficient yeoman status. 
The American colonists came from a world with a hierarchical social order that 
dominated access to resources (including land and capital). The American colonial charters 
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were grants of land from the Crown that carried with them specified conditions. The 
resulting colonial settlements were founded on roughly three different types of arrangements: 
the township system of New England; the extended feudal system pattern of the middle 
colonies; and the scattered slave holdings of the South, interspersed with manorial estates. l 
The New England system required the settlement oftowns under the direction of the parent 
colony, while the individual in the South was allowed almost total freedom to select land 
with no order to a settlement? 
The New England system was based on the English manorial system but without a 
manorial head. A group, known as "the proprietors," would secure from the colonial 
legislature (under the control of the Crown) a right to establish a community. The 
community continued under the control of the proprietors and their heirs, acting as a whole or 
through a town council. Townships were surveyed in advance of settlement, and were settled 
in accordance with an agreed plan, thus possibly the first land planning in America. The land 
was assigned to settlers, usually by the proprietors, and tracts were customarily reserved for 
the church and for general village purposes. Common lands for pasturage and wood, and in 
some cases for tillage, were retained by the proprietors either in the form of "commons" 
available only to the proprietors, or of "town commons" available to all residents. This 
practice was a carryover from the feudal estate system. No charge was made for the lands, 
but settlers were required to pay taxes for support oflocal institutions. Loan funds for the 
I Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States 1790-1950 (New York: Twentieth Century 
Fund, 1953). 
2 Benjamin Horace Hibbard, A History of the Public Land Policies (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1965). 
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average farmer in this system would not have been necessary. This began to break down in 
the early eighteenth century, largely as a result of growing speculative development. 3 
Unlike Europe, there were vast amounts of unsettled and unclaimed land in America. 
Opportunities existed here that did not exist in Europe because Europe was a closed system, 
in terms of available land. The land system did not officially close in America until the 
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, although much of it was removed from the public domain 
around the turn of the twentieth century when it was put into parks or under the direct 
supervision of the government. 
The middle colonies were grants made to individuals such as the Duke of York. Prior 
to the Duke of York being granted proprietorship of the Dutch colony New Amsterdam (later 
New York), it had been founded as a fur trading settlement by the Dutch West India 
Company. The emphasis in the New York settlement was on trade in furs and other items, 
rather than on colonization and the development of agriculture. To stimulate migration to the 
colony, extensive grants were made to several stockholders. The plan contemplated a 
number of huge estates along the Hudson. The grantee was to have practically the authority 
of a feudal lord. He was given authority to organize the courts and had jurisdiction over the 
property and even the lives of the tenants. Sale of the lands to the operating farmers was not 
contemplated. (Thus the farmers in this system had no need of loan funds to purchase land.) 
Because the form of settlement attempted to establish the medieval institutions of Europe, it 
was hard to convince men to accept feudal vassalage when they could go to a neighboring 
colony for somewhat better terms. When the Duke of York took over (after the Dutch in 
1664), no immediate change in the land law was made. By confirming pre-existing 
3 Benedict, Farm Policies. 
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privileges, a fully developed manorial system was established in the colonies. It was not 
popular with those who were not among the elite. 4 
The Duke of York, in 1680, leased Pennsylvania and Delaware to William Penn for 
10,000 years. Lands were sold to settlers in these areas for what are termed modest prices 
until Penn's heirs raised the prices. Settlers then went west in search of cheaper land. 5 
The colonies from Virginia on south took a different approach to land settlement 
because of the widespread adoption of the slavery system, which expanded the original small 
farming units to large manors. Once established, these manors continued under laws of 
. • 6 pnmogemture. 
Generally, as settlers moved west, they took their form ofland settlement with them. 
One of the first questions the new country would have to resolve (after the Revolution) was 
which pattern of settlement to follow. The method that would be adopted would determine 
land distribution, settlement patterns, and development. 
Public domain originated during the period 1781 to 1803. It included all lands that 
were at any time owned by the United States and subject to sale or other transfer of 
ownership under the laws of the federal government.7 After the Revolutionary War, the new 
Republic had land east of the Mississippi River, south to Florida, and north to the Great 
Lakes. There were disputes between some of the new states over who was in control of this 
land, going back to their colonial charters. The idea of "public domain" originated from the 
insistence of the six states with no western lands that the seven states with these claims 
4lbid 
5lbid 
6lbid 
7 Hibbard Land Policies. 
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surrender them to the new national government. Spearheaded by Maryland, these states 
refused to sign the Articles of Confederation until the demands were met. It was considered 
a practical move, since control over these lands implied an obligation to defend them against 
attack. The public domain would be the common property of the States of the new union at a 
time when they needed something to bind them together. 
Congress soon came under pressure to establish a policy for settling these lands. The 
lands were used as payment to soldiers and officers who had fought in the war. And, settlers 
were pressing westward, freed from the restricted settlement east of the Appalachians that 
had been imposed by Britain. Settlements in these new areas would help serve as buffers 
against attacks by Indians, Britain, and Spain. 8 
Benjamin Hibbard lists seven reasons for the Congress to act quickly in the 
disposition of the public domain9: 
1. Congress had promised land in payment to soldiers and officers who fought in the 
War. 
2. Because the Articles of Confederation conferred no taxing power on Congress, it 
needed a way to secure revenue to both pay the War debt as well as to function. 
3. Settlement would address the question of defense against the Indians. 
4. The western settlements (on the other side of the mountains, were only loosely 
connected to the new Republic. Their allegiance could shift to a foreign power. 
8 Harry M. Ward, The American Revolution (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995),294-297. 
9 Hibbard, Land Policies. 32-34. 
32 
5. A form of government needed to be determined for the new territory. 
6. The property needed to be disposed for the public benefit. 
7. Settlers were illegally pouring into the new land. 
In the Land Ordinance of 1785, the national government decreed these areas to be 
public lands to be sold to raise much-needed money. The sales would also provide the 
potential opportunity for land ownership, something that'was considered important to having 
a voice in the new government. There was already a difference of opinion as to the value of 
land. The settlers pouring into the new public domain not only considered it their right to 
settle that land, but they also believed the land had little value until it was developed. This 
was a different idea than those who wanted to sell the land to raise money. 
The public domain was later enlarged to include the Louisiana Purchase (1803), the 
acquisition of the Floridas (1819), the Oregon Territory (1846), land from Mexico (1848), 
and the Gadsden Purchase (1853). The amount ofland to be settled was vast, and the new 
republic offered new potential not seen before, it was noted that: 
Possibly never in the world's history has a new government, representing so few 
people, had so free a hand in deciding what kind of an agricultural economy it wanted 
to develop on so large an area of rich and reasonably accessible lands. 10 
Congress was to regulate the granting and settling of the lands, so the Ordinance of 
1785 began the process. Part of the process included settling prior private claims. The 
Supreme Court took the position that private property was not affected by the change of 
sovereignty. Property laws had developed over a long period of time. They were also 
incorporated into the political theories of John Locke (a member of the Enlightenment that 
10 Benedict, Farm Policies, 5. 
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had influenced some American intellectuals). Congress, therefore, was not starting from 
scratch as it instituted its policies for the public domain. II The 1785 ordinance, in essence, 
adopted the New England system of platting -- called the federal land survey system -- prior 
to opening the land to settlement. Under this system, surveyors divided the land into 
townships that were each six statute miles square with lines running due north and south and 
east and west. There was progressive numbering of the ranges, and sections numbered one to 
thirty-six. Because of the curvature of the earth (which would make the townships 
trapezoidal in shape), the townships are offset at periodic intervals. 12 In every township, the 
United States reserved sections 8, 11,26, and 29 for future sale. As chairman of the 
committee to devise a plan for the public domain, Thomas Jefferson liked the southern land 
management system of using government land offices for title claims, registration, and 
payment. He proposed that both northern and southern interests would be served if half of 
the townships were to be sold in their entirety (to companies who would then manage the 
sales), while the other halfwere sold in sections of640 acres each. 13 Section 16 in each 
township was set aside for local public schools. Commissioners of the loan offices of the 
states were to sell alternate townships in whole at public auctions. Those between were to be 
sold in sections. The Secretary of War was directed to take one seventh of the townships, by 
lot, to be reserved for veterans of the war. The minimum price was one dollar in specie, or 
its equivalent in loan-office certificates ofliquidated debt of the United States. Full payment 
was due at the time of sale, limiting the number of individuals who could acquire land to 
11 Hibbard. Land Policies. 
12 Rutherford Platt, Land Use and Society: Geography, Law, and Public Policy (Washington D.C.: 
Island Press, 19%). 
\3 John Opie, The Law of the Land: Two Hundred Years of American Farmland Policy (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1987). 
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those who had the means of payment in specie. At $1.00 per acre, 640 acres would be $640; 
a whole township would be $23,040. A yeoman farmer did not have this money. (In 1776, 
Jefferson had suggested that yeoman farmers be given the land free to develop. He lost that 
argument.i4 
An amendment to this 1785 ordinance was passed in 1787 allowing for terms of 
credit where one-third would be paid up-front, and the rest was due in three months. This 
still limited access to those who had income sufficient to make the payment in the time 
required. Farmers generally could not manage the credit terms. IS 
Farmers had been accustomed to a practice of trading what they produced (or labor 
they supplied) in exchange for goods they needed but did not produce themselves. This left 
them with little specie -- and, in fact, little specie was available. I6 Succeeding land acts all 
dealt in some manner with how to make land available to more individuals. Various credit 
arrangements were tried, but to those who saw little cash coming their way, opportunity was 
limited. Little land was sold before 1800. Sales increased until the war of 1812, and then 
tapered off during the war. They reached their peak under the credit system in 1819. The 
credit system was largely a failure, though. It had not produced the revenue expected. It had 
not promoted the interests of the settlers. It had not prevented speculation. It had created a 
large class oflandholders so hopelessly in debt that it took twelve years of various acts to 
clear away the wreckage. 17 In 1820, a system of cash sales began. The minimum purchased 
14 Ibid 
15 Benedict. Farm Policies. 
16 Satzmary, Shays Rebellion. 
17 Hibbard. Land Policies. 
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was reduced to eighty acres. At $1.25 an acre, the price was $100. More people were able to 
pay this. 
Settlement patterns reflect an interaction of physical, cultural, and legal 
characteristics. I8 The land survey system established the grid pattern that would be imposed 
on the land, as well as its availability for purchase and settlement; the culture of the settlers 
would influence the types of settlements; and the physical characteristics of the land would 
determine its suitability for how it could be used. The agricultural patterns of the North 
Central parts of the country, up to the 1990s, reflected the public domain policy. The 
farming unit was some multiple or subdivision of a quarter section. Roads tended to follow 
section lines. The farms developed under this plan were predominantly family farms, with 
the labor performed mainly by the farmer and his family. 
Settlers moving into undeveloped areas need infrastructure. This is true today as new 
subdivisions are developed, and it was true as the public domain was settled. One of the 
controversial measures taken by the government to both promote infrastructure development 
(railroads mostly, but also roads and canals) and settlement was the practice of giving public 
lands to the builders of the infrastructure (such as railroads) to sell for financing. It generally 
worked in the following fashion: 
To accomplish this the companies were given alternate sections ofland, in a 
checkerboard pattern, to a distance of20 miles on each side of the line .... The law 
provided that lands not sold within three years after completion of the railroad should 
be subject to preemption and should be sold to the preemptors by the railroads at 
$1.25 per acre. Under these acts the Union Pacific obtained some 12 million acres of 
the public domain and the Central Pacific about 10 million. Later grants to the 
northern and southern lines were even more extravagant .... The making of new grants 
was terminated in 1871 after intense opposition by settlers and the general public. 19 
18 Platt Land Use. 
I~enedict, Farm Policy, 69. 
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The reasons for reviewing the history of settlement patterns in colonial America and 
the early Republic include: 1) there was a decision to have a policy to provide the 
opportunity for more individuals to acquire land; 2) there was an organized plan on how to 
make the land available for settlement; 3) the opening ofland for settlement emphasized the 
need for a banking and a monetary system for the new Republic. Loan funds would also be 
necessary as the practice of farming progressed from self-sufficient yeoman types of 
operations to more capital-intensive types of operations producing a surplus for the market. 
This situation came about as the new Republic moved out of the strict controls of the British 
mercantile system into the capitalist world market. Credit would be necessary to purchase 
new technologies that increased the output per individual. These increased outputs would be 
used both domestically as well as in the world market for trade. These new technologies 
would increase the amount of land one individual could farm, thus increasing the cost (for 
both the increased amount ofland as well as for the new technologies). 
Was agricultural credit available when and where it was needed 
Before the Revolution, British merchants and bankers controlled the specie available 
in the colonies, as well as the credit. Because the colonies were a part of the British 
mercantile system, they were expected to ship raw materials to Britain for processing, and 
then purchase their supplies within this same system. This caused an understandable drain of 
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specie from the colonies to Britain. Because of this, the colonies wanted to print their own 
currency to use in the settlement of their debts. Britain objected.20 
After the Revolution, each of the states (and sometimes each bank within the states) 
printed their own money with their own security as backing. This caused the money system 
of the new Republic to be chaotic. The Continental Congress also printed money during the 
Revolution to finance the war. This proved rather disastrous when the value fell to almost 
nothing?l Even when money was available (something farmers generally liked), it was 
frequently devalued by inflation. 
When the Constitution was written, it was decided that Congress should take control 
of the money supply. Article I Section 8 declared that "The Congress shall have power. .. to 
coin money, regulate the value thereot: and of foreign coin, ... to provide for the punishment 
of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States .... ,,22 Those pushing for 
this control were the ones in favor of a strong central government. Under the Articles of 
Confederation, the states had exerted their authority to the degree that the central government 
was almost impotent. 23 Not only was the new Republic in debt for the financing of its 
Revolutionary War, it needed credit to take its place in the world markets. Credit implied the 
ability to service debt and to pay bills. Centralizing this authority made sense to those with 
this vision for the country. The Constitution provided the power to act, but what to do with 
this authority became a hot topic of debate. 
20 Ward. American Revolution. 
21 Benedict. Farm Policies. 
22 Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8. 
23 John P. Roche, "The Practical Democracy of the Framers," included in Major Problems in American 
Constitutional History Volume i: The Colonial Era Through Reconstruction. edited by Kennit L. Hall 
(Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1992). 
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In 1791 the first bank of the United States was chartered for twenty years with capital 
of $10 million. Alexander Hamilton (and those who agreed with him, called Federalists) saw 
this as an opportunity to wed the interests of investors and businessmen with those of the new 
government, as well as provide for some regulation of the banking system itself. While 
businessmen saw the need for strong credit, planters and frontiersmen did not because of the 
history of privilege they had experienced. They became suspicious of Hamilton and the 
Federalists. The following explains the reasoning: 
In the eyes of the planter and farmer [who used other mediums of exchange], banks 
were moneyed monopolies -- aristocratic institutions which encouraged usury, took 
coin out of circulation, set up false credits and unsettled trade. It was the duty of 
government to destroy monopolies, not to create them.24 
They felt this way because of the history of banking. When nations had formerly 
been engaged in chiefly agricultural pursuits, banking was not the type of power business it is 
today. As commercial dealings expanded, it became necessary for a more orderly means of 
handling monetary transactions. While, in the time of De most henes, bankers were generally 
oflow origin (such as freedmen or aliens), the interest income and other charges could allow 
them to rise to wealth and power. As the practice ofloaning expanded, those private 
individuals with the financial means of engaging in banking activities stepped into the void. 
It is interesting to note that an early instance of forced loans for the purpose of waging a war 
was the City of Venice in 1171. The citizens were forced to loan money at a low rate of 
interest and received a stock certificate in exchange, which they could sell or transfer to 
another. A commission was appointed to manage the payment of interest and the transfers of 
stock. As countries needed money, and as trade increased, the practice of banking by private 
24 Benedict, Farm Policies. 24. 
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individuals increased. Table 1 shows the starting dates of some major banks?5 At the time 
of the founding of the Bank of England, the government was financially stressed. There 
were defects and abuses of the tax laws, and the government was not stable. A loan was 
made to the government for public service. The subscribers received 8 percent interest 
Table 1: Starting Dates of Some Early Banks 
Venice ................................... 117 
Geneva. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1345 
Barcelona ............................... 1401 
Genoa ................................... 1407 
Amsterdam ............................. 1607 
Hamburg ............................... 1619 
Rotterdam .............................. 1635 
Stockholm .............................. 1688 
Bank of England ..................... 1694 
Scotland ................................ 1695 
Copenhagen ..................... ' ..... 1736 
Berlin ................................... 1765 
United States .......................... 1780 
St. Petersburg ......................... 1780 
Ireland ................................. 1 783 
France .................................. 1800 
Source: History of the Bank of England by Joseph Burne Francis, 1888. 
as well as a fee for management. The Act of Parliament that established the bank called it: 
"An Act for granting to their Majesties, several duties upon tonnage of ships and vessels, and 
upon beer, ale and other liquors, for securing certain recompenses and advantages in the said 
Act mentioned, to such persons as shall voluntarily advance the sum of £1,500,000 towards 
25 Joseph Hume Francis, History of the Bank of England (Chicago: Euclid Publishing Company, 1888). 
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carrying on the war with France. ,,26 As the government increased its debt, the Bank of 
England prospered. 
These early banks were run by and for private families and/or groups of such. 
Knowing this, the sentiments of farmers and planters can be understood. They did not see 
banking, even a bank under the control of the federal government, as something that was 
beneficial to them. 
The First National Bank of the United States did succeed in bringing order to the new 
Republic's banking activities and established the nation's credit in the world of trade. 
Southerners, however, continued to be antagonistic toward the bank. No action was taken on 
renewing its charter when the House was first presented with it in 1808 because of the 
antagonism of the representatives from the southern states. After enactment of the Embargo 
and Nonintercourse Acts in 1807, a recession eventually set in. The bank contracted its loans 
-- as banks do today in such circumstances -- resulting in distress that led to charges of 
political pressure by the bank to force renewal of its charter. The charter, therefore, was not 
renewed. There were two consequences to this: (1) The bank had been a restraining 
influence ori excessive expansion of note issues, which then expanded; (2) there was also, 
then, no means for transferring either public or private funds from one part of the country to 
another.27 
Without a unified banking and currency system, there was a spectacular rise in prices, 
followed by an equally spectacular collapse. Congress was reluctant to vote adequate taxes 
to finance the war (of 1812), and its source of loans -- the Bank of the United States -- no 
26 Ibid, 55. 
27 Ralph C.H. Catterall, The Second Bank of the United States (Chicago: Chicago Press, 1903), 184-85. 
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conditions were so bad by 1816, the Republican administration took the lead in bringing 
about a second National Bank -- briefly.28 
When Andrew Jackson was elected President in 1828, he so hated the national bank, 
because of his rural roots, that he took the federal money out of it and put it in a few of his 
favorite private banks. In a letter to Bank president Nicholas Biddle, he stated that his 
opposition was to banks in general because he considered them unconstitutional and 
impolitic. (The role oflending in the build up of the South Sea Island speculative Bubble 
was one of his concerns. Another concern was his beliefthat paper money had no part in a 
monetary systemf9 The private banks that received the United States funds then expanded 
their note issues (paper currency), which had been under forced contraction due to the 
required redemption in specie. Under Biddle's leadership, the specie-paying Bank of the 
United States tended to restrain note issues of state banks to amounts that could be supported 
by specie. This arrangement tended to draw specie away from the frontier areas and be a 
deflationary influence. Because state banks could not maintain a large volume of notes in 
circulation under this arrangement, settlement and business opportunities were aggravated. 30 
An additional problem of banking on the frontier was that land could not be used for 
collateral until it had been surveyed because there was no clear title. Lynne Pierson Doti and 
Larry Schweikart note in their Banking in the American West: From the Gold Rush to 
Deregulation that some settlers turned to speculation (on a small scale) as a means of income 
-- even though it was somewhat like playing the lottery. They also noted that even with land 
as collateral, lending rates could be as high as four or five percent a month~ without land, 
28 Ibid 
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid 
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they could go higher.31 Debtors, understandably, thought these rates of interest were high. 
Farmers wanted more money. 
Once Jackson took the federal funds out of the Bank of the United States and 
deposited them in private banks, the volume of issued notes increased. The resulting increase 
fueled speculation. A crop failure in 1835 not only hindered the ability of borrowers to 
service their debts, but it worked against the United States in its balance of trade. 
Agricultural products had been used on the world market to offset the items imported. When 
the volume of the agricultural products was reduced by the crop failure, there was a draw 
down of specie. The Specie Circular of 1836 required the use of specie as payment for 
public lands, something that was in short supply in the West. The following happened: 
There was little specie in the western areas, and much of the land purchase was made 
either with bank credit or bank notes, which amounted to the same thing. Naturally 
these notes, varying widely in value and now unusable in payment for government 
lands, quickly fell into disrepute. At about the same time various domestic and 
foreign business houses failed. The English demand for American cotton fell off. By 
the end of May 1837, every bank in the country had suspended specie payment. Bank 
note circulation shrank from $149 million in 1837 to $58 million in 1843 (sixty-one 
percent). This was a larger decrease proportionately than even the disastrous 
shrinkage in bank credit which occurred between 1930 and 1935 (fifty percent).32 
The Panic of 1837 followed. 
The Sherman Act of 1863 finally created a system of national banks. These banks 
served the dual purpose of creating a uniform currency, as well as providing an outlet for 
government bonds at low rates of interest. These banks could buy government bonds, 
deposit them with the Treasurer of the United States, and receive bank notes worth 90 
percent of the current market value of the bonds. The banks could have the use of this 90-
31 Lynne Pierson Doti and Larry Schweikart, Banking in the American West: From the Gold Rush to 
Deregulation (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991),20. 
32 Benedict, Farm Policies, 27. 
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percent-invested money as well as receive interest on the bonds deposited with the Treasury. 
If currency was scarce, banks were not likely to have much money to invest?3 There was a 
reluctance to expand note issues to address the seasonal needs of farmers, possibly because 
farmers were seen as a high risk due to the nature of farming, thus putting the bank in a 
riskier position in terms of redeeming its notes. This defect was not addressed until the 
Federal Reserve Act of 1914 and the creation of the land Banks in 1916. During the 
intervening years, the currency supplies were so rigid they caused difficulties for farmers and 
the farm businessmen as well. 
In 1866, a funding act was passed that gave the Treasury authority to convert 
temporary and short-term interest-bearing securities into long-term bonds. A move such as 
this extends the payments by making them smaller.34 
The banking panic of 1907 once again emphasized the need for further banking 
reform. A national Monetary Commission was set up in 1908 to study the system. The 
report and recommendations were submitted in 1912. The plan proposed was for a single 
central bank similar in nature to the First and Second Banks of the United States. President 
Wilson had already expressed opposition to having the money system controlled by a small 
group of capitalists. As governor of New Jersey, he had contended that a combination of 
banks in New York was exercising control similar to a central bank, but without being 
subject to public responsibility. The compromised solution, between complete government 
control and complete private control, was passed in 1913, and went into effect in 1914?S 
33 Ibid 
34 Ibid 
35 Ibid 
44 
The problem for farmers had been, and still appeared to be, one of insufficient 
amounts of credit when it was needed, as well as payment terms that could be serviced by 
them with uncertain income and little cash. In other words, the uncertainty of cash flow of 
farming operations seemed to require a special type of lender (and/or credit). The Country 
Life Commission of 1908, established the same year as the Monetary Commission, studied 
the credit problems of farmers and recommended special lenders to meet these needs. 
In 1916 Congress passed the first of several acts creating a lending system for 
farmers. The Farm Loan Act of 1916 provided for both land banks (to be ultimately owned 
by farmers) and for joint stock land banks (to be ultimately owned by private investors). As 
these entities organized and started to make loans, the farm depression of the 1920s began. 
By 1929, only 17,000 farmers borrowed $64 million from them, down from a 1922 high of 
74,000 farmers borrowing $234 million. With each year, an increasing number of farmers 
became further behind in their loans. The number of delinquent loans and abandoned farms 
increased each year. So did the number of foreclosures. After the stock market crash of 
1929, rural banks began closing because rural credit had dried up. By 1932, only 7,000 
farmers borrowed $28 million from the Land Banks. More wanted to borrow, but were 
unable to do so. The situation became so critical that Congress recapitalized the Land Banks 
to extend loans by appropriating $125 million to invest in capital stock.36 With these funds, 
the Land Banks could extend additional loans to financially strapped farmers, as well as 
renew and rewrite loans. 
In May 1933, Congress passed the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act. This provided 
36 W. Gifford Hoag, The Farm Credit System (Danville: Interstate Printers & Publishers, Inc, 1976). 
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more loan funds to refinance farm debt, it created the Production Credit Associations to 
finance short-term and intermediate-term debt, and it created the Farmer's Home 
Administration (FmHA -- the federal lender oflast resort). Almost 89 percent of the direct 
loan funds were used to refinance existing debt: 23 percent went to commercial banks, 14 
percent went to insurance companies, 48 percent to other creditors?7 
This action also benefited other segments of society by freeing their assets. 
Meanwhile, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 began providing a floor for 
commodity prices, thus providing some income support in order to service the loans. 
Loan funds become available when securities are issued, through a variety of means. 
These securities require collateral to lessen the risk for the investors who purchase them. 
Ultimately, this collateral for farm loans would be the farm mortgages, covered by farm 
assets. The terms of the loans to the farmerlborrowers involve the cost of the securities (their 
rate of return to the investors -- as demanded by the investors to cover their perceived risk in 
purchasing the securities), plus the operating costs of each level handling the funds between 
the investor and the farmerlborrower. The timing of the payments attempts to match both the 
cash flow of the borrower and the length of time for which the securities were issued. 38 The 
lender must be able to make timely payments of principle and interest to the investor in order 
to keep investors buying those securities. The income for the Farm Credit System was 
mostly the interest on the farm loans. 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (and its subsequent amendments) attempted 
to provide a floor for farm income that required the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
37 Ibid. 236. 
38 As an employee in the Central Iowa Production Credit Association from 1971 to 1986, it was my job 
in [manciaI operations to know this and to calculate the interest rate to the borrowers. 
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to regularly calculate the costs of production (including the average cost ofborrowing).39 
This is the section of Title 7 United States Code Annotated that has been consistently over-
ridden since 1953 and partially repealed with the passage of the 1996 Freedom to Farm Act. 
What was the settlement of Iowa like 
The French first explored Iowa in the summer of 1673. Louis Joliet and Father 
Jacques Marquette (and their five crewmen) are believed to be the first whitemen in the area. 
It was ceded to Spain in 1763, and returned to France in 1800. As a part of the Louisiana 
Purchase in 1803, it was subject to the Federal Land Survey method of platting and 
settlement. Prior to the official settlement in June 1833, there were squatters. These 
squatters exercised land claims under the rule of "squatter sovereignty." A squatters club was 
organized to recognize land claims up to 480 acres per individual, and to settle disputes. 
These claims were respected and generally held in peace until the land could be platted and 
sold by the government. Rather than being illegal, these claims clubs were "extra-legal" --
meaning that the law had not yet come to those areas when the first settlers moved in. Claim 
associations, therefore, brought a form of government to a newly-settled area by electing 
delegates, adopting a constitution, and electing officers. 4O Under Congressional acts in 1800 
and 1804, pioneers could buy as little as 160 acres at $2 an acre by paying down one-fourth 
of the purchase price within forty days after the sale. This credit system was abandoned in 
1820, but at that time the land price was lowered to $1.25 per acre and the size of the parcel 
39 Title 7 United States Code Annotated Section 1301 (B). 
40 Hibbard, Land Policy. 
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was reduced to eighty acres. This was in effect at the time Iowa was opened to settlement.41 
The members of the claim associations would work together when the land came up for 
public auction. A bidder and an assistant bidder were designated. They had plats of the two 
townships to be sold at auction with each claimant's name written on the subdivision. These 
two individuals would take their place beside the auctioneer conducting the auction. As a 
tract was approached with a name on it, the auctioneer would strike his hammer and give the 
name to the clerk. The remaining people in the association would stand by in a semicircle 
ready to take action if another bidder tried to get some already-claimed land. 42 Squatters 
honestly believed the public lands were a national commons available for settlement and 
profitable development by the first taker. They believed they should have a prior right of 
ownership and praise for their hard efforts of development. They believed all "right-
thinking" Americans should think this way.43 This attitude was at odds with people such as 
George Washington and James Madison. They felt squatters interfered with an orderly 
process. 
By 1835 there were over ten thousand inhabitants in the Iowa country. By the time it 
was organized as a Territory in 1838, there were 22,859 inhabitants.44 Sixty Thousand 
inhabitants were required for a territory to apply for statehood. The 1850 census (after Iowa 
became a state in 1846) showed a population of 192,214. 
American banking was in a very chaotic state at this time. With the failure to renew 
the charter of the Second Bank of the United States, banking regulation was left to the 
41 Preston, History of Banking in Iowa. 
42 Hibbard. Land Policy, 205-6. 
43 Opie, Law of the Land. 
44 Preston, Iowa Banking. 
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control of each state. The number of state banks in the country had increased from 330 in 
1830 to 788 at the close of 1836. At the time Iowa was being settled, there was an 
insufficient supply of specie for an adequate money supply. The circulating medium 
consisted mainly of the notes issued by chartered banks. Their note issue had more than 
tripled. Erling A. Erickson, in his Banking in Frontier Iowa 1836-1865, cited the statistic 
that in 1837 (a year after the creation oflowa as a territory), the total currency in circulation 
in the United States was $217 million -- $149 million in state bank notes.45 With lax 
regulation, the quality of the issue deteriorated, particularly in the West and South. Because 
of the lax regulation, various methods could be employed by "creative" bankers to expand the 
note issues beyond the legal limit. Erickson cites one of the more common methods as being 
the organization of a bank largely with nonexistent capital. This could be accomplished by 
subscribers making a down payment for bank stock, then pledging their partially-purchased 
stock back to the bank for a loan with which to pay for the remainder of the stock. The books 
of the bank would show that the capital shares were paid in full, even though only a small 
amount had actually been paid to the bank.46 With a bank's profit based largely on the extent 
of its circulation, efforts needed to avoid redemption of this overexpanded circulation. The 
Panic of 1837 was followed by a suspension of specie payments and heavy liquidation.47 
Early banking in Iowa, then, was strongly influenced by the economic and political 
activities of the time. The disorders generally prevalent were magnified in the areas being 
settled, to the point of being severe. The following quote describes the situation faced by a 
9. 
45 Erling A Erickson, Banking in Frontier Iowa 1836-1865 (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1971), 
46 Ibid, 10. 
47 Preston, Iowa Banking. 
49 
pioneer to Iowa at this time: 
Money was scarce and its quality was very poor. The Iowa pioneer brought little 
money with him to the new home. His former property had frequently been 
converted into cash to pay for land. Often, therefore, he was land poor. Heavily in 
debt as he frequently was, he found the period offalling prices which resulted from 
the heavy liquidation after the panic of 1837 very detrimental to his interest.48 
Because of this backdrop of chaotic and severe financial conditions, the Iowa 
pioneers had a strong interest in banking and currency. During the Territorial period from 
1838 to 1846, only one chartered bank served the settlers ofIowa: the Miner's Bank of 
Dubuque 1837-1845. Congress fixed the bank's capital at $200,000 -- divided into 2000 
shares at $100 each. 49 
The most important function of a bank in that period was the creation of purchasing 
power through the issuance of notes for circulation. This task was limited by the bank's 
indebtedness to twice the amount of its capital stock actually paid in (i.e., the number of 
shares sold). Because of the experience Iowa pioneers had been through with banks, there 
was a constant debate over whether to allow any bank to exist or whether to allow the 
existence of banks with proper regulation. 50 For the time Iowa was without incorporated 
banks of issue, the questionable issues form other states found their way in. Even some 
antibank advocates concluded that the prohibition of banks had been a failure. 51 
The delegates to the constitutional convention of 1846, designed to prepare Iowa for 
statehood, found themselves mired in debate over the chartering of banks. Finally, a 
committee drafted what came to be called a corporation article that prohibited corporate 
48 Ibid, 2. 
49 Erickson, Banking in Iowa, 18. 
50 Ibid 
51 Ibid 
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banking. Iowa was not alone in adopting this method of bank regulation. Nine States and the 
District of Columbia at this time also considered banking illegal. S2 
Private banking began to develop along the Mississippi River. Early banks 
considered transactions connected to real estate among their most important functions. 
Frequently, they were little more than real estate agencies. Land warrants had been granted 
to veterans of several wars: the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Indian Wars. These 
warrants could be bought and sold on eastern exchanges at eighty-five to ninety cents an 
acre. Government land offices accepted them in payment for land at $1.25 per acre because 
that was the price being asked by the government. Settlers buying land from the government 
at this time had to pay in specie due to the Specie Circular of 1836. Bankers could also 
purchase land from the government at the regular price of $1.25 per acre and sell it to 
speculators for $1.75 an acre, making a profit of 40 percent in addition to any profit from 
potential warrants on the land. S3 
Purchasers of farm mortgages could generally be grouped into five classifications: 
banks of all kinds, farm mortgage companies, insurance companies, endowed institutions 
(including land grant colleges), and private investors. S4 
Banks were eventually permitted to do general banking business, but they were 
limited. The 1858 free banking act ofIowa said that anyone could freely enter into the 
business of banking, however, the regulations were strict: capitalization required a minimum 
of $50,000 in advance, the location had to be in towns of greater than 500 population, 
circulated issues had to be backed by state or federal bonds, loans were limited to four 
52 Preston, History of Iowa Banking, 47. 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid 
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months and on personal security only, there was double liability for shareholders, a 25 
percent reserve was required against deposits, a state-appointed banking commission made 
inspections and checked for compliance with regulations. 55 Interest and discount were limited 
to 10 per cent until January 1, 1863, at which time it was to be not over 8 per cent. Usury (the 
charging of interest greater than the allowed maximum rate) was punishable by forfeiture of 
the debt. 
According to Erickson, prospective bankers shunned the free-banking act, however, 
the framers of the constitution of 1857 had provided for a state bank with branches. Iowans 
soon incorporated the State Bank ofIowa, providing the state with its first legal locally 
issued currency since the Miners' Bank of Dubuque. Erickson deduced from his research that 
it was probably businessmen who desired a bank of issue to establish sound currency for 
commercial purposes. By this time, settlers were in all parts of the state. Many railroads 
provided an outlet for farm products (within the business circumstances existing at the time). 
State regulations were under attack by the Populists in the 1890s. There was a two-
tiered system of national banks versus state banks in place since the Sherman Act of 1863. 
The federal legislation appeared to discriminate against western states by giving preference 
to existing state banks in granting national charters. In 1870, Congress authorized additional 
western and southern circulation and a partial redistribution of existing circulation. Editorial 
writers attacked national banks as gold gamblers, stock speculators, and oppressive 
unscrupulous monopolists.56 By the time of the Greenback Movement, Iowa farmers were in 
debt for land purchased and improvements made. Their bad experience with a banking 
55 Erickson, Banking in Iowa, 95. 
56 Doti and Schweikart, Banking in the American West, 80. 
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system still not organized, as well as a currency system not yet under control, combined to 
form a distrust of banks and government. The Panic of 1837 had hurt them. In August 1857, 
a severe panic started in New York, precipitated by the failure of the Ohio Life Insurance 
Trust Company. The Iowa banks were unprepared. Land speculation had been rampant, and 
the credit of banks in the newer sections of the state had been strained. Real estate became 
nearly valueless, reducing thousands offarmers, merchants, and mechanics to poverty. 57 
Mortgage dealers function by selling their securities to the five classes of investors 
mentioned previously. Their profits come from cash commissions charged to the borrower 
and from the ability to sell the mortgages in blocks at lower net rates of interest to the 
investor (than what was being charged to the borrower). This is similar to the methodology 
today of getting money into the agricultural sector for use in acquiring assets for production 
as well as financing operating expenses. 
Historians studying the impact of the economic and banking problems to the farm 
sector agree that there were large losses during the Panic of 1857, and again during the 
1870s. The partial crop failure of 1894 was followed by what has been described as 
abnormally low prices for crops during 1896.58 This loss of income (as well as assets) would 
have a negative impact on the ability to service a debt. 
As conditions worsened, President Theodore Roosevelt established both the Monetary 
Commission and the Country Life Commission to study the situation and make 
recommendations. The recommendation coming out of the Monetary Commission was the 
Federal Reserve System (similar in nature to the First and Second National Banks) to take 
57 Preston, History of Banking in Iowa. 
58 Benedict, Farm Policies. 
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control of the banking system. The Country Life Commission recommended a special 
lender to meet the needs of farmers. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 permitted national 
banks to loan on farmland an aggregate amount not to exceed 25 per cent of its capital and 
surplus, or one-third of its time deposits. The time limit for the loans was fixed at five years, 
and the maximum amount that could be loaned was 50 per cent of the actual value of the 
property offered as security. The Agricultural Credit Act of 1916 created the Land Bank 
system. 59 
Up to the time of the creation of the farm loan system, Iowa farmers had not had good 
experiences with banks. To get around a 1863 national banking law prohibiting real estate 
loans, for example, national banks would loan money on a farmers personal note, relying on 
the fact that he was a land owner to secure the note. The notes, then, could be recognized as 
investment loans and renewed from time to time.6o This was a poor substitute for needed 
capital to purchase land and new technologies to increase output and participate in the market 
economy. 
Did creation of the Farm Credit System and the FmHA improve the situation 
As the Land Bank system was getting organized and beginning to make loans after 
World War I, the rural areas began sliding into a depression. Production had been increased 
during the war, and continued at these levels after the war because the United States was 
loaning money to Europe to buy U.S. farm products until such time as they could begin 
59 Hoag, Farm Credit System. 
60 Ibid, 276. 
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producing their own food once again. After 1922, when these payments stopped, the farmers 
began getting farther and farther behind on their loan payments, and foreclosures increased. 
In 1923 Congress created the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks (FICBs) as another entity of 
the newly-forming Farm Credit System (that included the Land Banks) to supply operating 
credit for farmers. The U. S. Treasury investing in their stock provided the capital. The 
FICBs were authorized to discount agricultural paper of agricultural credit corporations, 
livestock loan companies, commercial banks, and savings institutions, as well as to make 
direct loans to farmer cooperatives on the security of livestock or warehouse receipts or 
shipping documents for staple agricultural commodities (at 7S percent of their market 
value).61 In this same legislation, Congress also created the fiscal agency for the system to 
coordinate the security issues for loan funds beyond the start-up capital from the 
government.62 
At the time, the money supply in rural banks was low, and the declining farm prices 
made it difficult for farmers to pay off their loans. With commercial banks dependent on 
deposits for their lending funds, they could not make loans for longer than 30-90 days. This 
did not fit the farmer's production schedule. When the bank was short on funds, it had a legal 
right to demand payment on its loans. 63 
When the stock market crashed in 1929, farm prices went down further and faster 
than they had been. The Federal Land Banks were dependent on the installment payments of 
their borrowers to make the payments on their bonds. When the farmers could no longer 
61 Hoag, The Farm Credit System. 
62 This was initially situated in Washington, D.C., but was moved to New York City in 1929. It is now 
called The Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding Corporation. 
63 Hoag, The Farm Credit System. 
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make the payments, the Land Banks stopped issuing bonds, thus eliminating available loan 
funds to farmers. Banks were already in difficulty. The situation became so critical that the 
government appropriated $125 million to invest in capital stock, thus enabling the Land 
Banks to extend the loans of farmers. 64 
Farm prices had hit all-time lows. Banks were closing all over the country, but 
especially in rural areas, which intensified the confusion and despair. Banks that had not 
closed had frozen assets because of the bad loans. Insurance companies were also confronted 
with possible bankruptcy. All sources of credit had dried Up.65 
On May 12, 1933, Congress passed the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act, which gave 
the Federal Land Bank Associations the means to take on the farmers' emergency problems. 
The Act included the following: 
1. Reduction of interest rates to 4112 percent on new and outstanding 
loans for 5 years to be reimbursed by the Land Banks from the 
Treasury. 
2. Treasury subscriptions to the paid-in surplus of the Land Banks 
equal to the amount of loan extensions and 5-year principal 
deferments granted to borrowers not otherwise in default on their 
loans. 
3. A government guarantee of interest on new Land Bank bonds 
issued within 2 years to facilitate their sale to investors. 
4. A $200 million fund for the Land Bank Commissioner to use in 
making first and second mortgage loans through the Land Banks 
up to 75 per cent of their normal value. (Land Banks were limited 
to 50 per cent on land and 20 per cent on the insured value of 
buildings. )66 
Early in 1934, Congress established the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation with 
capital consisting of the $200 million Land Bank Commissioner fund already invested in 
64 Ibid 
65 Ibid. 
66 Haag, The Farm Credit System, 234-5. 
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farm mortgages. The Corporation was authorized to issue government-guaranteed bonds up 
to ten times its capital, as well as to buy the bonds of the Land Banks. Governors were asked 
to appoint committees to work with farmers and their lenders to scale down the debts. If 
lenders were willing to scale down the debts by at least 20 per cent, then the Land Banks 
would refinance the remaining debt. Loans totaled $1.9 billion.67 
When the refinancing was complete, the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation held 48 
per cent of the farm mortgage debt. At the same time this was going on, the Production 
Credit Associations were being established as the outlets for the FICBs to assist in lending 
for operating expenses. In other words, the FICBs expanded their network of outlets to 
extend their lending opportunities to farmers.68 
Liquidations still took place, however. By 1939, the Land Banks had acquired an 
inventory of25,000 farms. These farms were sold to either tenants or to former owners.69 
With the help of what is called the permanent farm legislation, establishing a floor 
price for enumerated commodities, farm debt reached its low point in 1946.70 The push for 
new technologies to increase production, and the over-riding of the permanent legislation 
after 1953, started the debt rising again. In 1969, the Farm Credit System (now comprised of 
Land Banks, Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, Production Credit Associations, and Banks 
for Cooperatives) established a commission to study the future of agriculture and make 
recommendations. In 1971, the first major overhaul of the system since 1933 was 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 U.S. Bureau of the Census, The Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to the 
Present (New York: Horizon Press, 1965), 286. 
57 
undertaken. 71 These changes helped to create the conditions for the farm crisis of the 1980s, 
as Chapter 4 will explain. 
What was the farm mortgage like in Iowa 
From the time of the first settlements until the creation of the Federal Reserve System 
and the Land Bank system just prior to World War I, Iowa farmers had problems accessing 
loan funds, and meeting the terms of a loan, but they were able to do some borrowing. "On 
December 31, 1889, the farm mortgage debt in Iowa was $149,457,000. On October 15, 
1932, the debt stood at $1,082,882,000. ,,72 The difference was a seven-fold increase. During 
the depression of the 1890s, the average debt per acre on mortgaged farmland was $14 to 
$16. By October of 1932, the average debt per acre on mortgaged farmland was $71.73 
According to the 1930 Federal Census, 58 percent of the owner-operators had mortgages on 
their farmland.74 
During the timeframe 1915 to 1920 (which includes the First World War when 
commodity prices to farmers were good), the reason given for taking out a loan was to 
purchase farmland. After 1920, the chief reason given for loans was to renew the first 
mortgage for land purchase. At this time, the length of time for a mortgage (as previously 
mentioned) was five years. Because of the low farm income, the mortgages could not be 
paid off in five years. 75 
71 Hoag. The Farm Credit System. 
72 William G. Murray and Ronald C. Bentley, "The Iowa Farm Mortgage Problem, " The Agricultural 
Emergency in Iowa. ed. Staff in Economics at Iowa State College (Ames, Iowa: Collegiate Press, Inc., 1933), 
55. 
73 Ibid. 70. 
74 Ibid. 59. 
75 Ibid. 
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The distribution of mortgage debt among lenders is important because of the different 
policies for handling delinquent loans. An insurance company, for example, is financed 
differently than a bank; and the Land Banks are different from either of these. In October 
1932, insurance companies were the largest holders of farm debt, with a 42 percent market 
share. Private investors were second, with a 27 percent share. Deposit banks had a 16 
percent share, while the Land Banks had a 12 percent share.76 Notice that private investors 
and deposit banks together accounted for 40 percent of the farm mortgage loans in 1932. 
Any remedial action, therefore, would have to include both of these. By January of 1933, the 
governor ofIowa, Daniel W. Turner, issued a moratorium on the foreclosure of farm 
mortgage loans. The legislature passed a moratorium one month later. 
Three methods of action were considered: 1) the raising of farm income sufficiently to 
make it possible to pay the principle and interest; 2) the turning over of mortgaged land to the 
mortgage holders; 3) the scaling down of the debts to where the payments could be made out 
of the income as it existed.77 An examination of national policy reveals that all three of these 
were done. Because of the loan terms and the access to capital, the Farm Credit System took 
on the lion's share of the farm debt after 1933. 
Because of the government involvement in the Farm Credit System, its securities have 
always been considered a low-risk investment. For investors looking for safety, these 
securities were an attraction. The system policy ofloaning up to 75 percent of the appraised 
value of the assets, coupled with their share of the farm lending market, had an influence on 
available loan funds in agriculture. Up through the war years, however, the tendency of 
76 Ibid 66. 
77 Ibid 
59 
farmers was to refinance existing debt in order to stay on the farm, and then to pay down the 
debt. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (and its various revisions) provided the cash 
flow necessary to accomplish this repayment because the calculation for the floor price of 
commodities included an average cost ofborrowing.78 
From the time of the creation of public domain, when large quantities of land became 
available for settlement, speculators have been present in the land market, at times driving up 
prices, when money was available. Speculators are in the market to turn a profit on their 
investment~ they are not necessarily interested in actually settling on the land. Land prices 
driven by speculation are not related to what land will produce, but by what the increasing 
value can create in profit for the speculator. Those who actually want to settle on the land 
have different motivations. Settlers want to own a piece of land, to live on it, and to work on 
it. This attitude can be traced to colonial days, and showed itself in the claim associations. If 
farmers were the only ones purchasing farm land, and if their motive was for farming rather 
than speculation, this combination of access to financing, terms manageable for farmers, as 
well as an income floor whose calculation included the costs of borrowing should be 
adequate to meet their needs. When they find themselves paying prices for land that are 
unrelated to what the land will produce, they have a problem generating income from the 
land sufficient to service the debt owed against it. Having available credit to purchase land 
has been a historical problem. Credit terms reasonable for a farmer to meet have been a 
historical problem. Income derived from what can be produced on the land has been a 
problem for farmers. All of these are factors that must be examined when looking at the 
financial picture for farmers. 
78 Title 7 United States Code Annotated. 
60 
The statistics in Table 2 (add 000) are total Iowa farm debt (all lenders combined) for 
1960 to 1990.79 Note the gradual increase through the 1960s and first half of the 1970s with 
the overriding of the permanent farm legislation. Then the debt takes a bigger jump around 
1979, when land prices started going up along with rates of interest. By 1987, when the farm 
liquidations dramatically increased, the debt declines. 
Table 2: Iowa Farm Debt (all lenders) 
YEAR DOLLARS - add 000 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1725672 
1815780 
2009986 
2236691 
2411872 
2648737 
2944502 
3264512 
3435664 
3648288 
3820889 
4195512 
4536967 
5258735 
5664930 
6547637 
7606464 
8922333 
10300061 
12364277 
13287028 
14105128 
14859823 
14838198 
14720142 
12955631 
11012490 
9759267 
9506385 
9546705 
9S4735fi 
Source: Economic Research Service USDA, January 1998. 
61 
Figures 1,2,3,4 show the breakdown ofIowa farm debt by lender from 1960 to 1997. Note 
the big increase in the Farm Credit System debt from the late 1970s to the middle 1980s. 
That was a time when the amount that could be loaned was increased by Congress to 97 
percent of the appraised value. The Farm Credit System was able to access money through 
the securities market while banks were regulated so as to restrict their farm lending activities. 
After the mid 1980s, the commercial banks became the dominant lender category for farm 
loans. The Farm Credit System aggressively liquidated its farm loans during the 1980s, 
creating a lot of bad feeling with its farmer market base (that felt the system should have 
handled the bad times differently, considering its roots). 
Land policies today include debate over how much farmland to allow for urban sprawl. 
Some planners, writing on the history of public domain, bemoan the fact that little planning 
was done at the time the public domain was opened to settlement. It was only "after the fact" 
that programs to set aside land began to be enacted.80 As more categories of buyers bid up 
prices for farm land, the farmer is faced with the choice of trying to finance higher-priced 
land on the income farming can generate, or getting out of farming. 
Debt, and the cost ofthe debt, is only one aspect to the farm credit picture. The ability 
to generate income to service the debt is the rest of the story. 
79 United States Department of Agriculture, (Washington, D.C.: Economic Research Service, 1998). 
80 Marion Clawson, The Federal Lands Revisited (Baltimore: Resources for the Future, 1983). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FARM INCOME 
What is farm income 
Unless we each seek to be self-sufficient, it is necessary to somehow acquire what we 
do not furnish for ourselves. Some sort of exchange medium must be employed in order to 
acquire. It is also necessary to fix a price in the terms of whatever medium is available. The 
two parties involved in the transaction must agree to the terms before it can take place. 
While this seems like a basic thought, it is necessary to focus on it to understand farm income 
-- both the sources, as well as the impact of policy. 
When the majority of farmers were self-sufficient yeomen and specie was scarce, 
things needed but not produced on the farm were traded with produce or labor. 1 With the 
move to an increasingly market-oriented economy -- beyond the level of self-sufficiency -- a 
monetary system was needed for pricing goods and exchanging them. This is the capitalist 
system. Producing for the market also created a need to acquire land (or more of it) as well 
as new technologies to enable the production of more goods per individual for the market. 
1 David P. Szatrnary, Shays'Rebellion (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980). 
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This created a need for credit; available credit, in turn, created a need for income sufficient to 
service the debt. 
Farmers produce both for themselves as well as for the market. Table 3 shows that 
farm income calculations have included such non-cash items as food produced and consumed 
on the farm. They also include changes in asset values and inventories from year to year. 
Table 3: Breakdown of Farm Income by USDA for 1992-1997 
AVERAGE INCOME U.S. FARM OPERATOR HOUSEHOLDS 1992-95 
YEAR 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Cash income 11320 11248 11389 11218 13502 12460 
LESS 
Depreciation 5187 6219 6466 6795 6906 6578 
Opwages 216 454 425 522 531 513 
Rental inc 360 534 701 769 672 568 
Others 961 872 815 649 1094 1429 
Net Farm inc. 4596 3168 2981 2484 4300 3373 
PLUS 
Opwages 216 454 425 522 531 513 
Farm rental 360 n.a. n.a. 1053 1178 945 
Self-employed 5172 3623 3407 4059 6009 4831 
Farm related 2008 1192 970 661 1898 1158 
Farm income 7180 4815 4376 4720 7906 5989 
Off farm inc. 35731 35408 38092 39671 42455 46358 
Equals 42911 40223 42468 44391 50361 52347 
Source: Economic Research Service USDA Situation and Outlook: 
Agricultural Income and Finance 1999. 
Rent on farm buildings is in the calculation. Except for the food, the other values can only be 
realized if they are actually sold (or rented out), however, they are still included in the USDA 
calculation of farm income. There is also a cash income calculation. As even the USDA 
acknowledges: "When net cash income declines, farmers have less cash available to support 
their families, pay debts, or purchase equipment. ,,2 
2 United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, Agricultural Income and 
Finance Situation and Outlook Report (Washington, D.C., 1996), 4. 
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The USDA has begun reporting off-farm income as part of the farm cash income 
calculation, in addition to the non-cash items. Off-farm income now accounts for most of the 
amount reported as cash income. Farm lenders have been using this income in calculations 
to determine debt-servicing capacity for some time. Figure 5 shows the reason why. 
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Figure 5: Average On-farm Income and Off-farm Income for U.S. 1992-1998. 
Source: Economic Research Service USDA situation and Outlook: 
Agricultural Income and Finance 1999. 
Since Iowa has had an economy largely dependent on agriculture -- from its service 
providers to its processors, as well as the businesses dependent on the spending of farmers --
the ebb and flow of farm income has been strongly felt in the state. 
The historical debate in the u.s. on how to help fann income 
The previous chapter established the problems with having credit terms that farmers 
could meet. The reason for these problems was both the availability of credit as well as the 
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ability of farmers to generate enough income from their farming operations to payoff the 
debt in the short period of time allowed by the lender, and also pay the interest on the debt. 
Since the founding of the new Republic, there has been debate over the best means to 
attract capital and to generate income. Scottish economist Adam Smith published his Wealth 
of Nations (as a free trade approach to capitalism) in 1776, the same year as the Declaration 
of Independence. Very simply, under capitalism a minority of individuals owns the means of 
production (including investment capital), and has the legal right to use this for private gain. 
Capitalism relies on the market system to determine the distribution and allocation of 
resources (who has and who does not have), and to establish income levels, wages, rents and 
profits for the different social classes? This puts the individual pursuit of riches for its own 
sake against the interests of societal responsibility toward each individual. The Church had 
an ongoing problem with capitalism form the time of its inception because of its emphasis on 
profit and the use of people to increase the profit of others. For capitalism to be acceptable, a 
way needed to be found to make it appear as if it was doing something good for society. 
Adam smith was able to find such a way by using the Puritan work ethic of personal gain as 
being favored by God. By presenting a model of an economic order with acquisitiveness as 
its cornerstone, he justified individual economic self-interest and a free competitive market 
as being in the common good of society. Adam Smith was a philosophe, so he assumed 
individuals and countries had common abilities and common self-interests. Through his 
"invisible hand of the market place," individual economic liberty (of free trade) could 
3 Robert Lekacbman & Borin Van Loon, Capitalism for Beginners (London: Writers and Readers 
Publishing Cooperative Limited, 1981). 
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achieve natural harmony by the pursuit of individual economic self-interests. Since that 
time, those who believe in this approach have tied economic liberty to the profit motive. 
Because he interpreted the drive for more money as a natural trait (hence a natural law), he 
identified the freedom to acquire more with freedom as such. This allowed for the 
identification of a free competitive market with individualism and democracy in the minds of 
those who see the world in this manner. The Chicago School of Economics works form this 
basis, as do many politicians and businessmen. The acquisitive, profit-oriented, individual 
could be free to pursue his own acquisitiveness in the belief that in doing so he was 
promoting the public good.4 
While a case could be made that Smith was attempting to justify the hierarchical 
system then in control of Europe, or possibly to the shortcomings of the members of the 
Enlightenment Movement (to which he belonged), the reason for including his thoughts is 
because they were introduced to the world the same year that the Declaration of 
Independence declared all men to be free, free to assume a "separate and equal station to 
which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them. ,,5 As the American Revolution 
(freeing a large region from the British mercantile system, under the control of the 
aristocracy) took advantage of the thinking at the time to discuss governments and their 
relationship to people, the vast unclaimed resources of the new country provided 
opportunities for those ready to put the new system of capitalism to use. 
An analysis of the writings of Americans from 1760-1805 clearly indicate an 
awareness of responsibility toward others, and that this should be taken into account in 
4 Gerald Dworkin, Gordon Bennant, Peter G. BrO\\n, Markets and Morals (Washington, D.C.: 
Hemisphere Publishing Corporation, 1977),34-5. 
5 Declaration of Independence, 1776. 
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forming governments because people coming together for this purpose give up some of their 
personal rights for the rights of society.6 Therefore, for the basic concepts of personal 
acquisitiveness to take hold in such an environment, it would be necessary to show them as 
being in the public good. 
Our Founding Fathers, though, had already been through a time with Britain when the 
aristocracy was more interested in what they considered their natural right to control 
resources and people, and so were very familiar with the tactics employed to do exactly that. 
If the former colonies were to develop their own independent economy, and take their place 
in the world with their new political system, then assistance would be needed to allow the 
necessary development to occur. The new government would also need financing for the 
development of needed infrastructure (not allowed as a colony) and for credit in the world 
markets. (Having credit requires the ability to service the debt.) Alexander Hamilton, as one 
example, put forth the ideas to accomplish these ends. 
Hamilton wrote several papers on the types of policies the new country should have 
to establish itself in the world market of trading, as well as to protect itself (in its weakness) 
from the predatory practices of other countries.7 He expounded on topics of policy for the 
new republic in editorials and in letters to influential people, such as George Washington 
(who used one of the letters as the basis for his Farewell Address). He was the first Treasury 
Secretary and the leader of the Federalist Party. He won establishment of the first national 
bank. He promoted the protectionist approach to capitalism. As this ideological debate has 
played out in policy legislation, it has affected both the availability of credit, its terms, as 
6 Hvneman and Lutz American Political Writing. 
7 Aiexander Hamilto~ The Basic Ideas of Alexander Hamilton. ed. Richard B. Morris (New York: 
Pocket Books, 1957). 
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well as the income for servicing the debt. A brief overview of the conflicting ideas is in 
order because it is reflected in the legislation ultimately affecting farm income. 
In 1789, with the adoption of the Constitution, Treasury Secretary Hamilton 
recommended the enactment of tariffs to both raise revenue to meet the government 
expenses, as well as to protect the income of some American products against dumping by 
other countries (principally Britain). Toward this end he suggested the following measures: 
I} Protecting duties -- or duties on those foreign articles which are the rivals 
of the domestic ones intended to be encouraged. 
2} Prohibitions of rival articles, or duties equivalent to prohibitions. 
3} Prohibitions of the exportation of the materials of manufactures. 
4} Pecuniary bounties. 
5} Premiums (ofa nature allied to bounties). 
6} The exemption of the materials of manufactures from duty.8 
For the first two decades of the country, the idea of a tariff was not much of an issue 
because the Treasury needed money. Tariffs generally drifted up until the Compromise 
Tariff of 1833. A debate over tariffs arose as the ideas of Adam Smith gradually increased 
their influence. William McKinley, in his book The Tariffin the Days of Henry Clay and 
Since, noted comments by ex-President John Quincy Adams to the House on the policy: 
Under that system of policy (the protective) the Nation has risen from a depth of 
weakness, imbecility, and distress to an eminence of prosperity unexampled in the 
annals of the world. It was by counter legislation to the regulations of foreign nations 
that the first operations of the Government of the United States were felt by the 
people; felt in the encouragement and protection given to their commerce; felt in the 
fulfillment of the public engagements to the creditors of the Nation; felt in the gradual 
discharge of the debt of gratitude due to the warriors of the Revolution; felt in the 
rapid increase in the population, in the constantly and profitably occupied industry of 
the people, in the consideration and respect of foreign nations for our character, in the 
8 Alexander Hamilton, "Report on the Subject of Manufactures," The Works of Alexander Hamilton. 
(New York: Williams and Whiting, 1810). 
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comfort and well-being and happiness of the community felt in every nerve and 
sinew, in every vein and artery of the body politic.9 
South Carolina had been lobbying heavily for reduced tariffs. Frustrated, the state 
passed the Ordinance of Nullification declaring the most recent tariff act of 1832 
unconstitutional and void, and refusing to collect it. A proclamation was made by the 
Legislature that if the government of the United States attempted to collect the tariff then 
"South Carolina will no longer consider herself a member of the Federal Union."IO 
McKinley noted in his book that the cause of South Carolina's problem with the tariff was 
not really the tariff but the issue of slavery. "Mr. Calhoun realized that the policy of 
protection to home industry was inimical to the employment of cheap or enslaved labor. ,,11 
In February of 1833, President Jackson secured the passage of what came to be called 
"the Force Bill." This would have collected the tariffs in South Carolina if they had not 
backed down from their nullification movement. Henry Clay, in the meantime, worked to 
secure the passage ofa compromise tariff that would gradually reduce duties but would 
preserve the protective system. 
The plan of the Compromise Tariffwas to gradually reduce protection by 10 percent 
of the rate above 20 percent (the level of 1824), until 1840 and then steeply reduce it to 20 
percent in 1842. However, the 20 percent level had been in existence only two months when 
it was replaced by a new act to return the duties to the 1832 levels. The 1830s had 
experienced a monetary crisis and land speculation that first brought in money and then took 
9 William McKinley, The Tariffin the Days of Henry Clay and Since: An Exhaustive Review of our 
Tariff Legislation (New York: Henry Clay Publishing Co., 1896). Reprint New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1970, 
8. 
10 Ibid. 9. 
11 Ibid, 9. 
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it away in the Panic of 1837. To generate revenue, it was necessary for the Congress to re-
impose tariffs. 12 Notice that the reimposition of tariffs was done after a speculative land 
binge that damaged both lenders as well as farmers, creating a need to preserve income. 
Just what is a protective tariff? To survive, businesses (including farms) need to 
receive a price for what they produce (or provide, in the case of a service) which covers the 
following: The cost of assets necessary for the business, the business operating expenses, 
labor, and a profit sufficient to reinvest in new technologies to increase efficiency of 
production, and bring a return on investment. Individuals need to do this too by covering the 
assets necessary to survive (such as housing), the living expenses, a standard of living 
commensurate with their development, and savings sufficient to replace assets as they wear 
out or cost too much to maintain. 
The Constitution conferred upon Congress the power to levy a duty in Article I 
Section 8. The first Act was passed in 1789, and did not become a major party issue. Minor 
changes were made in 1792, 1794, 1797, 1800, 1804, and 1812. Through 1816, twenty-five 
tariff acts were passed. The tariff drifted upward at the urging of Treasury Secretary 
Hamilton, who saw the need for revenue. These duties increased 100 percent, doubled the 
rates, and placed a further duty of 10 percent upon the good imported in foreign vessels. 
Those who embraced the protective policy fought to preserve American markets for 
American manufacturers. For the first eighty years of the country, then, politicians debated, 
compromised, and generally rewrote tariff legislation to favor various products and bring in 
needed revenue. Because tariffs can be structured to work in a variety of ways, the method 
12 Benedict, Farm Policies. 
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changed almost as often as the rate, usually with political compromise determining the final 
result. 13 
However, by the mid-1800s, a change took place. It is noteworthy that the 
Republican platform of 1876 stated that "the duties levied for the purpose of revenue should 
so discriminate as to favor American labor. ,,14 This was considered a first in acknowledging 
a tariff as something other than bringing in revenue to the government. The additional 
purpose was to improve the situation of labor. This was significant. Hamilton had 
recommended tariffs after the establishment of the Constitution to both bring in needed 
revenue to the government as well as to assist in the promotion of American manufacturing. 
Under the mercantile system, the colonies had not been allowed to establish many kinds of 
manufacturing because their purpose in the system was to send raw materials to the British 
manufacturers, and to purchase the products. Hamilton wanted a diversified economy 
because he saw that as providing more economic stability and revenue to the new Republic. 
He wanted the fledgling companies to have a chance to develop and grow without the 
interference of the already-established British companies. He supported a tariff for these 
reasons. His Report 011 the Subject of Manufactures clearly states that domestic production 
should be preferred to foreign production because it is a more reliable market. By 1876 the 
idea was now being expanded to help the situation of labor. This is the significance reflected 
in the Republican platform position. 
The McKinley Tariff of 1890 has been criticized for the large duties it imposed, and 
blamed for the resulting problems. There was a political reason for its passage. It was 
13 McKinley, Tari./ft. 
14 Ibid, 47. 
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designed to bring the western farmers into a closer tie with the Republican Party. It was 
largely successful in this endeavor because it provided a complete schedule of protective 
duties on farm products. However, in the case of sugar, a bounty was to be paid to American 
producers on sugar imports, rather than an import tariff. This resulted in a loss of funds to 
the Treasury. Large congressional pay raises were voted at the same time as the Treasury 
was experiencing this loss offunds, but that is seldom cited in discussions of the financial 
impact of tariffs to the Treasury. 15 
If the government was going to rely on duties for revenue, then imports were 
necessary. The idea of a tariff was not to stop the imports, but to raise the cost to one 
commensurate with domestic prices in order for American producers not to be forced out of 
the market by cheaper imports. 
In 1851, economist Henry C. Carey (whose father, Matthew Carey had been an 
economist at the time of Alexander Hamilton) wrote a book on the first 50 years of the 
United States as it struggled to establish its new system of government and economics. 
Using available statistics and excerpts from political debates and newspaper editorials, he 
laid out the case for the debate and why the American System of protection should be 
favored over Adam Smith's free market system. He noted: 
Two systems are before the world .... One is the English system; the other we may be 
proud to call the American system, for it is the only one ever devised the tendency of 
which was that of elevating while equalizing the condition of man throughout the 
world. 16 
William McKinley, former Representative from Ohio (elected President in 1896), 
15 Benedict, Farm Policies. 
16 Henry C. Carey, The Harmonyojlnterests, (philadelphia: J. S. Skinner, 1851) Reprinted New York: 
August M. Kelley, 1967,228-9. 
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wrote a book (published in 1896) titled The Tariff in the Days of Henry Clay and Since. The 
book examines the tariff legislation in the United States from 1812 to 1896. McKinley quotes 
from a speech made by Henry Clay in 1824 in favor of tariffs: 
The object of the bill under consideration is to create this home market, and to lay the 
foundations of a genuine American policy. The creation of a home market is not only 
necessary to procure for our agriculture a just reward for its labors, but it is 
indispensable to obtain a supply of our necessary wants. If we cannot sell we cannot 
buy. The sole object of the tariff is to tax the produce of foreign industry with a view 
to promoting American industry. 17 
The reason for including this discussion is to show that there was an ongoing debate 
in the United States over a policy of protective tariffs for the purpose of preserving income 
and raising capital, versus free trade. Carey's book went so far as to show how tariffs would 
promote every facet oflife, including the well being of families. These aspects are no longer 
taught in our schools today, so the reasoning behind some of the legislation of the past 
becomes clouded. This debate over policy took place at the same time as the discussions on 
banking and monetary policy. All of these are factors that influenced lending to farmers 
because they determined whether or not funds are available, the terms of the loans, and the 
ability of the farmers to service the loans. 
Another aspect to this discussion that needs to be mentioned is the subject of 
monopolies. The reason for this is because people generally think of consumers as the 
market for farmers. While they are the end buyers of the product, the "market economy" that 
farmers sell into is not the public one most of the time, but the processors. This is a 
17 McKinley, Tariffs,5. 
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concentrated group. During the latter half of the 1800s, the idea of laissez-faire (originally 
promoted by the philosophes of the enlightenment to prevent government from interfering 
with the then-expanding bourgeoisie) gained acceptance. Corporate forms of 
organization and large-scale production expanded rapidly. Monopolies arose because there 
was nothing to stop them. They found cutthroat competition and price wars so ruinous that 
they turned to price agreements, division of territories, corporate trust combinations, and 
other ways to avoid competition. 18 
From time to time throughout our history, Congress has found it necessary to step in 
to break up some types of operations and the large monopolies (or Trusts). One example of 
the type of problem farmers faced involved cooperation between some railroads and some 
elevators. There were secret rebates, special favors in supplying cars, a western rate possibly 
four times that of one in the east for the same distance traveled, monopolization of sites for 
elevators, and requirements to ship through specific elevators. I9 The Sherman Antitrust Act 
was passed in 1890. During the Theodore Roosevelt Administration, twenty-five lawsuits 
were brought against Trusts, but only a few of them were decided in favor of the government. 
One of these was the Beef Trust. 
Before 1874, the population centers of the United States supplied their food needs 
locally. If meat was shipped to these points, it was "on the hoof," or live. Then the 
refrigerator car was invented. Chicago became the centralized slaughter-house for the United 
States. Then Kansas City developed. Next came Omaha. These rivals began competing 
18 Benedict, Farm Policies, 91. 
19 Ibid 
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against each other by forcing out smaller packers, or buying them out. The four largest 
packers -- P. D. Armour, Gustavus F. Swift, George H. Hammond, and Nelson Morris --
came to an agreement that they would not compete among themselves. Thus, 60 percent of 
the dealers in fresh meats had agreements whereby they avoided bidding against one another 
for their meat supplies. Even though there existed more than one meat processor, because 
they did not bid against each other, there was a virtual monopoly of a market in terms of 
where the farmer had to sell his produce. These four conspirators then entered into an 
agreement with the railroads to be paid for the refrigerator cars they furnished to ship their 
own meat. The remaining packers had few refrigerator cars (or they rented them form 
private lines), so they got no rebates. This meant that their expenses were not being 
subsidized, as were the expenses of the "Big Four." These monopolizers, as they put their 
Trust together, then moved to control the price to farmers. West of the Mississippi and east 
of the Nebraska Plains, the business was not cattle-raising but cattle-feeding. For meat to 
have a longer carrying capacity for shipping, the cattle needed specific types of feed. To 
finish feeding cattle for shipping required com. In the Com Belt, the practice came to be the 
feeding of cattle from western states: finishing. This practice required capital to buy the 
range cattle and pay for the shipping. This required loans. As the Trust came to control the 
railroads, they became the only market for the farmers?O The income to farmers was 
controlled, and possibly reduced. The control over farmer income had an impact on the 
ability to service loans or, at times, to get credit. 
After an investigation into meatpackers in 1919, the Department of Justice took steps 
20 Charles Edward Russell, The Gratest Trust in th4 World (New York: Ridgway-Thayer Company, 
1905). 
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to prosecute them under the antitrust legislation. An agreement was reached in 1920 
whereby the meatpackers agreed to divest themselves of several of their interests that were 
operating in a manner of vertical and horizontal integration (as we have today in these 
industries). 
The idea of monopoly extends to investment banks. "From the nineteenth century 
onward [capital accumulation and concentration have] characterized banking.,,2l As we 
moved to the present day, many giant corporations began investing their accumulated profits 
in enterprises in unrelated sectors, leading to holding companies. "Financiers who direct 
investment banks and also rule expensive capitalist empires enjoy a form of power that has 
long been described as oligarchy.22 This oligarchy is composed of a small number of big 
capitalists whose power (both direct and indirect) allows them to dominate an economy. 
This can happen in the following manner: Ifit requires an average of33 percent control of 
the shares for a financial group, and company A in this group holds 33 percent of the shares 
in a subsidiary company, the latter company can be controlled by 33 percent of33 percent, or 
11 percent. There is nothing to prevent the subsidiary from setting up another subsidiary. 
This is the reason the capital of investment banks and holding companies is invested 
frequently through a complicated network of subsidiaries.23 
The following explanation of monopoly and consolidation taking place today makes 
it important to understand why some of the past laws in this country reflected the ability of 
some people to grasp the significance of the debate between the American System of 
economics and the Adam Smith system: There is a general tendency for monopolies, alone or 
21 Pierre Jalee, How Capitalism Works. (Now York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 83. 
22 Ibid, 84. 
23 Ibid, 84. 
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in combination, to spread their grasp over the entire world market, with the purpose of 
accelerating the accumulation of capital. They work for a world economic and political order 
that would free the movement of capital and commodities and regulate currencies and their 
circulation. Trade is their vehicle. The value of a commodity is determined by the amount 
oflabor socially necessary to produce it. The value of the labor force is represented by the 
value of goods required to maintain and renew it. The value of such goods is much lower in 
underdeveloped countries; in developed countries it combines a complex of individual and 
social expenditures. It is generally true that the underdeveloped countries export goods that 
are relatively undervalued, while those of the developed world are overvalued. This is 
known as unequal exchange. 24 
Our Founding Fathers were familiar with a world dominated by an aristocratic elite. 
From their writings it is obvious they tried to establish a system that would allow more 
opportunities for a greater number of people. Hamilton, for example, wanted the broadest 
interpretation of the commerce clause of the Constitution. He disagreed with those who 
believed trade should be unregulated. He insisted that there must be "a common directing 
power. ,,25 He believed that power should be the national government. 
The following, more current, observation is what some of them wanted to avoid (and 
the reason for the policy debate): Those whose high rate of profit enables them to preempt 
the lion's share of total national surplus value can only do so at the expense of the share of 
others with a lower rate of profit. It is usually the same group, the monopolies, who take 
most, and the small or medium capitalists who get less. This creates sharp antagonism 
24 Ibid, 86. 
15 Hamilton, Basic Ideas, 274. 
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between these rival contenders for a share of national surplus value. As the state becomes 
more controlled by these monopolistic-like interests, its interventions in the economy have 
the ultimate purpose of supporting these interests' resistance against the tendency of the rate 
of profit to fall. 26 
It is necessary to understand the policy debate, as well as the history of agriculture, 
because solutions to problems are derived from the context of their understanding. 
Therefore, in order to understand the agriculture policy behind the legislation of the 1930s 
and the 1940s, that has come to be called the permanent farm legislation, the circumstances 
leading up to it and how that was viewed become important. The part of this legislation that 
has since been repealed since 1953 read in part: 
The parity index as of any date shall be the ratio of...the general level of prices for 
articles and services that farmers buy, wages paid hired farm labor, interest on farm 
indebtedness secured by farm real estate, and taxes on farm real estate .... Parity, as 
applied to income, shall be that gross income from agriculture which will provide the 
farm operator and his family with a standard of living equivalent to those afforded 
persons dependent upon other gainful occupation.27 
This equivalent income is nothing more than the equal pay for equal work we have 
today in other areas. Notice that the parity calculation involved a factor of the estimated 
average cost of money in order to service the debt. That has been missing in farm income 
ever since this legislation was repealed in 1953. 
At the time the 1933 legislation was written, farm foreclosures were causing an unrest 
that needed to be addressed. People could not make their payments because they were not 
receiving a price for their products sufficient to cover the costs of production. While there 
were some who insisted that there was too much produce available, and this was causing the 
26 Ibid, 101. 
27 Title 7 United States Code Annotated, Section 1301, (l)(c) and (2). 
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low prices (based on the concepts of Adam Smith capitalism), there were others who saw that 
many people were going hungry because they could not afford to buy food, thus reducing the 
market for the produce. (The market is only composed of those who are able to buy.) The 
legislation was part of the package offered by President Franklin Roosevelt during his New 
Deal era that attempted to put people back to work so they could once again be in the market 
place as consumers. It also addressed the concerns of lenders over the ability of their 
customers to service their loans. By the time of the farm crisis in the 1980s, the solution was 
different because the policy being taught in the schools was different. 
It should also be noted that, beginning in the 1940s and continuing to this day, one of 
the vocal entities calling for an agriculture policy based on free trade was the Committee for 
Economic Development (CED), composed of business representatives from 200 large major 
companies. This group was organized during World War II to plan for the restructuring of 
the world economy when the war ended. It continues to this day, meeting periodically and 
writing proposed policy papers on various topics. 
On the subject of agriculture, they have been consistent with their proposals: 
1) Gradual removal, within definite limits, of farm price and income supports ... and a 
land retirement program dedicated ... specifically and singly to reducing the resources 
devoted to agriculture, including both people and land~ 2) disposal of surpluses now 
held by the government~ 3) removal, at the end of a limited transition period, of 
acreage allotments and marketing controls~ 4) special programs to assist farmers ... to 
find a better livelihood in other industries. 28 
These recommendations were based on free trade theory. The parity pricing of the 
permanent farm legislation was partially repealed and then over-ridden in 1953. As each 
28 Committee for Economic Development, (New York, 1945, 1955, 1957, 1962). 
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succeeding farm bill is written, there is language in it that says it supercedes specific sections 
of the permanent laws in Title 7 United States Code Annotated. Those permanent sections, 
that have not been repealed, only become activated when there is not a farm bill in place to 
override them. Such a situation would only happen when a farm bill lapses (because it has a 
sunset date in its language) and there has not been a new farm bill passed by Congress to take 
its place. In 1996 this situation arose because Congress had not agreed to the terms of a new 
farm bill in 1995. Then Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman delayed implementing the 
permanent legislation until Congress could pass a new farm bill in 1996. 
As these ideas of free trade gradually gained acceptance, and times moved memories 
farther away from the sufferings of the 1930s, farm bills began lowering the support price for 
covered commodities with the idea that it would eventually be eliminated -- as called for by 
free traders such as the CED. Land set-aside programs increased, thus reducing the basis for 
generating farm income. 
In the Congressional Record of June 21, 1972, Rep. Melcher requested, and was 
granted, permission to address the House for one minute: 
Mr. Speaker, there is a great deal of interest in the plan developed by the Department 
of Agriculture Young Executive's Committee recommending that we forget about the 
importance and needs of agriculture by programs. Since inserting the summary of the 
report in the Record of June 15, my office has been besieged with calls for extra 
copies of the text, which I do not have, and I understand that the Department of 
Agriculture is issuing only a limited number, since they do not wish to be held 
responsible for the document at this time, before elections ... .In all fairness to the 15 
young executives [whose chairman was the Under Secretary of Agriculture] who thus 
have been given full responsibility for getting up their amazing recommendations 
independently, I think that the Record should show that their committee was set up on 
April 26, 1971, and that they were handpicked, with the Under Secretary of 
Agriculture [Richard Lyng] -- the second highest official in both the Hardin and Butz 
regimes -- serving as chairman, dated April 26, 1971, setting up the Committee.29 
29 Congressional Record, June 26, 1972. 
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The memo setting up the Young Executive Committee was then placed in the official 
record, along with the report itself. The report called for the restructuring of farms to large 
corporate farms. During the 1970s the definition of "farm" was changed by increasing the 
size of the operation and the income generated from it, thus causing a large reduction in the 
statistics of the number of farms in this country. Farm bills continued to gradually lower 
price supports. Price supports were finally eliminated with the 1996 farm bill. According to 
a USDA Economic Research Service summary of the act: 
[T]he 1996 Act furthers the process of reorienting key segments ofD.S. agriculture 
toward the marketplace that had been well under way over the last 10 years. Under 
previous legislation, the links between government payments and producer planting 
decisions were weakened .... Farm commodity programs became more market-
oriented with less government involvement through features such as (1) freezing 
program payment yields implemented under the 1985 Farm Act, and (2) planting 
flexibility with 15 percent nonpayment acres 
in 1990 legislation.30 
What did Iowa look like in the 1930s 
In November 1932, Iowa State College held a conference to examine the problems 
then existing in agriculture. Agricultural economist AG. Black vividly describes the situation 
being faced at that time: 
Hogs now (November 1932) are selling for $3.00 per hundred; beef cattle, $5.00; 
corn, 10 cents a bushel; oats, 7 cents; butterfat, 20 cents a pound. The things that 
farmers produce are all selling at one-half or one-third of their 1922-1929 average 
prices ... .Interest and principal on old debts remain the same. The average farm 
mortgage for mortgaged farms still runs at $65 an acre. Taxes average $1.50 an acre-
- down a little. Freight rates are practically unchanged .... Purchasing power of the 
30 C. Edwin Young and Paul C. Westcott, ''The 1996 U.S. Fann Act Increases Market Orientation" 
(Washington, D.C.: Economic Research Service, 1996), iii. 
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farmers products now is only 52 percent of pre-war; the farmer's capacity to pay has 
been cut in half When he takes a load of hogs or com to town and sells it to meet his 
running expenses, the money he receives for the load will go only half as far as it 
used to go .... The index of the things farmers buy includes the goods used in living 
and in production, but does not include rents, insurance, taxes, or payments on land or 
other debts. These all remain close to 150 percent of the pre-war, the same as they 
were a few years ago. With these included, the average farmer's purchasing power, 
instead of being reduced to 52, actually is reduced to 40 or 45 percent of pre-
war .... These low incomes have had a disastrous effect on land values. The value of 
Iowa farm land has been declining steadily ever since 1920 .... From 1931 to 1932 
they went through the most rapid decline in history .... Many farms would now sell for 
less than the mortgages on them. In many cases the decline in their values has 
exceeded all the payments made since the farm was purchased ... .Iowa led the nation 
in bank suspensions for the period from 1921 to 1929 with a total of 457 .... The peak 
in bank suspensions seems to have been passed .... A great deal of this improvement 
can be attributed to the activities of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which 
has brought a new element of strength into the banking situation.31 
The author of this same paper from the conference also pointed out that farm income 
for 1931 had been negative, and was expected to be even lower in 1932. 
Another paper from the conference, dealing with the farm mortgage problem, went 
into the average debt per acre ofIowa farmland. It went back to the 1890s (another bad time 
in Iowa farm history) for comparison. In the 1890s, the average debt per acre on mortgaged 
land was $14 to $16; in October 1932, the debt stood at $65 per acre. Much of this debt was 
refinanced debt, brought about by the reduced commodity prices since the origination of the 
first mortgage. The participants generally agreed that the lower prices came about when the 
government stopped financing European buying in the early 1920s. lIu>ther...wmds, when 
_ pri~e~~ere up during and immediately_aftecWorid War I. farmers incurredd~1J1Jo_~2CP_~d 
and/or upgradeJo newer technologies. Prices fell~.~Il(tmQ(e_debLwas. incurredjnJhe~orm of 
,---------_. - ._.-" ----- .. -------~ 
re!}!1ancing .. Prices fell further, and the debt 90ul.d Eot be serviced. (William McKinley, in 
31 A. G. Black, 'The Crisis in the Fall of 1932," The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa. ed. Staff in 
Economics at Iowa State College, (Ames: Collegiate Press, Inc., 1933). 1-3. 
87 
his 1896 The Tariffin the Days of Henry Clay and Since, offered a similar explanation for the 
problems farmers faced in the 1870s -- an after shock of the Civil War.) 
The above paper, by Murray and Bentley, also noted that farmers "had been using up 
resources outside the farm to keep taxes and interest paid. [In other words, farmers were 
----------_. 
using income from non-farming sources to try to keep their farms.] Furthermore, pressure 
..--------------._-- -, --- .-.----._---
was placed on the land to make it produce more in order that the fixed charges could be met. 
Both of these sources of reserve could not last indefinitely. Hence, foreclosure, assignment 
of the land to the mortgage holder, or a scaling down of the debt occurred. ,,32 
Included in the list of solutions to the problem at the time was the recommendation 
that farm prices be brought back to a level that would better secure the debt. In fact, this was 
seen as the quickest and most effective way to alleviate the problem than the other 
recommendations.33 
Two methods of accomplishing this were put forth to Congress in 1933. One of these 
was a cost-of-production calculation (recommended by some of the farm groups, such as the 
Farmers Union, and the Grange). This method would put a floor under all farm products 
based on the cost of production, as determined by the Secretary of Agriculture. Prices could 
go up from there, but they could not go down; the government did not support the price by 
purchases. The calculation, as developed by Iowa agricultural economist Edward E. 
Kennedy in 1924, worked in a manner similar to manufacturing. Costs were as ofa certain 
date. To arrive at an average income, a five-year rolling average of all farm products was 
calculated. The percent of farm cost to farm production was calculated. Kennedy went on 
32 William G. Murray and Ronald C. Bentley, "Iowa Fann Mortgage Problem," The Agricultural 
Emergencv in Iowa. (Ames: Collegiate Press, Inc., 1933), 57. 
3~ Ibid. 
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from there to show how an average cost of production could be determined that would not 
amount to 50 percent under for some and over for others?4 A two-price system was 
developed: one price would be for agricultural products predicated upon the quantity 
----- - ~-
,consumed domestically, and another price for surplus agri~ultural products that would be 
sold into the world markets. In other words, the price to the farmer for the amount of the 
produce consumed domestically would be the minimum amount, as calculated, that was 
needed by the farmer to cover the average cost of production. (This was roughly comparable 
to the method proposed by those supporting the American System of approach to capitalism.) 
Five McNary-Haugen (from Iowa) bills attempted to establish this legislation, but failed to 
gather the necessary political support. The basic principle remained the same for each bill, 
but the proposed mechanism varied as the plan evolved to meet objections raised in 
Congress and by the Presidents. The idea was not to support all production beyond what 
could be used domestically, but to support the domestic prices so the farm sector would be on 
a par with the other sectors of the economy. 
TjJe second method, called the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, was the 
compromised method that was passed and signed into law May 12, 1933. With this method, 
an average cost was determined, but it was supported by the government entering the market 
.... - -----~.--<--- .. _.-.... . - ,.... . > - • "-
to purchase sufficient quantities to maintain the floor price.35 (This concept is based on the 
------ .-.~ - -~ - .. -------.. -----~--.---.--~-~~--~.~----"" ."-, ~- - . 
Adam Smith approach to capitalism.) The adopted method attempts to reconcile the 
----------- ----------------~- - -- ---
capitalist idea of price determination through the market based on quantity, with the 
government taking quantities out of the market through its purchases to raise the price to the 
34 Edward E. Kennedy, The Fed and the Farmer (U.S.A: EdwardE. Kennedy, 1983). 
35 Benedict, Farm Policies. 
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desired floor level. This, of course, caused the problems that eventually led to its over-ride 
and partial repeal. 
In Figure 6, the ratio is determined by farm cash commodity income on the top, 
divided by farm debt on the bottom. The trend of the chart is down until the late 1980s, 
when the farm liquidations reduced the debt. This means that the debt was rising faster than 
the farm cash commodity income. There are no additional non-cash amounts included for 
change in asset values, consumption by the farm family, or rent for farm buildings that the 
family was using in the farming operation. The expenses exclude dwelling expenses. 
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Figure 6: U.S. farm income as a percent of farm debt 1950 to 1990. 
Source: USDA statistics as furnished by the Economic Research Service December 
1998. http://profiles.iastate.edu/download/profiles/ 
According to a number of sources (Federal Reserve Bank, USDA, Farm Credit 
System), the debt was rising beyond the repayment capacity of income generated from 
farming activities. Loans were increasingly made on the rising paper value of the assets as 
an offset to the reducing income. It was considered good business practice, even by 
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businesses not in farming, to use this paper equity by borrowing against it. When the values 
stopped going up, many businesses were caught with excessive debt and insufficient income 
to service the debt. When this abruptly stopped, the trend went back down, as Figure 6 
shows. Adding off farm income would show an improved situation, but the point is to show 
that farm-generated income was insufficient to service the debt. 
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Figure 7: Iowa farm expenses as a percent of Iowa commodity income 1949-1990 
Source: Economic Research Service USDA December 1998. 
http://profiles.iastate.edu/download/profiles/ 
Figure 7 shows Iowa farm expenses as a percent ofIowa farm commodity income for 
the years 1949 to 1990. Note that there are two times -- 1984, 1989 -- when the expenses are 
more than 100 percent of farm commodity income. After the mid-l 950s, the Iowa farm 
expenses are generally 70 percent or more of Iowa commodity income. During this time, 
farm bills were overriding the parity price structure, and the USDA support price was less 
than the USDA-calculated average cost of production for what a parity price would be. 
(Even though the USDA no longer supported a parity price to farmers to support their 
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income to a comparable level with the rest of the economy, they were still required to make 
the calculation as to what that price would be.) 
Figure 8 shows Iowa farm debt as a ratio to Iowa cash farm income. Note the jump in 
Iowa farm debt as a percent oflowa commodity income after 1970. Note that in the 1980s it 
was not only over 100 percent, it was over 150 percent. This corresponds to the comments 
made by the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank economists (in the next chapter) that farmers 
were supplementing their low income with more borrowing. This is the same situation that 
was observed in the 1920s and 1930s. 
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Figure 8: Iowa Farm Debt Per Income. 
Source: Economic Research Service USDA 1998. 
http://profiles. iastate. edu/ download/profiles! 
Figure 9 shows the increase in Iowa non-farm real estate debt. This is important 
because this short- and intermediate-term borrowing has been used by farmers to supplement 
their low commodity income (when other sources were not sufficient). It was also used to 
make the payments on the long-term debt. Even though it was not good business sense to 
borrow money at a higher interest rate to make a payment on a loan with a lower rate of 
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interest, the priority for the farmer was to keep the farm. Note the increase in the Iowa short-
tenn debt for the late 1970s to the late 1980s. As long as lenders were willing to increase 
short-tenn debt to pay long-tenn debt, the long-tenn lenders were in a good position. 
However, when the short-tenn lenders quit advancing money to make the long-tenn debt 
payments, the long-tenn debt position was in trouble. It should be recalled that it was 
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Figure 9: Iowa Non RE Debt Per Income. 
Source: Economic Research Service USDA 1998 
http://profiles.iastate.eduldownloadlprofiles/ 
considered good business practice at the time to borrow against equity (to make your money 
work for you). The Federal Reserve economists acknowledge this in the next chapter. 
The response in the 1980s was not the same as it was in the 193 Os. The crisis of the 
1980s led to a push by the government for farmers to supplement their commodity income 
with income from the Board of Trade and from off farm jobs. In addition, there were two big 
land set-aside measures: the Conservation Reserve Program and the Wetlands Preservation 
Program. Each of these aimed to set aside 50 million acres. This is land out of production, 
on which farmers cannot generate income. Lenders, on the other hand, wanted more control 
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over risk, so they pushed for an increase in contracting arrangements where a price would be 
spelled out in the contract. The manner in which this shift in control has taken place is 
similar to the methods used by the Beef Trust (discussed earlier in this chapter). 
Farm commodity income was not sufficient to support the farm debt, the farm 
income, and the farm family. All of these factors were in the required calculation the USDA 
was to make to determine a basic price. However, when this legislation was overridden by 
succeeding farm bills that aimed to lower the support price to nothing in the move to a free 
market system (where contracting would be the only "game in town"), the income was not 
available to the farmer. With the income not available, farm lenders initially loaned more 
money (increasing the debt load) to refinance the debt, then they stopped doing this and 
began liquidating. A~ the next chapter will show, the response by the government was to 
advance money to the lenders to finance the liquidations (as was done in the 1930s), but no 
increase in farm income was forthcoming (as it had been in the 1930s). The reason it was_ 
different in the 1980s is because the idea of a free trade market economy had determined the 
decision-making. Under this system, the price to the farmer would be determined by the 
increasingly concentrating handful of processors, who buy on a worldwide basis. This is 
_nowJhe.new farm policy. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE FARM CRISIS OF THE 1980S 
Events in the 1970s 
Why begin a look at the farm crisis of the 1980s with an examination of farm policies 
in the 1970s? The answer lies in the fact that the groundwork for what happened in the 
1980s was laid in the 1970s as an outgrowth over the direction farm policy had taken. This 
groundwork involves the question of farm income as well as farm lending. 
Since the farm crisis of the 1930s, the Land Banks, the Federal Intermediate Credit 
Banks (FICBs), the Production Credit Associations, and the Bank for Cooperatives (now 
called collectively the Farm Credit System) was a national presence in farm lending, with 
access to funding that was not available to other farm lenders. The Farm Credit System has 
its own funding agency that is in the securities market sixteen times a year. This funding 
corporation is located in New York City and manages a selling group of approximately 125 
investment dealers and dealer banks that offer the securities. It also provides financial 
advisory services and supports the Farm Credit System institutions in the management of 
interest rate risk. 1 As long as investment dealers are willing to buy Farm Credit System 
1 All of the annual Fann Credit System annual reports discuss the structure and operation of the 
funding system. 
95 
securities, money continues to flow into agriculture through that entity. Investors, looking 
for a low-risk investment, have considered Farm Credit System securities a good investment 
because government backing was assumed, though not explicit. Banks and insurance 
companies (other major sources offarm lending) have other sources of funds that can limit 
what they have available for agricultural lending. 
The Farm Credit System is a national farm cooperative lender that is allowed to exist 
by Congress for the sole purpose of financing agriculture. The private money flowing into 
the system - and ultimately out of it - influenced the inflation of farm real estate prices and 
the liquidation of farm loans for itself and other farm lenders during the agriculture crisis of 
the 1980s. The following is how it worked. 
While the government provided the initial seed money for the beginning of the 
System, the last of that was retired in 1968. The financing comes from Farm Credit System 
securities (of varying lengths from 3 months to several years) issued sixteen times a year. 
The Farm Credit System Financing Corporation (created in 1923) handles the sales. The 
securities are purchased by a pre-approved list of brokers who then sell some of the securities 
and keep some for themselves. This is the process that channels money into the System for 
lending. The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City describes the process thusly: 
The system's bonds and notes are ... sold through a nationwide chain of securities 
dealers. The dealers in tum sell the bonds to other private and public investors, 
tapping a source of funds which otherwise might not flow into the agriculture sector. 
Only the amount of bonds issued by the U.S. Treasury exceeds the amount issued in 
the national money market by the Farm Credit System.2 
2 Kerry Webb, "The Faun Credit System," Economic Review Federal Reserve Bank o/Kansas City 
(June 1980):27-28. 
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In 1970, the total U.S. farm real estate debt was $27,505,932,000. Table 4 shows the 
breakdown. For Iowa, the total was $2,085,940 (000). Table 5 shows this breakdown. The 
1971 Farm Credit Act, passed by Congress and signed into law, was a re-chartering of the 
system, the first since 1933. Two of the major changes concerned lending for land. One of 
Table 4: 1970 U. S. Farm RE Debt by Farm Lender. 
Life Insurance Cos. 
Banks 
Other 
, , 
2,179,873,000 
5,122,291,000 
3,328,876,000 
10454540000 
Source: Economic Research Service USDA: Agricultural Income and Finance 
Situation and Outlook Report 1975. 
Table 5: 1970 Iowa Farm RE Debt by Farm Lender. 
Farm Credit System 
FmHA 
Commercial banks 
Ufe insurance Co. 
Others 
$ 394,235 
107,465 
118,034 
432,518 
1,033,688 
Source: Economic Research Service USDA, December 1998. 
http://profiles.iastate.eduldownload/profiles/ 
the changes involved the determination of the appraised value. Until the change, the appraisal 
was based on the value of what the land would produce. After implementation of the 1971 
Act, the appraisal was based on market value - increasing the borrowing potential when 
values were going up. The other major change in this regard was the percentage that 
could be loaned against the new appraised value. That percentage was increased from 65 
percent to 85 percent. Because the Land Banks have their benchmark farms in their 
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territorial counties, the extent to which the Land Banks have market share influences other 
appraisals in those areas. The Economic Research Service of the USDA commented in 1975: 
The rapid shift in market share and the increase in funds provided by the Federal 
Land Banks are dramatic evidence of the changes in lending policies which were the 
result of the Farm Credit Act of 1971. This shift also reflects the inability of 
insurance companies to increase their allocation of funds to agriculture in a time of 
rising demand for loan funds.3 
The above quote says that there was a demand for loan funds that was not being met 
by other lenders at the time, either because of policies, or because the funds were not 
available except through the Farm Credit System securities. Farmers have to have land to 
produce, and new technologies to maintain efficiency. If speculators (not interested in 
production but only in turning a profit) are in the land market driving up the land prices and 
the security rates, or, if there are demands for the land for other uses (such as urban sprawl or 
preserves), then farmers will have to pay the higher prices in order to acquire the land. 
In 1978, the national Farm Credit Administration Board (the regulator of the Farm 
Credit System) approved the final regulations necessary for the introduction of new Federal 
Farm Credit Bank Consolidated Systemwide Bonds.4 The implementation of this system was 
completed at the beginning of January 1979. All Farm Credit bonds issued after that time 
were Consolidated Systemwide Bonds. In the annual report for that year, the Farm Credit 
System stated that all entities in the national system would now participate in these joint 
issues, rather than a single district Farm Credit Bank group (as had been the practice up to 
that time): "The Systemwide Bond issue are joint and several obligations of the 37 Farm 
3 U.S Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service "Balance Sheet of Fanning Sector 
1975," (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975). 
4 45th Annual Report of The Farm Credit Administration and the Cooperative Farm Credit System 
J 977-J 978 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), 5. 
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Credit Banks. liS This meant that every entity in the national system of twelve districts around 
the U. S. was now liable for the entire national debt of the system -- as opposed to just their 
own district debt previously. In addition, loss-sharing agreements were initiated so that if 
one entity needed financial assistance, every other entity within the system would contribute. 
Land prices at this time were 78 percent higher than they had been five years before, 
according to the USDA. 
In June 1978, the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank issued its ''Economic Review." 
In this report, co-author Marvin Duncan noted that the personal income of farm people 
included a substantial and increasing amount of non-farm income. In fact, almost 60 percent 
of the earnings accruing to farm people in 1976 came from off-farm sources, an indication 
that the lower and lower support prices from the 1970 and 1975 farm bills were reducing the 
cash income to farmers from farming. 6 
For the rest of 1978 and 1979, the Federal Reserve was worried about inflation. 
When the Federal Reserve worries about inflation, raising interest rates become an option. 
The raising of Federal Reserve rates has a bearing on the rates of Farm Credit System 
securities. While not expressly guaranteed by the government, the buyers of the securities 
assumed that the government would come through in an emergency, so the security rates 
were usually within 0.5 percent of the Treasury rates. The result of this was that as the 
Federal Reserve rate was going up, so was the Farm Credit System's average security rate--
as well as the lending rate to borrowers. (Each layer of the system then added its spread for 
operating expenses to determine the final rate to the borrower.) At this time, each 
5Ibid,29. 
6 Marvin Duncan and C. Edward Harshbarger, "Parity - Is It The Answer?" Economic Review Kansas 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City (June 1978): 10. 
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Association had one lending rate to all of the borrowers in its territory. This meant that those 
with more equity were partially subsidizing the ones with less equity - those with new capital 
purchases. 
According to the USDA, 53 percent of the farm debt at the time was in real estate. 
After 1980, the Farm Credit districts began initiating tiered rates that were determined by the 
level of perceived risk in the loan analysis forms. This would have the effect of separating 
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Source: Economic Research Service USDA 
Agricultural Finance and Income March 1999. 
the loans into several categories, with a rate of interest for each category. The interest was, 
thus, going up at a faster rate for every category above the lowest rate. This is important at 
any time, but when the cash income was going down and the borrowing was going up, it 
becomes critical. 
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It would be highly unusual for a borrower to pay the average rate of interest. The real 
rate of interest would be either above or below the average rate. Because the information is 
not available, it is not possible to determine if the lowest rates were being subsidized (or 
partially subsidized) by the higher rates. As the 1970s were coming to an end, the lending 
rate, generally, was going up, as was the inflation rate. This combination had always been a 
problem for farmers. 
The Farm Credit System 1979 annual report noted: 
The rate of inflation speeded up in 1979, while growth in the real economy slowed to 
a walk .... The System accommodated the expanded demand for loans by selling a 
record amount of securities. Mirroring double-digit inflation, money market rates 
rose to peak levels causing System rates to rise also to new heights .... The Federal 
Reserve Board on October 6 [made] a fundamental change in its operating 
procedures. It shifted the day-to-day focus of open-market operations from the 
Federal Funds interest rate to growth in bank reserves and money supply. Thus, 
interest rates were free to fluctuate with market forces and, as a consequence, rose 
and moved over a wider range. At the same time, the discount rate was raised by 1 
percentage point to 12 percent and an 8 percent marginal reserve requirement was 
applied to certain managed liabilities of commercial banks. These measures had the 
effect of increasing interest rates and decreasing the supply of money, but failed to 
halt inflation's growth .... Rates on Farm Credit System securities rose. Six-month 
maturities rose from an average of8.11 percent in 1978 to 11.05 percent in 
1979 .... Farmers turned to the Farm Credit System and to the Farmers Home 
Administration for credit.,,7 
The above quote supports the conclusion that the other farm lenders now did not have 
access to as much money to make available for farm loans because of the new Federal 
Reserve requirements. The Farm Credit System had money available because it did not have 
the additional requirements placed on them. This, coupled with their new lending policy of 
7 4r!" Annual Report of the Farm Credit Administration and The Cooperative Farm Credit System1979 
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979),2. 
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85 percent of appraised value, channeled money into farm real estate lending at a time when 
the demand was there because of rising prices. 
The 1980s 
In 1980, total U.S. farm real estate debt was $89,692,429,000. Table 6 shows the 
breakdown by major farm lender. For the state ofIowa, the farm real estate lending totaled 
$7,220,993(000). Table 7 shows the breakdown by major farm lender. 
Table 6: 1980 U. S. Farm RE Debt by Farm Lender. 
Farm Credit System $33,224,684,000 
FmHA 7,435,059,000 
Life Insurance Cos. 11,997,922,000 
Banks 7,765,058,000 
Others 29,269,705,000 
Source: Economic Research Service USDA 
Agricultural Income and Finance Situation and Outlook Report 1980. 
Table 7: 1980 Iowa Farm RE Debt by Farm Lender. 
Farm Credit System 
FmHA 
Commercial banks 
Life insurance companies 
Others 
2,258,172 
344,592 
321,530 
900,263 
3,396,436 
Source: Economic Research Service USDA 
Agricultural Finance and Income Situation and Outlook 1998. 
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The Congressional Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1980 increased the amount the 
Land Banks could loan against collateral to 97 percent. USDA reports showed farm real 
estate debt growing at the fastest rate in 60 years. In other words, not since the end of World 
War I, when farmers were using good farm prices to purchase real estate, had the farm debt 
been so large. These same USDA records also showed farm income declining. The 1980 
Farm Credit System Annual Report said: "During 1980, many farmers were plagued by high 
interest rates, tight credit, generally lower farm prices, higher costs and drought."g 
In June 1980, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City had the following to say: 
The system [Farm Credit System] has funneled large amounts of money into 
agriculture .... At the same time it has gained an increasing share of the agricultural 
lending market and become the nation's leading agricultural credit supplier. .. .If 
present trends continue, outstanding farm credit will double by 1990 ... .The Farm 
Credit System will playa major role in the determination of U.S. agricultural 
production and marketing efforts in the coming years. 9 
In the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank December 1980 year-end economic report, 
Marvin Duncan noted that "The year ahead will be a dynamic one for agricultural 
producers. ,,10 That certainly proved to be true. The following year he noted in the December 
1981 year-end report: "The past year has been a disappointing one for farmers .... During 
1981, farmers experienced the second year in a row of sharply depressed net farm income."ll 
In 1981 the new farm bill reduced the support prices another 1 0 percent. 
In 1981, the annual report ofthe Farm Credit System, noted: 
8 4th Annual Report o/the Farm Credit Administration and the Cooperative Farm Credit System 1980 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), 2. 
9 Kerry Webb, "The Fann Credit System," 16. 
10 Malvin Duncan "A Year of Promise for American Agriculture," Economic Report o/the Federal 
Reserve Bank o/Kansas City (December 1980): 7. 
II Malvin Duncan. "The Fann Outlook: Recovery in 1982?" Economic Report o/the Federal Reserve 
Banko/Kansas City (December 1981): 25. 
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The $73.9 billion in credit extended during 1981 was an all-time high .... Nearly half 
of the amount extended was used to refinance some kind of existing debt, indicating 
that many farmers were either stretching out payments to improve cash flows or using 
equity in real estate to finance o~erations. The average cost of borrowing by the 
System rose to 15.3% in 1981. 1 
The cost of borrowing to the farmers was going up at a time when their income was 
going down. The USDA estimated that interest charges were double the percent of farm 
production expenses from 10 years earlier. 13 
By 1983, net farm income had dropped to its lowest level since 1971, according to 
the USDA. Marvin Duncan noted in a Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank report that: 
The recent period of income stress has ... spawned some serious financial problems for 
farmers. Farmers either leaving farming or selling part of their capital assets as a 
result of financial stress represent a substantially larger proportion of all farmers than 
would be expected under more normal economic conditions .... Farmers have 
increasingly relied on debt financing over the past decade. (Emphasis added.) 
Total farm debt outstanding has risen 310% since 1970. Real estate debt has risen 
275% and non-real estate 354%. During much of that period, however, farm asset 
values rose even faster, holding the farm sector's debt-to-asset ratio around 16% to 
17%. Most of the increase in farm asset values was due to escalating farm real 
estate values. (Emphasis added.) From 1970 to 1981, when values peaked, national 
farmland values increased at an average annual rate of 13.4% -- well ahead of the 
7.2% average annual increase in the GNP implicit price deflator.,,14 
In this same article, Marvin Duncan noted that these financial problems developed for 
several reasons. One of the reasons was the low cash flow. Another reason was due to the 
escalating interest rates. These reasons combined to precipitate a beginning decline in asset 
124ft' Annual Report of The Farm Credit Administration and The Cooperative Farm Credit System 
1981 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), 13. 
\3 4f7h Annual Report of The Farm Credit Administration and the Cooperative Farm Credit System 
1982 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982). 
14 Marvin Duncan, "Financing Agriculture in the 19805," in the Economic Review of the Kansas City 
Federal Reserve Bank (July-August 1983): 3-5. 
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values that was squeezing the ability to borrow to continue the farming operations. This 
situation was causing an increase in loan delinquency rates. 
It was the widespread substitution of credit for income during the past several 
years that is responsible for the current unfortunate plight of many financially 
troubled farmers ••. (Emphasis added.) ••. Financial market conditions during the 
1970s, both in and out of agriculture, tended to encourage farms to use leverage in 
their growth strategies .... As a result, it is not surprising that agricultural debt levels 
grew so rapidly during that period .... Farm consolidation could reduce the number of 
replacement farmers needed and many entrants will likely receive family assistance in 
starting their business. IS 
By 1985 the new farm bill reduced price supports further, causing farm incomes to 
fall more, according to USDA reports. Marvin Duncan wrote in March of that year: 
American agriculture is under its greatest financial stress since the Great Depression. 
Heavily leveraged farmers are having great trouble servicing their debts. Capital 
losses in the sector promise to be large as farm asset values decline .... Misled by 
rising income expectations and price signals distorted by rising inflation, farmers 
used debt aggressively in the 1970s to finance expansions and to paper over 
short-term debt service problems. Farm debt at the beginning of the 1970s was 
about three times annual farm income. By 1983 and 1984, farm sector debt was 
about eight times annual farm income. (Emphasis added.) Poor prospects for farm 
income have combined with high real interest rates to exact a toll on farm real estate 
values ... .It seems clear that U.S. agriculture is in the midst of a major adjustment to 
both the market realities it currently faces and those that are in prospect. That 
adjustment will be more traumatic than any since the Great Depression .... Lenders are 
expected to take possession of large amounts of farm real estate over the next two to 
three years as a result of foreclosures and other actions to settle problem loans.,,16 
In December of 1985, Mark Drabenstott wrote in the December issue of the Kansas 
City Federal Reserve Bank Economic Review that Wall Street would likely remain skittish 
about Farm Credit System bonds because of the mounting past due loan portfolio and the 
liquidations. At that time, the spread between system bonds and Treasuries was greater than 
15 Ibid, 6-11. 
16 Mark Drabenstott and Marvin Duncan, "Fann Credit Problems:Policy Choices," Economic Review 
Federal Reserve Bank o/Kansas City (March 1985): 10. 
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the traditional 0.5 percent. The collateral for the securities was the loan portfolio of the 
system - linked by system-wide loss-sharing agreements and system-wide security issues, 
both begun in the late 1970s. The collateral for the loans was the farm assets, which were 
now declining in value. 
In December of 1985, Congress passed the Farm Credit Amendments Act, which 
went into effect in January 1986. The management of the System became vested in a 
Presidentially appointed three-member, full-time board of directors; the national 13-
member farmer board was out. Not only was the national farmer board out, but any farmer 
board member at the various levels below could now be removed ''for cause" (never 
defined in the legislation).17 The significance of this is that the farmer board members 
were also borrowers (by regulation), therefore potentially sympathetic to the plight of 
farmers. If there was resistance to increasing the interest rates, resistance to liquidating 
loans, or other acts favorable to the farmer borrowers and potentially not favorable to the 
System, they could be removed and another appointed in their place. The government 
agreed to come to the financial aid of the System should it become necessary, but first they 
had to use up all of their reserve for potential losses and their accumulated .surplus. This 
calmed the jitters of Wall Street. One of the new members ofthe restructured Farm Credit 
System Board was Marvin Duncan, former Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank economist. 
Another board member, and designated chairman and chief executive officer was Frank 
Naylor, former Under Secretary of Agriculture for Small Community and Rural 
Development. The third member of the new board was Oklahoma rancher Jim Billington. 
17 Farm Credit Administration Annual Report 1986 (Washington D. c.: Government Printing Office, 
1986),3. 
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According to the 1986 annual report of the Farm Credit Administration: "The new law 
gives the FCA enhanced enforcement authorities, including the power to issue cease and 
desist orders, levy civil money penalties, and remove officers and directors of the system 
. • • ,,18 InstItutIons. 
By the end of 1985, total U.S. farm real estate debt had reached $100,076,120,000. 
Table 8 shows how this breaks down by major farm lender. For Iowa, the farm real estate 
lending was $7,778,117 (000). Table 9 shows how this breaks down by major farm lender. 
The agriculture sector did not improve in 1986. 
Table 8: 1985 U. S. Farm RE Debt by Farm Lender. 
Farm Credit System $42,168,554,000 
FmHA 9,820,913,000 
Life Insurance Cos. 11,272,689,000 
Banks 10,731,881,000 
Others 26,082,096,000 
Source: Economic Research Service USDA 
Agricultural Income and Finance Situation and Outlook Report 1986. 
Table 9: 1985 Iowa Farm RE Debt by Farm Lender. 
Farm Credit System 
FmHA 
Commercial banks 
Life insurance Co 
Others 
$2,584,656 
489,933 
688,666 
900,260 
3,114,602 
Source: Economic Research Service USDA 
Agricultural Finance and Income Situation and Outlook Report 1998. 
18 Ibid, 3. 
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Mark Drabenstott wrote in the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank Economic Report 
in December 1986 that: 
Agriculture had another painful year in 1986. The industry entered the year at 
perhaps the darkest moment of its deep recession. Farmland values were still falling 
rapidly in many parts of the country and farm liquidations were the highest in recent 
memory. 19 
In 1987 Congress passed the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987. The act established 
the Farm Credit System Assistance Corporation. It costs a lot of money to liquidate loans. 
There are extra staff hours and extra paperwork. There are legal expenses. There are 
management fees because the assets must be managed in some manner until such time as 
they can be sold. In fact, it can take more money to manage and liquidate assets than to 
keep the loan on the lender's books and operate it. The Farm Credit System was required 
by legislation to perform an analysis on each loan for the costs of alternative actions before 
liquidation could take place. This is where the manner of loan analysis is important. What 
figures were used, and were they realistic? 
Bonds would be issued to pay the additional system costs of liquidation. These 
bonds would have an interest rate. Both the interest and the principal would have to be 
repaid to the investors who purchased the bonds. The underlying collateral was the loan 
portfolio of "bad" loans and the assets of these loans. The Assistance Corporation would 
pay all of the interest costs on the bonds for the first five years. During the next five years, 
the interest costs would be shared equally by the Treasury and the System. The System 
19 Mark Drabenstott, "The Long Road Back for Agriculture," in Economic Review Federal Reserve 
Bank o/Kansas City Vol. 71, No. 10 (December 1986): 40. 
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would pay the costs for the last five years. These were 15-year bonds whose interest would 
be subsidized by the Assistance Corporation for 5 years, and partially subsidized by the 
Treasury for the next 5 years. The remainder of the money for the interest and the principal 
of the bonds would be paid by the System using the liquidated assets and other sources of 
its income?O 
Loan demand by farmers had decreased, so money going into the system through the 
usual channels of security issues was not as high as it had been. The Federal Reserve 
reported that the decline in farmland values - a drop of 30 percent since 1980, 60 percent in 
some areas - appeared to have slowed. 
By 1988, the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank: reported that there was a farm 
recovery: "The recovery? .c.oI11ing on the he~I~.9f.Q~e ~K t1!~ bigg~st _fj~ancial restructurings 
--' ..... __ .. --' "-- '-'-. ~"~~'---"--'----'------'--~'--
in agricultunf.~Lhistory, .. marks the beginning of a new era for the industry and fo.r lenders to 
__ ------ __________ ._ ._ ..... _ ••• _ .~ •• _._ ••••• ~~_~._ .. _ •••• _. ___ ,_ ...... __ •• ____ ._. ____ • ___ ._"" __ ·_·_. ___ ••• _ ... ___ 0 __ ,
~gricUJ!!.!r~."21 The authors of this report went on to point out that "The market share held by 
the Farm Credit System grew steadily to a peak of 44 percent in 1984 before slipping back to 
just under 40 percent in 1986.',22 It was also noted that by the end of 1988 the System had 
taken $196 million out of its Reserve for Loan Losses and put it back into income - at the 
request of Congress. 
It is important to understand how this Reserve for Loan Loss account works. The 
System was required to take out of its earnings each year up to 0.5 percent of its year-end 
loan balance and put it into an account for potential losses before closing the books. This 
20 1987 Annual Report Farm Credit Administration (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1987),7. 
21 Alan Barkema, Mark Drabenstott, Landell Froerer, "A New Ern in Fann Lending: Who Will 
Prosper?" in Economic Review Federal Reserve Bank Kansas City Vol. 73, No.6 (June 1988): 22. 
22 Ibid. 25. 
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entry did not represent actual loan losses, but was a reserve for potential future losses. 
Because it came from earnings, the interest rate spread (as a part of the operating expenses) 
between the cost of the securities and the lending rate to borrowers included the estimated 
amount of this entry each year. In 1985, the method of calculating this entry changed in a 
significant way. In 1983, Congress had passed the International Lending and Supervision 
Act that mandated a change in accounting for anticipated losses for Savings and Loans, 
Banks, and the Farm Credit System. The Farm Credit Administration (as federal agency and 
regulator for the Farm Credit System) took until the summer of 1985 to write and implement 
the required new regulations for the system. 23 
The new entry to the Reserve for Loan Loss account became based on the potential 
losses as estimated by the new loan analysis forms (a copy of which is included at the end of 
this chapter). Whatever these forms determined to be the new potential losses for the system 
each month was transferred to the Reserve for Loan Loss account on a monthly basis. Thus, 
if the forms were including extra expenses as a cushion for possible liquidations (which they 
did), and declining asset values (which would only be known for sure when the assets were 
sold), then the entries to that account could be over stated. These new monthly entries (in the 
public financial reports of the system) were the figures that were being reported in the news 
media as system losses. This amount was not actual losses. Any actual losses that did occur 
were taken out of this provision for loss account. If the account were depleted, the loss-
sharing agreements among the districts of the system would be activated. After that, it was 
23 As Financial Operations Manager for the Central Iowa Production Credit Association at this time, it 
was not only my job to know how this worked. but I was asked to write the manual section for LA)an Loss 
Accounting for the Omaha Farm Credit District. 
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assumed that the government would come to the rescue of the Farm Credit System security 
holders.24 The significance of the transfer of$196 million from the Reserve for Loan Loss 
account to the income account means that the system had set aside more money than it had 
needed to cover the losses it experienced as a whole. In a book published in 1992 by the 
Assistance Board for the Farm Credit System, it was acknowledged that the accounting 
method changed in 1985, and that the system aggressively forced borrowers into 
liquidation.25 
What was happening in Iowa 
For purposes of Farm Credit lending, Iowa was part of the Omaha Farm Credit 
District during the farm crisis of the 1980s. At the end of June 1978, the Omaha Federal 
Land Bank reported 59,580 agricultural and farm-related business loans. Of those, almost 
one-half of them (27,069) were in Iowa. The loan volume stood at $2.9 billion for the same 
time frame. The number of Production Credit Association members for the Omaha District 
was 23,641. Of those, almost half(10,722) were in Iowa. The loan volume was $1.4 
billion.26 
The annual financial report for December 1981 showed the Omaha Federal Land 
Banks with 69,372 loans; of these, 33,696 were in Iowa. The loan volume was $5.7 billion 
for the district and $3.1 billion for Iowa. Of these loans, 745 were reported with extension or 
delinquent installments. The Iowa portion of this was 285. The Production Credit 
24 As an employee of the Fann Credit System at that time in Financial Operations, it was my job to 
book these losses and to know how the calculations were being made. 
25 Peoples et al, Anatomy a/Credit Crisis, 41-2. 
26 45th Annual Report a/The Farm Credit Administration. 
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Association portion of this report showed 24,446 loans for the district. Of those, 11,079 were 
in Iowa. Loan volume was $2.3 billion for the district and $1.1 billion for Iowa. Losses for 
the district that year were just over $3.8 million?7 
By 1982, the Omaha Federal Land Banks showed loan numbers at 77,558; 38,836 (or 
half) were in Iowa. Loans with extensions or delinquent installments were 1,393 for the 
district, and 577 for Iowa. The loan volume for the district was $6.2 billion; for Iowa it was 
$3.3 billion. The Production Credit Associations in the district reported 24,284 loans 
outstanding, with 10,941 in Iowa. Loan volume was $2.3 billion for the district and $1.1 
billion for Iowa. The district reported charge-offs of$14.8 million for the year.28 
The 1983 annual report did not break: down the states for reporting. The Omaha 
Federal Land Bank District showed outstanding loans of 77,379. The loan volume was 
reported at $6.2 billion. Of these, 2,090 were reported with extensions or delinquent 
installments. The allowance for losses was $62 million. The Production Credit Associations 
reported 23,531 loans. The loan volume was $2.2 billion. 29 
In 1984, Iowa State University agricultural economist, Neil Harl, analyzed the farm 
debt situation and recommended against a moratorium, which was being discussed at the 
time because it had been used during the last comparable crisis in 1933. His conclusion was 
based on his assumption that it would adversely affect farmer borrowers rather than help 
them: 
Perhaps the most serious shortcoming of a moratorium is that is shifts the burden to 
creditors who then respond by reducing exposure to borrowers who are the most 
27 4ffh Annual Report of The Farm Credit Administration. 
28 4!fh Annual Report of The Farm Credit Administration. 
29 5d" Annual Report of The Farm Credit Administration and the Cooperative Farm Credit System 
1983 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983). 
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likely candidates to invoke the moratorium. Thus, it would likely end up impacting 
adversely the borrowers in greatest need of assistance. 30 
What Harl did recommend was a debt restructuring. Just as in the crisis of the 1930s, 
he suggested that lenders be asked to take a 20 percent write down in principal value of the 
obligation up-front. After that, various methods of rescheduling the debt could be employed, 
depending on the circumstances of each borrower. He saw it as in the ultimate interest of the 
lenders, the farm suppliers and servicers, as well as the rural areas to keep the borrowers on 
the books rather than liquidating them. 
A fundamental feature of the debt restructuring program is that all amounts of 
principal and interest that are deferred (except for the 20 percent reduction in 
principal value suffered by the lender and the one-half year of interest reduction for 
the first year) would be added to the debtor's principal balance. (Emphasis added.) 
Interest would be based upon the original loan rate for the original term of the loan 
and the federal borrowing rate for the period beyond the original term of the loan. 3 1 
One of the positive aspects to debt restructuring, according to Harl, would be a 
stabilizing of the factor markets. Attempts to improve cash flow by selling assets was being 
hampered by weak factor markets. If, for example, five of ten farmers in an area are trying to 
sell assets to raise money, who is available to bid on the assets, and how much money do 
they have with which to bid? The same principle would e true for lenders trying to sell 
repossessed assets. When there is a glut on the market, the prices are bid down (if there are 
any bids at all). This reduces the income from the sale of the asset, thus thwarting the 
purpose of the sale. The amount raised from the sale could be less than the amount owed. 
The real solution would be for the owner to have sufficient income to continue to make the 
payments and to use the assets to generate income to make other payments. 
30 Neil HarL The Farm Debt Crisis of the 1980s. (Ames: University Press, 1990),4. 
31 Ibid, 6. 
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Another recommendation ofHarl was an expanded loan guarantee plan by the 
USDA's FmHA. There was not a recommendation for supporting farm income. Neil Harl is 
considered an expert in the theories of free market capitalism, and is frequently called upon 
for advice in the farm sector because of his knowledge of this area. Therefore, 
recommending a floor under farm income is not an option he would have made because it 
would have been inconsistent with that ideology of allowing the markets to determine the 
prices. But, note that this was a different approach than the one recommended by the staff of 
Iowa State College in 1933 under similar circumstances. 
As the farm crisis continued, the 1984 Farm Credit System annual report stopped 
reporting some breakdown of loan figures for the districts. Up to this time, the loan losses 
were relatively small. Effective December 17, 1984, an amendment was made to the loss-
sharing section of the regulations for the System, indicating that trouble was coming. 
"Unlike" banks and "unlike" associations (meaning Land Banks and Production Credit 
Associations) would be allowed to share losses on a districtwide or Systemwide basis to 
accommodate certain loss sharing strategies in the form of casualty insurance. These 
amendments expanded the loss sharing options available to System institutions for 
responding to financial stress?2 At this time, the Reserve for Loan Loss account for the 
System as a whole stood at $700 million. 33 Because of the nature of the systemwide loss 
sharing agreements in place, whereby the entire system is jointly and severally liable for 
covering losses anywhere in the system in order to assure payment to security holders, it is 
necessary to track the Reserve for Loan Loss account from the national level. 
32 Farm Credit Administration Annual Report. 1984. 
33 Ibid. 
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In 1985, the Omaha Federal Land Bank (which included the state ofIowa) had an 
outstanding loan volume of $4.5 billion. That year it recorded an operating loss. The 
Federal Land Banks nationwide recorded a loss for 1985. The Production Credit 
Associations for the Omaha District (which included Iowa) reported a loan volume of $856 
million. They also reported an operating loss for 1985. The Production Credit Associations 
nationwide recorded an operating loss for 1985. The entire Farm Credit System reported an 
operating loss for 1985, but had a Reserve for Loan Loss Account balance of$3.2 billion, up 
from $700 million in 1984. The addition to this balance came from the earnings for that 
year. On a nationwide basis, the increase offsets the reported loss on the financial 
statement. 34 
The 1986 financial report showed the Omaha Federal Land Bank loan volume at $3.6 
billion. It showed a small operating loss. The Federal Land Banks nationwide showed an 
operating loss that was about half that of the previous year. The Omaha Production Credit 
Association showed a loan volume of $464 million. Like the Federal Land Bank, it showed a 
small operating loss for the year. Production Credit Associations nationwide showed an 
operating loss for 1986 that was less than 1985 and less than the addition to the Reserve for 
Loan Loss Account. The System as a whole reported an operating loss that was almost equal 
to the addition to the Reserve for Loan Loss Account. The Reserve for Loan Loss account at 
this year-end (after charge-offs) stood at $3.6 billion.35 
The 1987 annual financial report showed the Omaha Federal Land Bank loan volume 
at $3.2 billion. The district showed a small operating loss for the year. The Federal Land 
34 Farm Credit A dministration Annual Report 1985. 
35 Farm Credit Administration Annual Report 1986. 
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Banks nationwide showed a small operating loss. The Omaha Production Credit 
Associations showed a loan volume of$352 million, and a small operating profit. The 
Production Credit Associations nationwide showed an operating profit for the 1987 operating 
year. The Farm Credit System as a whole showed a small operating loss for the year (about 
30 percent ofthe addition to the Reserve for Loan Loss account), but a year-end Reserve for 
Loan Loss account balance of $3 billion.36 
By the end of 1988, the Omaha Federal Land Bank loan volume had been halved. 
The Omaha Production Credit Association loan volume had been reduced about 83 percent. 
That is a big reduction in short-term lending. Short-term lending is used to advance 
operating expenses when they are needed, so the sale of commodities can wait until the 
proper time in the cycle for each. It was also used to make the payments on the long-term 
loans for land, when the commodity income was insufficient. Therefore, the reduction in the 
volume is significant. It indicates that the operating expenses were either being paid from 
other sources, or not being paid. It also means that the payments on the land loans were not 
being advanced. By the end of this year, Congress ordered the System to transfer $196 
million from the Reserve for Loan Loss account back into income. This meant that the 
system had taken out more money from its income than it had needed to cover its actual 
losses. In other words, it had unnecessarily increased its lending rate to borrowers through 
the changed method of putting money into its Reserve for Loan Loss account by over 
estimating the potential expenses on the loans and by possibly underestimating the asset 
values. Since those were the two calculations being done, the difference between the 
36 Farm Credit Administration Annual Report 1987. 
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estimates and the reality must be in one or both of these figures. Table 10 shows the activity 
in the Reserve for Loan Loss account nationally. Notice that the System, as a whole, only 
used about one-half of the funds it set aside into the Provision for Loss Account during the 
course of the 1980s crisis. The money to put into the account came from generated earnings 
for those years (through interest rates to borrowers). 
Table 10: Farm Credit System Provision for Loan Loss Account 1984-1989. 
PROVISION FOR LOSS ACCOUNT BALANCE (000) 
1984 1326356 
1985 3189628 
1986 3635300 
1987 2951000 
1988 1857500 
1989 1577800 
CHANGES (000) 
335096 
2968756 
1797700 
-195900 
-680600 
-284700 
Source: Farm Credit Administration reports 1984-1990. 
How the Farm Credit System put more income into the Loss Accounts 
As previously mentioned, the Farm Credit System had already begun a tiered interest 
rate system to its borrowers. Those paying the lower rate would be in a better position to 
cash flow their expenses. Those being charged one of the higher rates would be less likely to 
cash flow their expenses. 
In 1985, the Omaha Farm Credit District instituted a change in accounting for the 
Reserve for Loan Loss account. Rather than making one entry at the end of the year, entries 
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would be made each month, based on more frequent assessments of the loans in the portfolio. 
The manner in which loans were assessed then became crucial. 
The Omaha District used a "Recovery Value Worksheet" FCBO 6001 (Rev. 8-85) to 
assess its loans. (Note that the form was revised in August 1985, one month after the 
accounting procedure was revised.) A copy of the form is in Appendix B of this paper. 
When loan officers used this form, they put in numbers and performed the calculations called 
for on the form. By the time the form was completed, the expenses had doubled, but the 
income had not -- even though potential additional sources were allowed for on the form. 
Some of the expenses were only necessary if the loan was being liquidated, thus increasing 
the total of the expenses being considered. As the rate of interest was being increased (due to 
both the tiered rate system as well as the increasing costs of the securities), the recovery 
value was deteriorating. These forms were used to classify the loans, thus determining their 
interest rate. As the increased potential losses were being determined from the calculations 
done with this analysis form, the operating spread of the Associations (and the District) was 
being increased as well in order to be able to make the accounting entry for these potential 
losses. The lending rate to the borrower was determined by starting with the average rate of 
the outstanding securities of the system, and adding a spread to allow for the projected 
expenses of the system to conduct business. As the increasing estimate of potential losses 
was increasing the spread being added to the base cost of the securities, the beginning rate to 
the borrowers was going up (and being put into the loan analysis form for calculations to 
determine potential losses). This increased the base lending rate before the tiered rates were 
then determined for all of the loans that did not fall into the classification for the lowest 
beginning rate. As the loan categories were separated by increasing spreads on each 
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category, the rates for all but the lowest were going up faster than the base average cost of 
the securities of the system. This negatively impacted the calculations each time they were 
repeated. In other words, there was a "snowball effect" at work.37 
To this process was then added the asset values. This report deliberately did not use 
the average equity position at this time because it was being calculated using inflated land 
values (being fed by the availability ofloan funds). Once the value of these inflated assets 
began falling -- as determined by the appraisals of the Federal Land Bank's county 
benchmark farms -- those declining values were plugged into the Recovery Value 
Worksheet. Even if the expenses had not been doubled, the declining asset values would 
deteriorate the loan position, thus "legitimizing" an increased interest rate for the loan. 
Table 11: Average Value per Acre for Iowa Farms 1975-1986. 
IOWA FARMS 
YEAR AVERAGE/ACRE 
1975 1095 
1976 1368 
1977 1450 
1978 1646 
1979 1958 
1980 2066 
1981 2147 
1982 1801 
1983 1691 
1984 1357 
1985 948 
1986 787 
Source: Agricultural Statistics, Iowa Department of Agriculture 1987. 
31 As an employee of the Fann Credit System from 1971 to 1986, it was my job to know how these 
calculations were being made and how they were being booked on the accounts of the system. 
119 
From the high of $2066 per acre in 1980 (according to Table 11) to the low of$787 
per acre in 1986, there was a 61 percent drop in value. These are averages. Some were 
higher; some were lower. All of these factors were out of the control of the farmerlborrower. 
As examiners for the System, the Farm Credit Administration (the national overseers for the 
System) had the final control over the loan forms in use. According to the audit manual, part 
of the job of examination involves the forms and their proper use. 
The regulations of the System state that when it is determined that the collection of 
interest is in jeopardy, the loan must be transferred to the nonaccrual status. That entry 
collapses the interest due at the time of transfer, any accounts receivable -- in short, all 
balances due -- into the principle balance and places that balance in what is supposed to be a 
nonaccrual account. This is not a nonaccrual account to the borrower; this is a nonaccrual 
account for the System. The System operates by calculating its income on the interest 
accrual method, rather than the interest paid method. This means that when it appears the 
accruing interest will not be paid, the accrual must be stopped in order to stop accruing 
income that cannot be collected for cash. The computer continued to maintain what is called 
a "memo" interest calculation -- at the highest rate being charged by the Association because 
the loans in process of liquidation were classified as high risk -- and that was added to the 
principle balance (along with any charges made to the loan for expenses involved in the 
liquidation) for collection purposes.38 
The System, as did other farm lenders, also applied to the FmHA for their loan 
guarantee plan (which was expanded during the crisis) -- if a loan could qualify. Under the 
38 Ibid 
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terms of this plan, if the loan defaulted, the lender could collect the guarantee from FmHA. 
While some of these may have worked as they were envisioned, others did not. A Federal 
Grand Jury investigation for the Northern District ofIowa in Cedar Rapids filed a court brief 
April 28, 1992, documenting that the Omaha Farm Credit System did willfully misrepresent 
borrower paperwork in order to qualify a loan for the guarantee loan program, not advance 
operating funds in order to force a liquidation of the loan, and then collect the guarantee. In 
order to hide the name of the parties involved in the suit, it was filed as United States of 
America, Plaintiff, vs. Three Million Dollars, Defendant. While all of the documents 
involved in this investigation were sealed by the federal prosecutor for the Northern District 
oflowa, copies of official letters from one of the cases are included with this paper because 
they were originally presented in open court prior to the initiation of the Grand Jury 
investigation. A later investigation resulted in similar findings and another fine. The Farm 
Credit System paid the fine, and may have made undisclosed settlements with the individual 
borrowers involved -- all are sworn to secrecy. 
The 1987 Farm Credit Act, in addition to its many changes to the System, also 
included the establishment of credit review committees as an appeal process for borrowers 
who had been refused restructuring. 39 (Restructuring was supposed to be an option in cases 
where the analysis form showed that it would be more cost effective for the lender to 
restructure the loan rather than liquidate it.)40 In a case filed in July 1988, the decision of a 
credit review committee not to restructure a loan was taken before the United States District 
Court District of North Dakota Southeastern Division. The reason for bringing this up in an 
39 The audit manual for the system includes this infonnation. The Code 0/ Federal Regulations 
includes this information. The system's annual report for 1988 includes this infonnation. 
40 Code o/Federal Regulations 614.4517. 
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examination of practices in Iowa is because it established case law which was then used 
nationwide, including Iowa. This case eventually went to the U.S. Court of Appeals and was 
upheld. It was eventually overturned, but by that time it was a moot point. The final 
paragraph of the District Court judge's decision is important in understanding what was 
happening during the 1980s farm crisis: 
As Plaintiffs counsel has accurately pointed out, this court's holding means that an 
aggrieved farmer has no remedy through the federal courts in review of possibly 
erroneous, malicious, anti-social and unpatriotic acts of credit review committees. 
Congress confers jurisdiction upon federal courts in areas of statutory remedies. It 
has not done so here. Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed.41 
What this means is that Congress considered this a matter between the 
farmerlborrower and the lender. As long as the borrower followed the letter of the law in 
Title 12 United States Code Annotated, which did not cover the nature of the calculations nor 
the accuracy of the numbers chosen for the forms, neither the courts nor Congress was going 
to stop the process taking place. 
Under the Administrative Procedures Act (AP A), passed in 1946, a framework was 
established for governing federal agency action.42 (The Farm Credit Administration -- the 
overseer of the Farm Credit System -- is the agency.) Congress can enact legislation that 
supercedes the authority vested with the agencies, and the President can issue an executive 
order that supercedes the authority of the AP A. The AP A provides a blueprint of 
administrative law by establishing minimum procedural requirements for many types of 
agency actions, specifically rule making and adjudication. (Adjudication refers to case-by-
41 Civil Action No. A3-88-1l5, Raymond P. Zajac, and Helen Ann Zajac, Plaintiffvs. Federal Land 
Bank of St. Paul, Defendant, In the United States District Court District of North Dakota Southeastern Division, 
July 19, 1988. 
42 Frona M. Powell, Law and the Environment (West Educational Publishing ComlElY, 1998). 
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case decision making by the agency in a hearing with trial-like procedures.) The APA also 
provides a framework for judicial review of administrative decision making. It addresses the 
availability of review of agency action, the scope of judicial review, and court review of 
agency inaction. 
An administrative agency (which the Farm Credit Administration is as the regulator 
of the Farm Credit System) may exercise different kinds of powers as long as its enabling 
legislation either states expressly or implies that it can do so. The AP A confers two 
important powers: policy making through rule making and policy making through 
adjudication. An agency makes policy through rule making by issuing legislative rules and 
regulation. In other words, when the FCA writes regulations for the system, it is making 
policy for the system. It has the authority to do this because it is an agency of the federal 
government, thus it is covered by the AP A. Policy making through adjudication occurs 
when the agency acts like a judicial body and applies legal standards set out by statute or 
regulation (which they have written, usually) to the facts in a particular case in a hearing. 
This is what the credit review committees were doing. The courts have established a 
precedent that they will recognize an agency's authority to formulate policy through various 
means as long as its enabling legislation allowed it to do so. This means that the courts 
considered the loan liquidations to be a matter between the lender and the borrower. Even if 
the borrowers had understood the manipulated paperwork, they were almost powerless to 
bring it to the attention of authorities to take any action. Both the Congress and the President 
had authority to override what was happening, under the terms of the APA legislation, but 
took no action to do so. 
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The actions of both the Executive Branch and the Legislative branch of government 
(at the national level) during the farm crisis of the 1980s show that they agreed with the farm 
restructuring policy of free trade capitalism, as promoted and set forth in many documents 
(including the recommended farm policy of the Committee for Economic Development and 
the Young Executive Report), by implementing legislation that would accomplish the 
restructuring of agriculture. Opportunities were presented to the Executive Branch through 
its agencies and to the Legislative Branch through Congress to step in and take action that 
would have changed the course of events, but they chose not to take that action. Because 
these two branches of government took no action, the Judicial Branch was limited in taking 
action. Restructuring proceeded, as planned. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE IMPACT TO IOWA 
Farm restructuring caused a change in demographics 
The farm crisis of the 1980s destabilized the financial position of farmers and the 
farm service sector that relied on numbers of farmers and farm income for survival. All 
businesses need markets. When a sufficient-sized market is not there, or if the potential 
market does not have the money to buy (thus, not in the market), the businesses must either 
consolidate or go out of business. The rural areas, whose small towns and rural counties 
relied on numbers of farmers and farm-related businesses as an income base, saw a decline. 
Table 12 shows that from 1964 to 1987, the number ofIowa farm operators declined 
32 percent. From 1978 to 1987 the decline was 17 percent. 
Personal income data for the state of Iowa shows that between 1969 and 1997, 
personal income rose 548 percent (not adjusting for inflation). Farm income, in the same 
timeframe, rose 152 percent (not allowing for inflation). 1 Farm income, in 1980, was lower 
1 Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1998: uw.econ.ag.govlbriefinglfbelfIlfinfidmu.htrn. 
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than in 1969 by over 50 percent. In 1983, farm income was negative. This represents a loss 
of buying power for those on the farm. 
The gradual shift to larger and fewer farms had an impact on both numbers and 
income. Table 13 shows the decline in farms nationally and for Iowa. In twenty-five years, 
Iowa lost approximately 58,000 farms, or about 580 per county. Table 14 shows that this was 
a loss of35.56 percent in tenant farms and a loss of32.33 percent in fully owned fru-ms. 2 
Table 12: Iowa Farm Operators by Age Cohort 1964-1987. 
OPERATORS BY AGE 1964 1969 1974 1978 1982 1987 PCT. CHG 
Under 25 years 3654 3600 4280 6339 5602 2852 -21.95 
25-34 years 20677 18374 15835 19205 20346 17458 -15.57 
35-44 years 37144 31235 24153 23918 22548 21282 -42.70 
45-54 years 41538 39255 33668 30341 26104 21744 -47.65 
55-64 years 33092 33543 31404 28959 27594 25287 -23.59 
65+ years 18057 14347 15335 12577 13219 16557 -8.31 
Source: Census of Agriculture. 
Table 13: Number of Farms and Acres per Farm 1964-1990. 
YEAR U.S. IOWA U.S. IOWA 
(000) (000) Acres Acres 
1964 3457 162 332 214 
1969 2999 147 369 234 
1974 2830 138 384 249 
1978 2436 123 429 275 
1982 2401 117 427 288 
1987 2213 107 451 313 
1990 2143 104 461 322 
Source: Iowa Farm Outlook Charts, 1990-91, Iowa State University Extension. 
2 Iowa State University, Iowa Farm Trends. 48. 
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In additio~ the acreage in farms declined from 33,758,321 in 1964 to 31,638,130 in 1987. 
The loss of2,120,191 acres is roughly 6 percent (averaging about 21,000 acres per county). 
The average cropland harvested as a percentage of average acreage, by 1987, was almost 
reduced to the levels of 1969, as Table 13 shows. 
T bl 14 B kd a e : rea own 0 fI owa F arm o h O 1969 1987 wners Ip 
- ° 
1969 1974 1978 1982 1987 
ALL FARMS 57.45 69.86 70.87 74.01 64.75 
Tenant 64.20 76.25 76.88 79.93 70.30 
Part owned 60.03 73.09 73.19 76.48 67.07 
Fully owned 49.88 61.73 63.01 65.61 55.24 
Source: Census of Agriculture. 
The reduction in cropland harvested from the previous increases over twenty years 
would reduce the inputs being purchased from local suppliers, who had come to rely on that 
business in order to remain in business. Land enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program 
or put back into the Wetlands Preservation Program would reduce the income for the farming 
operatio~ so other purchases could also be down. Note in the statistics in Table 15 that the 
income from government payments had increased substantially by 1978 in terms of its 
percentage to the total farm income for Iowa. 
When the income statistics are adjusted for constant dollars in 1989 equivalents, there 
is actually a net loss of38.03 percent.3 The reduction in crop income was 50.78 percent and 
the loss oflivestock income of37.38 percent. The government payments, on the other hand, 
increased 2605.63 percent. When the farm expenses from 1970 to 1989 are adjusted in terms 
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of 1989 dollar equivalents, the largest change was in real estate interest (up 124.29 percent).4 
Another casualty of the loss of farms and farmers is the decline of population 
generally. Census figures show that the Iowa population was 2,913,018 in 1980 (as the crisis 
was getting starting), and 2,767,006 in 1987(as the crisis was abating). This is an 
approximate loss of 147,000 people. 5 By 1990, some were returning. 
Table 15: Iowa Farm Income Breakdown by Source. 
INCOME ($) 1974 1978 1982 1987 1989 
CROPS 
LIVESTOCK 
GOVERNMENT 
4,278,995 
3,797,821 
16,596 
3,635,989 3,110,845 
5,419,627 6,023,827 
270,987 215,869 
3,509,853 3,910,838 
5,270,686 5,196,972 
1,987,685 981,206 
Source: National Agricultural Statistics Service, Economic Research Service USDA. 
http://profiles.iastate.eduldownloadlprofilesl 
Census, figures by age cohorts in Table 16 show that the people leaving were the 
younger men and women who would eventually be starting families. Compared to the age 
cohorts of those in farming (as shown in Table 12), it can be seen that farming lost from all 
age groups. The biggest losses for the farming groups were the ages 25-54. Those are the 
ages that need to be maintained for the business to remain vital. 
The maps for Iowa (in Appendix A) show per county changes for: change in 
farming's share of total employment, percentage change in retail and wholesale employment, 
percent change in manufacturing employment, change in manufacturing's share of total 
4Ibid 
5 "State Population and Household Estimates with Age, Sex and Components of Change: 1981-1987," 
Current Population Reports, Population Estimates and Projections, U.S. Bureau of the Census; Vital Statistics, 
Iowa Department of Health, 1988. 
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employment, change in retail and wholesale's share of total employment, and change in wage 
and salary's share of total employment.6 
For comparison purposes, look at the corresponding changes for a rural county and a 
county on the fringe of the Golden Circle Area of Des Moines: Greene and Jasper. 
Table 16: Iowa Population by Age Cohorts 1980-1990. 
Age Cohorts 
Under 5 
5-24 
25-44 
45-54 
55-64 
65 & Older 
TOTAL 
IOWA POPULATION 
1980 1990 CHANGE 
221445 193203 -28242 
992261 809390 -182871 
752433 823940 71507 
281293 274428 -6865 
278894 249688 -29206 
387482 426106 38624 
2913808 2776755 -137053 
Source: Bureau of the Census U.S. Dept. of Commerce. 
Greene County is a rural county whose largest town of Jefferson has fewer than 5,000 
people. There are no major employers in the area that dominate the work force. Many of its 
businesses rely on farming and/or farm income as a major source of their income. This 
would be typical of rural counties in Iowa. In Table 17, note that in rural areas like these, 
where off-farm employment opportunities are more limited, the general migration between 
1980 and 1990 was out for all age groups. The change in farming's share of total 
employment for Greene County falls into the category of -4.0 percent to -2.3 percent. 
Percent change in retail and wholesale employment was -13.1 percent. The percent change 
in manufacturing employment was -17.1 percent. The change in manufacturing's share of 
total employment was -1.2 percent. The change in retail and wholesale's share of total 
6 Data from the Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1988, 
supplied by the Economics Department Iowa State University. 
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employment was -1.2 percent. The change in wage and salary's share of total employment 
was -5.4 percent. The percent change in wage and salary employment was -14.3 percent. 
These were all more than the state average, although not the worst in the state. In Table 18, 
the situation for Jasper County is different, with different results. 
Table 17: Age Cohorts for Greene County Iowa 1980-1990. 
!\ge Cohorts 1980 1990 CHANGE 
Under 5 877 636 -241 
f)-24 3587 2466 -1121 
25-44 3554 2601 -953 
45-54 1237 982 -255 
55-64 1342 1098 -244 
65 & Older 2314 2262 -52 
TOTAL 12911 10045 -2866 
Source: Census Bureau U.S. Department of Commerce. 
Table 18: Jasper County Age Cohorts 1980-1990. 
Age Cohorts 1980 1990 CHANGE 
Under 5 2703 2242 -461 
5-24 11478 9327 -2151 
25-44 8437 10312 1875 
45-54 4028 3736 -292 
55-64 4812 3632 -1180 
65& Older 4967 5546 579 
TOTAL 36425 34795 -1630 
Source: Bureau of the Census U.S. Department of Commerce. 
In the case of Jasper County, the categories that did not decrease from 1980 to 1990 
were the same as for the state as a whole: 25-44 and 65 and older. The major employer in 
Jasper County is the Maytag Company (with 25 percent of the workforce). There are other 
supporting businesses not dependent on agriculture. Therefore, while the county lost 
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population, it did not lose as much (either count-wise or percentage-wise) as the more rural 
Greene County. The maps in Appendix A show that for Jasper County Gust as for Polk 
County), the change in farming's share of total employment was between -2.2 percent and 
zero. The percentage change in retail and wholesale employment was 2.2 percent (better 
than the state average of -1.3 percent). The percentage change in manufacturing employment 
was 3.3 percent (better than the state average of -12.6 percent). The change in 
manufacturing's share of total employment was -0.1 percent. The change in retail and 
wholesale's share of total employment was -0.3 percent. The change in wage and salary's 
share of total employment was -2.2 percent (almost the same as the state average of -2.5 
percent). The percentage change in wage and salary employment was 0.5 percent (better 
than the state average of -2.2 percent, but not as good as the Polk County average of8.6 
percent). Over 5,000 acres in Jasper County (former farms) have been taken out of 
agriculture production and put into a prairie preserve. (See next section.) 
Changes in land use planning 
Since the 1960s, land use planning in rural areas has become increasingly more 
complex, because of farm restructuring as well as with the enactment of laws to preserve 
areas and to return some areas to "their natural state" (however that is defined at points in 
time). At a time when farmers were exiting the profession, and farms were consolidating, 
various pieces of legislation worked to remove the amount of land from farming: 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), Wetlands Preservation Program (WPP), Wildlife 
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Habitat, Prairie Preserve, to name a few. While the reasons given for these varied, the 
removal was consistent with the recommendations contained in the Committee for Economic 
Development reports: remove resources from farming in order to "improve" it. 
Those farmers who wanted to remove their land from production (thus reducing input 
expenses as well as income) discovered another option in addition to the CRP and the WPP: 
natural prairie or wildlife habitat. Due to society'S changing perspective on the natural 
environment, a series of laws have been enacted to protect and preserve national lands, 
wilderness areas, and wildlife. This makes less land available. 
A nationwide movement is underway to put land into wildlife habitat, or prairie 
preserve. While assessments are required to consider impacts on individuals, groups, and 
communities as well as the effects on historic, cultural, and scenic resources, sometimes the 
farmer who is tired of fighting for survival or who is close to retirement might see this as a 
socially acceptable way out. 
The Tallgrass Prairie Preserve is one such program. Its purpose: "to preserve, restore, 
and manage a portion of the remaining critical northern tallgrass prairie habitat and 
associated habitats at widespread locations throughout western Minnesota and northwestern 
Iowa.,,7 This would include portions of 48 counties in Minnesota and 37 counties in Iowa. 
The 1997 plan includes an estimate of the amount of "original" acres oftallgrass prairie in 
Minnesota and Iowa: 25 million acres. There was no reference as to how far back in time this 
25 million acres may have actually existed, but it was estimated that 300,000 acres remained. 
The proposed plan was to preserve 77,000 acres in Iowa and Minnesota. This would be in 
7 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and U.S. Department of Interior Region 3, Northern Tal/grass Prairie 
Habitat Preservation Area, (pt. Snelling: U.S. Dept. ofInterior, 1997), i. 
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addition to the acres enrolled in the CRP and the WPP, each of which has a stated national 
goal of 50 million acres. 
The goals for the Tallgrass Prairie project are: 
(1) Preserve remnants of native tallgrass prairie to ensure protection of unique plant 
communities, native fish and wildlife, and historic and cultural sites. 
(2) Restore native tallgrass prairie, including: 
Enhancement of some of the best remaining degraded remnants oftallgrass prairie 
through management practices (burning, grazing, etc.) and inter-planting or seeding 
of native plant species. Associated natural wetland habitats including prairie 
wetlands (potholes), fens, wet prairie, and riverine areas could be enhanced as well. 
Also included would be the reconstruction of areas oftallgrass prairie using native 
plant species to buffer or connect remnant native prairie tracts. 
(3) Conserve, manage, and restore the diversity and viability of native fish and wildlife 
populations associated with tall grass prairie. 
(4) Provide public areas for compatible wildlife-dependent uses, emphasizing increased 
public understanding of the tallgrass prairie. 8 
An analysis ofthe plan states that it is not technically possible to restore tallgrass 
prairie, but that will not stop the plan from proceeding. Some of the advantages put forth in 
this plan include reduced expenditures on such infrastructure as roads, and other things 
people would need, like water and sewers. For areas with less income to provide these 
8 Ibid 
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services (possibly due to the loss of farmers and the farm income), the placing ofland into 
this type of plan could appear as a solution to budget problems. 
The Tallgrass Prairie Plan proposes that most of the land to be placed in the prairie 
preserve would come from agriculture. Iowa is acknowledged as the leading producer in the 
country of com and soybeans. In addition, the leading five Minnesota counties that produce 
com, soybeans, and wheat were all located in the proposed preserve. The potential loss of 
these top grain and soybean producing counties (if they are included in this preserve) is not 
seen as a problem by those who proposed the plan. Something else is not seen as a problem: 
During the past three to four decades, the agricultural community in the project area 
and across the Nation has experienced a dramatic shift from many smaller farm 
ownerships with diversified farming to just a few large farming operations that grow 
only two or three types of crops each year. In many instances, five, six, or even more 
small family farms have been bought out and transformed into one large ownership.9 
A natural course of events is assumed, rather than looking at how farm policy has 
been driving the situation. In fact, the plan notes ''The effect of government farm programs 
was not included in the analysis." 10 
The economic analysis of the project did not use a benefit cost analysis, but, instead, 
used an input-output model. Economic analyses for the agriculture sector do not use a benefit 
cost analysis. The proposed plan discussed agricultural income from the farming operation 
9 Ibid, 84. 
10 Ibid, 96. 
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as household income (rather than as business income whose expenses include the farm 
family living).11 
One assumption of the analysis is that taking land out of production will not reduce 
the output or the income because of the increased production due to new technologies (which 
must be paid for, and which must take place somewhere). This assumes, obviously, a status 
quo in the level of production, not an increase to accommodate the increasing population 
(even at a reduced rate). There was no analysis done to determine what the food production 
needs would be over time. However, the proposed plan noted that CRP land could be 
reconverted to crop production (if it has not been planted to trees). No where in the 
discussion was it mentioned that CRP acres taken out of production were supposed to be 
marginal lands not best suited for production. It is possible there was an assumption that 
future science would figure out how to make this marginal land available for production, but 
no mention was made of this in the plan. 
The acquisition of private land for a public purpose removes the private benefits 
associated with it. These are property rights guaranteed in the Constitution. 12 The purpose of 
public domain, in the first place, was to provide the opportunity for private land ownership 
(as well as to bring in needed revenue to the government). When land is removed from the 
potential market, then there is less land available for private use. The reduction of land 
available for private use can exert pressure on prices. The first time this happened in this 
country around 1900 when large portions of the remaining public domain was put into 
national parks and taken off the market. (The remaining public domain was closed with the 
11 Ibid, 96-7. 
12 United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment. 
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Taylor Grazing Act of 1934.) The extent to which these various land preserves are reversing 
private land to public land is further reducing what is available for the market. 
A study for the future of livestock in Iowa 
If there is going to be a restructuring of agriculture, then there must be a plan for its 
future. While national plans call generally for corporate agriculture, some state plans have 
been put forth. In 1989, a preliminary report (written by Carol Elliot and Kurt James ofIowa 
State University) on the future of jobs in animal agriculture in Iowa was released by the Iowa 
Business Council. Titled Job Creation Potential in Animal Agriculture in Iowa, it analyzed 
where the industry was and where it was likely going. 
Seeing animal agriculture as a value-added industry whose receipts had dropped from 
75 percent ofIowa's total farm receipts in the late 1960s and early 1970s to 55 percent during 
the 1980s, the stated purpose of this report was to recommend necessary changes to increase 
available jobs in this industry. The new jobs were estimated to provide $18,000 in wage and 
salary income per job. The poverty level at this time was $16,000 for a family of two. If25 
percent is used as an estimate for benefits, that would reduce the $18,000 income figure to 
the level of poverty. 
The Iowa Business CouncillIowa State University report noted that off-farm income 
in Iowa had grown from 44 percent in 1983 to 90 percent in 1984. The Economic Research 
Service of the USDA, in its report "Agricultural Income and Finance A Situation and 
Outlook" for 1998 reported off-farm income for farmers nationally as shown in Table 19. 
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The Iowa Business Council report recommended revitalizing livestock production to 
create more jobs for farm families as well as new jobs in animal feeds, animal health, 
livestock and processing industries. It did not recommend more income for farming. This is 
probably due to the influence of free trade economics. 
T bl 19 Off. f: d f: Ii USf: 1992 1997 a e . - arm an on- arm earnmgs or •• armers 
-
. 
YEAR OFF-FARM ON-FARM OFF-FARM 
INCOME EARNINGS % TO WHOLE 
1992 35731 7180 83% 
1993 35408 4815 88% 
1994 38092 4376 90% 
1995 39671 4720 89% 
1996 40893 5535 88% 
1997 42292 5251 89% 
Source: Economic Research Service USDA 
Agricultural Income A Situation and Outlook 1998. 
. 
The report acknowledged that the top hog processing firms of the 1970s had 
been replaced by a new generation of companies that specialize in low-cost slaughter. The 
three mentioned were: mp, EXEL, and ConAgra (Monfort). The four largest beef packers 
already controlled 68 percent of the steer and heifer slaughter. Poultry was already 
acknowledged to be vertically integrated. The producers of the report saw Iowa as having 
fewer incentives for these companies to expand production in the state.lJ 
After release of the report, a hearing was held before the Advisory Committee on Job 
Creation in Animal Agriculture. 14 The report on the testimony and the recommendations, 
\3 "Job Creation in Animal Agriculture," Iowa Business Council, (Ames: Iowa State University, 1989), 
5 
14 The Advisory Committee was composed of representatives from agri-business, Iowa State 
University, the Iowa Legislature. 
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"Job Creation in Animal Agriculture in Iowa A Statement By the Advisory Committee on 
Job Creation in Animal Agriculture," was written by Dennis Starleaf of Iowa State 
University and Myrt Levin of the Iowa Business Council. Testimony indicated that animal 
production would be more effective if there was a mixture of production systems: (1) farm 
family production; (2) farm family production as part of co-ops or contracting operations; (3) 
farm families as part of integrated operations. Testimony also pointed out that iflowa chose 
to limit the type of operations from those listed, it would slowly lose its market share. IS 
Some testimony focused on cost studies which suggested that the new large 
intensively managed swine production facilities, such as North were highly competitive with 
the typical Iowa producer. "Small-scale Midwestern hog producers can survive in 
competition with large producers outside the Com Belt.,,16 Producers inside the Com Belt 
were portrayed in testimony as being able to survive if they became very efficient. The 
report did not mention the impact of the disappearance of a cash market to the independent 
producers if an increasing number of farmers chose to raise hogs on contract (outside of the 
market system). 
The report went into social concerns of environmental issues and land use planning. 
"Public policy decisions ... must provide the guidelines that producers and local governments 
need to determine the location of animal production and processing facilities ... .Iowa appears 
to have more restrictive regulations for the disposal of dead animals and higher standards for 
the design of animal waste disposal systems than most other states .... This may place Iowa at 
15 "Job Creation in Animal Agriculture," xi. 
16 Ibid, 2. 
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a disadvantage in competing for the development of animal production and processing 
facilities with other states that have more lenient environmental regulations.,,17 
The following six policies were developed and put forward in the report as ways to 
achieve the desired goal of keeping Iowa in the forefront of animal agriculture: 
(1) Include economic, social and environmental policies that retain a strong job 
creation if Iowa is to keep its young people and rural communities~ 
(2) Involve all stakeholders when developing policies~ 
(3) Understand the economic consequences of desired social and environmental 
policies~ 
(4) Remember that animal agriculture enterprises will, and have, moved to regions 
perceived as being more amenable to their needs~ 
(5) Avoid using environmental rules to make social policy~ 
(6) Lean toward job creation when confronted with decisions on the introduction of 
new ideas and capital. 18 
The report held: 
There is significant concentration throughout the food industry beginning at the retail 
level. Concentration is not limited to meatpacking~ it exists up and down the food 
chain. Efforts to drive inefficiency from the food system has led to inexpensive high 
quality food when measured against worldwide standards. Iowa cannot win in the 
medium term by attempting to redefine the direction of antitrust enforcement which 
ultimately is the single most potent weapon against concentration. To attempt to go it 
alone against national and international economic trends will result in reduced market 
share for animal products in Iowa and fewer jobs in the medium term. The federal 
government, however, should continue to review the effect of concentration on 
farmer incomes. 19 
17 Ibid, 7. 
18 Ibid, 25. 
19 Ibid, 25. 
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A more encompassing plan for Iowa as a whole 
In November 1989 the Center for Economic Competitiveness in Menlo Park, 
California, released a report titled "Iowa's Future A quality economy for tomorrow: A Six 
Point Action Plan." While agriculture was not left out, the report proposed a plan for a 
process that would assist Iowa to restructure the entire economy in the wake of the 
agricultural crisis. It pointed out that over the past decade a new economy had developed 
around the world, changing what it takes to be competitive. Iowa's agricultural problems 
were blamed on the new world economy. The move into the new economy of the world 
market had increased production capacity with little growth in demand, and had rapidly 
changed technologies. In other words, the rapid move into the world market economy 
(allowed by the farm policy focused in that direction) was the cause for the 1980s farm crisis. 
On the assumption that the direction would not be changed, the recommendations for 
restructuring the Iowa economy would follow. 
The report noted: "Iowa needs to take a more strategic approach to developing its 
economy because the external environment remains volatile and the pace of change remains 
fast. ,,20 The areas of focus were financial capital, technology, small business formation, 
quality of life and community development, human capital, and other actions. The report 
was to be a framework within which issues could be decided. The vision was one of 
diversification, adaptability, and value-added. These were to shape public and private 
20 "Iowa's Future A quality economy for tomorrow A Six Point Action Plan. " (Menlo Parle Center for 
Economic Competitiveness. 1989),3. 
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policies and initiatives. 
Over 100 public meetings were held around the state after release of the report to 
show it to the public and engage those who attended the meetings in a controlled and directed 
discussion of alternatives. Since the group that had come together to form the committee and 
invite the Center for Economic Competitiveness to write the report was sponsored by the 
Iowa Newspaper Association, the public heard about these activities for a time, and then no 
more was heard of it. 
The point to this effort, as well as the effort on animal agriculture in Iowa, was to 
direct the Iowa economy toward the emerging world market. If this was to be the new arena 
in which decisions were made and events occurred, then an understanding of it would be 
necessary. Those who made planning decisions and had been caught unaware when the 
1980s farm crisis began would now have an opportunity to know the direction. 
"Achieving success in these initiatives will require a broad public-private effort; thus, 
leadership must come from the local level as well as the state level and 'big business.' ... The 
Iowa Future Project will now move to build commitment across Iowa and create a statewide 
coalition committed to moving the state forward. ,,21 The idea put forth by those associated 
with the Iowa Future Project was that it was an opportunity for planners in all areas to focus 
on the new market economy and work together to position Iowa. In 1993 Congress approved 
NAFT A (North American Free Trade Agreement). A year later Congress approved GATT 
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Both of these agreements pushed the world 
closer to a free market system, as originally envisioned by Adam Smith and other 
21 Ibid, 42. 
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philosophes of the Enlightenment. 
Understanding the context of change 
Those who must work with rural areas need to understand the restructuring taking 
place in order to recognize the conflicts between people and the general direction of policy. 
While there are many analyses of conflicts in rural areas, Deep Disagreement in U.S. 
Agriculture Making Sense of Policy Conflict, by Christopher Hamlin and Philip T. Shepard, 
classifies the thinking and the motivations into three categories: conventional productivism, 
ecological progressivism, and radical humanism. 
Conventional productivism is the outgrowth of the Enlightenment free market system. 
According to the authors, those who fall into this category believe free markets will take care 
of whatever situation presents itself, if the markets and policies for them could be free to 
respond. 
Those who fall into the category of ecological progressivism believe that the 
patchwork of compromise required of free markets fails to assure wise use of resources, nor 
does it have adequate safeguards for the natural environment and human health. Progressives 
want more expert management in all aspects of society. 
Advocates of radical humanism want a radical shift away from industrialism through 
personal and community responsibility. Both ecological progressivists and radical humanists 
are linked to a critique of the industrial revolution, but progressives tend to worry about the 
sustainability oflarge systems and hope to substitute long-term thinking for short-term. 
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Radical humanists are more concerned with the effects of industrialization on persons and 
culture?2 The humanists propose the Renaissance concept of standards in aesthetics as well 
as morality. For humanists, "enough" to meet the needs is not the same as "as much as one 
can get." 
Three writers are cited as exemplary examples of each type of thinking. The authors 
analyze their writings in search of recognizable bases for categorizing the comments made by 
others who are involved with the restructuring taking place in rural areas and the 
consequences of it. Wendell Berry is the author for the radical humanists, pushing culture 
ahead of industrialization. Charles Walters Jr. is the author for the progressives, an 
outgrowth of the Grange, the Farmer's Alliance, the Farmer's Holiday Movement, and other 
similar organizations. Agriculture 2000: A Look at the Future (whose forward was written 
by former USDA Secretary John Block) sees a future of fewer but larger farms. The authors 
see the prototype of this projected future of agriculture as coming from the reports of the 
Committee for Economic Development (CED), although only the 1962 report is cited. 
According to the authors, the CED reports influenced the policy of Secretary of Agriculture 
Ezra Taft Benson in the Eisenhower Administration and the subsequent Democratic 
administrations. (Obviously, for the Eisenhower Administration to be influenced by an 
agriculture report from the C.E.D., it would have to have been either the 1946 or the 1955 
and 1957 reports. They all made the same recommendations for policy.) Corporate 
agriculture was to be the future. According to this look at the future, agriculture today is not 
only on the right track, but it is on the only rational track. Remember that each of these four 
reports recommended forcing resources out of agriculture and into other areas by lowering 
22 Hamlin and Shepard. Deep Disagreement in U.S. Agriculture. 
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income, retraining fanners, and educating farm children to work in other professions. As 
cited in Chapter Three: 
1) Gradual removal, within definite limits, offann price and income supports ... and a 
land retirement program dedicated ... specifically and singly to reducing the resources 
devoted to agriculture, including both people and land; 2) disposal of surpluses now 
held by the government; 3) removal, at the end of a limited transition period, of 
acreage allotments and marketing controls; 4) special programs to assist farmers ... to 
find a better livelihood in other industries. 23 
This is really the urbanization policy (of forcing people out of rural areas and into 
urban areas) at work. 
These three views are then examined at length as to agriculture and human nature, 
nature, knowledge, social order, and praxis (a customary mode of behavior). The authors 
feel it is important for those who must work with individuals who hold one of these views to 
understand the basis of each. In this manner, it will be possible to work with conflict 
resolution. People can be using the same words but have very different meanings for those 
words. It is common to assume that others will come to share a viewpoint if they just have 
the "right" information, or can be "enlightened." The book points out that this is not the case, 
as many have come to realize. There are reasons for holding opinions. 
The conclusion of the authors is: 
Within the U.S., not to mention many other places, discussions over the very basic 
matter of how we shall provide ourselves with food have passed during our lifetimes 
into an historical era of fracture and fragmentation, of disjuncture and ultimate 
impasse. In this process of historical change it is not only particular policies that have 
become threatened, but also the very possibility of making effective policy 
democratically. The gaps between where different people are coming from have 
grown so large as to strain trust in democratic processes, particularly processes of 
23 Committee for Economic Development Reports, (New Yorlc, 1945, 1955, 1957, 1962). 
144 
open discussion. The frameworks that people use have grown so deeply divergent as 
to cast doubt on whether the other guy is even trying to be reasonable .... Something 
different is needed to heal the rifts, and it must begin by respecting the divergences 
that have already occurred in people's ways of being reasonable, in their ideologies. 
Thus the larger enterprise is to bridge these differences without presuming on them, 
and not merely on paper, but in our political practices and especially in the 
1· ak· 24 po lcym mg process. 
The authors, Hamlin and Shepard, point out in their book that what we have is a crisis 
in policy making. As a faction has politically pushed their viewpoint -- as the proper course 
of action at the expense of other viewpoints -- it has fractured the democratic policy making 
process. Two ideologically different viewpoints have been at work in the United States since 
its war for independence. One of these viewpoints succeeded in politically implementing its 
policy, with impacts to all economically and socially. This has worked to effectively 
disenfranchise those with the opposing ideology. This has caused serious problems in the 
ability of individuals in these two groups to communicate and work together. An analogy for 
this situation would be the Balkans. In that area, different ideologies have practiced ethnic 
cleansing rather than trying to work together. As difficult as it may be, it is necessary to 
work through a change in the process that allows for each viewpoint to be more than 
verbalized. To do anything less would further fracture the fabric of our existence. This is the 
societal contract we have as a responsibility for others. As improved communications move 
people into closer contact with each other, there is a necessity to learn how to work out these 
differences in a manner other than the seizure of control by one and its ouster of the others. 
24 Hamlin and Shepard, Deep Disagreement in U.S. Agriculture. 280. 
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Conclusion 
The debate over the ideology of our farm policy again took us into another farm 
crisis, this time in the 1980s. The debate over policy has been a part of our country since its 
founding. Today we appear to be even farther away from consensus than we were at the time 
of the Revolution. 
Today, the free trade farm policies, as originally put forth by the philosophes of the 
Enlightenment Movement two hundred years ago, are moving us into contracted production. 
Under this type of system, a farmer agrees to grow something on contract, without owning 
the product as in the past, and receives a price per unit that is stated in the contract. In 
exchange for this lower perceived risk (where the price is known in advance), the lender that 
is financing the facilities charges a lower interest rate to the contractee. The rate to a 
borrower who is not on a contract is higher because of the perceived increased risk of not 
knowing what price will be received. The lower interest rate, coupled with the somewhat 
higher contracted price, provides a better cash flow to the farming operation. The 
multinational agribusinesses that have already expanded vertically and horizontally in their 
control of the food system have now extended their control over production. As the cash 
markets disappear to the independent producers, the only hope for them is the area of niche 
markets. The restructuring of agriculture toward this "efficiency" was what the farm crisis of 
the 1980s was all about. Because the Farm Credit System was the largest farm lender in 
market share, it was the vehicle of restructuring. 
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The farmers who were experiencing the stress of the crisis responded in either one of 
two general ways: 1) they figured out what direction farming was headed and became a part 
of it; 2) they organized in a similar fashion to past farm movements. The ideology of the first 
group would be that of conventional productivists (an outgrowth of Enlightenment thought as 
labeled by Hamlin and Shepard); the ideology of the second group would be either radical 
humanists or ecological progressives. As the next phase of restructuring takes place, these 
are the ideologies at work in the rural areas. While the free trade capitalists will speak of the 
events taking place in terms of market forces at work, those with a different ideology will 
speak in opposite terms. Those who work in, or who study, this area need to be aware of 
these differences. 
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,'s ;>er your 'request, I h&ve c!o:le a lubstL'ltU I. &oount of 'JOr!( on che 
C':',lneJ!S ,41""...3 1001-"1 \/lth tbe South SF-ntul Lov. i'r~u[t1on ecHit 
,~"OciH10:'l : •• .3 you =1.& lIc t'tcdl,:-1sob Vavra h.ss :'eta c!ol..." til. the: 
'-'Or:' on ents 10.:n ~::d th~c L" ;:&t"-c of the re..soQ [ ~~s aoc L., ~ ?os.l:e!!>n 
co .:o=~nt [01l<:"'",1n, 'Joue .quu t1ans crod co;,e: e:rns .!lout these ~>(Hro ' ... :rL 
It ",'auld &p;>ut th£t, overli.l, the~e bo rro"e.rs n.'1e no c ·, .. rled .s\lb,c~,,­
c! .. lly (roQ .cbe ?Cl>Jccc10, .... 1thouSh it 1s the op.101on of the ,~UOClH!O" 
that iurela r , detu10ratlan is · .. eLf 11.kd,y. The A.saoc!aclon ~ • pla:l OC 
act!on to collect this lou., that ?lan being that "hen the ,~c.rnt.eed 
1c-~:\ 1$ C:U~ t-hat efforts "lll ~e =c!e to .. 'ccele.rate che Lnd~bce<!t:ess .s...,d 
«.it foc paY"C:l t .s pe r the ceC':S of the aUilr .... "tee. The Assoc!.t 10n 1s 
very cont!de:lC c~ .. c no fu.,,~ ....tll be a"aUable to <:& lc.e the gUU:C1CCed 
tOO:'l p2yce~c . The Assoeuclo:'l 1!J also verI reluctanC ~o l:\d~<: .. te t~ls 
~1 . :'I of .etlo:l 1:'1 .~ythlng but ~:'I t:'lfot~l letter such ~~ chis ~hlth ~ ll1 
nat )~ ;:.ttC of c~e ;:~::-~n~r.c lc~n (Ue . In o::dee for the ,~".ltl"c!.l n c> 
c,,!! eet c:-.!~ lon, Ic ls £;:c!c!;lateJ l!cl&Oltloa .,lit !Ie ~·,.,I ': ~d ~:J "" 
Co:.:: c _;,e centc;,t of ;he 10.!!n folder ,,~uld be rco,uied 1'1 1't40t(0" . 
I ( t~.e .'"acheLon lnd!cacu 1n its 10&0. ca=Ults eh.c it e. . ~cced !:lto 
til 6u.,r~nttC.f 10.n ~Ith chose bon-o· ... ets 'Jlth the sale 1nee..,t aC collect-
ln3 the l".!.~cecnu .. and perb.aps noe ·..ork!.ns "Lth chea; It :.] jeop&:dl;c 
D U : guar~:>tec . ' ,Nt is pHb"j)s ..,hy theee 1s he:"!:lS 1.:>!o'-I&cton &S t:> 
s;:et1f!cllly ,..h;,t the ,~",:;o[bt!on '", ?hn (s. 
i n : c;:~r~tL:\! nOCe: c:.stu:,~s O~ce..::~eC' <.i , i;35. ~~ :~e Asst)c!~ct?n toes :'iOC 
(:l and to &Clt:C ~"y e~c~.,s!ons 0(' t o nsUtr ::ny C~:lc ·J.ls of c~ .. c l./lCt:ccd-
ness, 'n, &U~"~:lc~cd 0 .. 0. dc£s ~ot :llture u:.t1 1· :'..lrth za, 1~';6; therteore, 
t !: c Assochclan "111 i-:oc be 1.:> a p051t10:\ to co : :: ... ,ce 'I:>Y coll.:ctlvo 
~c: !'dt:/ 0·' the aU1rI:Jceed 101:'1 u:\tl1 tll .. t po L" C" L:'I t1=0. 
Source: Randy Caviness, Farm Credit borrower. 
Au&ust 1, 198} 
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, Once che aacuricy of Df!c~ber 28, 1985. acrives, the Assocutlon .. 111 , 
jutC cry to Uquld.te the opu.cLon do ....... but it c"n and, ' hopefully, 
the borr""erll "111 not be able to Iti.account w1th a ~aclle a.aoUI1C of : 
proc~eds, All you CAn see, t here are. ,ood n~bf!r of UQ " ecuced creditor. 
in this sltuAtion .nd it vl11 be SOQ~~t cessy .nd the As soclation 
ul l l: no doubt, be involved in a Cha ptec 11 bLnkruptcy, if the borcovec" 
U:I put toaechcr a plan thAc "ill \lork, · If ooc, 'the II \1111 c:od up 
betnS • 7 "hle!\ ,,111 ultlc.ttc.ly provide Cor liquidatlon ..,hleh h "h.c· 
"ould be 1."1 the ,(5 50c14tloo'" but in t;ece~t .t t hat tbe. 
S ~",uld you have . ny quest 10:1' er require Curc her l"Cor=aclon, plc" s c 
do no e hes tea te co con tee t ce, ·r apolo&lze for jluc t l n .. ) ' OU i n • 
posicion of try~, to ,UUlI or .pecu.laee oo ' vhot hAd tun~plred o n 
t h i s account, I rell ed h~v liy on iIob'. yoelc o~ tll1, ..... t rer; ' hovever, 
i:. you staCe<!, he VIC ' pr~.blT 10 aoacv!u.t of • Irvcry to ,et tb1.a dooe 
prio e to bia ct..ecin, h1. :a ... job . 
5 1:'1 cere1y. 
5ruce A. i!&U&A~ 
Y!C f! Pre~ lden t 
~H !J jC ct: 
,-., : 
l h~ Offic e I) f In , ; , ct o r Gene r a ls Office ha s l~y i s~ ~ U ~ l ., 
SEP23 En. 
n ., t j i 'l :l" f' ".}'~ \ C "'J(, t Y (, ( f i c ol s n ,. t t ., .j c \ t r 0'1 1. n'l f C A 
:;U "l":I :l tCQ ·j I .),n fl l .: unt i I (u,oth . ,' n., tic,,· b ~ ClU S t! "r on :;'l i n:] 
i n '/~st i~ ~~" :' .• 
. ~h. R ~ P 1:1 
Slate O i ,..ct " r 
Source: Randy Caviness, Farm Credit borrower 
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_F-a-rm-C-re-d-i-t-B-a-"-k-s-o-f-O-m-a-h-a----~~q 
Memo ~J'i N \<.. S 
TO: FOe DATE: January la, 1986 
. FROH: Roger Crllller SUBJECT: Caviness Farms, [nco 
While in Sidney, I talked to John Helling, Regional Vice President for Region 
111 (Clarinda, Red Oa~, and South Central Iowa). I discussed the phone call 
with Caviness. 
John said his staff Is investigating up to 15 clses of f~ loans from South 
CentrAl Iowa PeA. There IUY be some problenls with a nUlllber of these loans. He 
was not able to go into further detail but Slid he would keep us informed. I 
wi 11 follow up. 
Host disturbing WiS John's statements that Caviness may be right fn their 
statements concerning the.FmHA loan. 
This wili .lIsa be :'ollowed up on. 
Source: Randy Caviness, Farm Credit borrower 
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Farm Credit Banks of Omaha f~<:I -----------------------------------------------------~ -r \:06' ""l Memo bJ'\N\<.~ 
TO Terry fufl",~ 
fRo.'i: Roger J. Crllller' 
DATE January 18. 1986 
SUBJECT: Caviness Farms. loan 
frcxa Region 111 
Enclosed is I lengthy recap of our Inal~ of the last 18 months of the 
prior approval actfvityon this loan.~~cluded fs several telephone 
conversatfons this borrower has had with the Bank. 
The borrowers tre upset with the assocfation 1n the vay thefr loan has been 
handled and said they have contacted the Attorney General of Iowa and the 
State fmHA offIce. ihey also safd they would f1Te I sUft against the PeA for 
giving fraudulent"ffnancial information to FmHA. 
~ 
Host dfstur~fniwas John Helling's comment when I reviewed the last phone 
call with hia on January 10. 1985. He Slid the borrowers Ire probably right. 
Thfs is based on a refiew ~e is in process of completing on up to 15 lcans 
that hive received either direct or gUlrantees frOQ F~A. I will contfnue to 
(011 ow-up «nd IlIOn i tor th is 10111. 
[ have also discussed this lo~, with Jim Stych. 
Source: Randy Caviness, Farm Credit borrower 
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CV.C,~:!. ':C:·.cS. h:tE'( G( F;~tEY. P.C. 
;'1:1:1 5, 1937 
..., .... ~,. ': .... ,: ..... 
cr Ii: ~'".''' 
I r~cent11 read 'i~ the Oes ~oine5 ~a9ist~~ t~a: th~ .Fa:~~r5 
;.;c;.:~ .!.c:::inistr.!tic:1 ~ass~in1 t,,·o iarr::ers ·for 3Ue;ed 
,"i.sr~~!"~~<;:itatic;"\ a;:d fra~d .in .oct.!inir.g .. F::'1H'\ lca::s. 1::cse 
31.1·~S.!l::'·:::1::;' '..i~r,: 0: f!artic"Jl .. ar· interest "t,,). :::e. a::d :::.1 .. !=ac~:'!e!: I 
~.~,:r"'i~·.!· :~;;'"!J :!s :"'·1 '!:'t:!?::02~C-!l·t ;:·lrold, 2;vs.:cl:t .. :ta:-:dy .ar ...:! ";a~3!~-'; 
C.~ . .'Ji.:-:~S3 in ·1 !:'Ji: :i!.g3i~~t _.tte ?r.c~cctic . , 'Cre"i)it .\s~cci~tic'1 0: 
t:~03 :·'i.:dl.3;":~s· .. ··r:'l cart"', it" .{s th~·C~:"'i~essl alla;aticl1 t~at .t:-:e 
;:C!' ;-.el!=adtr.e Ca"l i!1esses obtai:! an F:nt!.\ g::,u·a.'t~ed lca:t '''; i t~ t:;a 
soh i~te:'lt. -of not: ,-,or ic i:':q t.1ith the Ca~i::esses .!!1d.collec:ti:;g 0:1 
:~~ gl.!~t"::'lty" ~~ t~(! ec::r~~ of Ji.s'covery du~i:,:g t~~ litigatic1, 
~ ~:;~~~~ of ~cc~~4~~~ .~:~~~ bee~ fc~~d ~~ic~ tend to S~b5·t~~tiat~ 
t::·~ C-=i"'lnCSS' clai~s ar:d (:lethe:.- i~dic.'~ta tha": f31s~ itafc:'~~tic:1 
.... ;-:$ f:t"C~l:'i~"eti' :;'Y t:~; -:?C.l. t.o the :=zH,\. . 'i"::=s~ e,=c:,:::~:'i t.5 .... ·~r~ 
"r~l:";:~tl'! ':311~·:i t·;) t!::~ .~tt~:itic~ of F~"~;\: !~c~·~·.,.;:-~ :;~H;;' see.-::ad 
''';;:011:1 '.!!1co,.,cee'~ed a!1d ~:1inter",st~din t;;;a_ infc'~.lti.c . ,. 
-:~.~" C,!":i~~_:::~::; c~'::".lt~ r:t ;!.":'Iily !ar-:l i:1 ~c.\i~ C~:.:~tjf. !:'l 
~::·r!"l, 1';35, t;" .. :! '~~te::e:1 i~to ~~ .~.~A t;:':~C;!':t~~n ICe.,. ·../it~ Se~t.1 
C;:-~tr"~!. !:'':l ::':.;' (~c"J r..:"~ of t::·) :·~idla:1cs'. r~.;! E""":':~'"! .. \ ;::.!r.l."':~':?~· 
'~~3 :~ '~~1 ~C~ ~~ t~~ ::~~ t~ FCA if t~·~ C~~i:~CSS~3 def!~lta1. 
~~ ~a~:.~t t~~ ?!~, fer !i~a~ci~;, t~~ ~c~ z~r~ad, ~~c~J ¢=~e~ 
thi~~!, :0 ~C=~ ~it~ t~a C\7inesee3. "i, :~~ ~~e~: cf ~. ~~f~~lt a~! 
t·') :-:~~:.~ :; .... / rao!::.·:~!:)l,~ ~c.::=::-.::-:cca':.io~ t): :,:.~i;:t.~:'~ t~1.! lea:1. 1." 
C:::1j ;:':·c~:-:'""·.:it:' ~:-:! ;,r~:'!~.~!1t,?~j lc:!:'1, t~,~ rC.~ :":":!\-:1 ~:'J .';::~ra:i::; 
!~11" 7~~ ~C~ l~a~ officars ~:a~~ ~~~i:t~J t!:at i: ~as 
c~~:a~~l~~Ed t~at the lc~~ arra~secent ~~uld ~c~ti~~~ fer s~v~ral 
;~ar3 !~J ~!3 ~~~ 3 c~~-:i~~1 c~e-yQar !!~anCl~l plan. 7~e 
i~f?~~!t~e, ~~ "~3~~ cc=?iled, t:~e~er, i~jic3tes th3t. iC~ ent~ce.' 
i~t~ 3 c]1~~1~t~·1 .~!a~ :Q ~ut t~e Ca~i.~~sSC3 c~t cf b~si~~!s ~~i 
~~1:9c~ ~, ~~~ F-~~ gC~~3~t~e ~it~i, t~~ C~~-1e~r ;ericd. ~~~ 
Source: Randy Caviness, Farm Credit borrower 
Sen~tec C~aclQ3 Gr~ssley 
:~al 5, 1937 
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'Io'..!r ::--e·Jie· ... , I have .~ncloscd ;1 co't?'I of t e tOi'!'\ 10a.n ~Sc~e:::Q:'lt 
b02t·.·~e:l ?C,\ a;;d f!:lr..\ · ·.:~ic;' ce,Hs a c3·te ot "prTl H .8S. 7!:-e 
c~1~'·!:1t , :;ccticns ha'ie cec:! :::a'cked for:- 'le '.!.r easy refer.:!~ce. I 
ha~~ al!Q icclc~ed a laa:1 approval ceG~e3t mar~cd ~s !~~ibit 64. 
~h~~ c ::c·.1:"-'"Tl't bdicato?s that the ?C.\ ... ·as "setting ' Lteelf \.:0 to 
set ·: ·;t ,;f tl:~ lean on tr.~ r.atuciti" dat~ of Dect?::-.ber 23, 1955.· 
Alst) iccl; r.!ed is a !?tt02C, ::x~ibit 24, fro!:! t}; e FCA Vic~ 
?re3i~e:'\t, lrcc02 ~~c~carn, to :he Fac~ Credit 9anks in Ccaba 
cat.e;j .~Gx;'~st 1, 19135. - ,That latte-r: reads in ?er:1:in.ent fart: 
·"I:e~e t:-on:ol.'crs han~ ' net ' .. aried subst':!r:ti.a1:~y frc::! t he 
:;ro::!eccicn:J alt hcu<;h it is the opinion c.f th'e Asscciatic:'l 
t~a-t L;rther cetariora·tion is ' !Jery likely. Tna A~!ociation 
~~"S a ?Ian t!t action to collect: this lQan. l'hat pIa:! bei .. " 
t::~t "-'::te :l the gca-ra,"rteed lean is <:!ce, that: ' eLfcrts ,.,ill l:e 
~a.~e b accelera.t:e the i " cebtedness and as.k for .pay-::teOlt as 
~f:e-t .. t7:i! terms of the <jJ;acantee~ :rbe '\·.s~cciation · is verI 
co~fL~ent that -no ~ funes ~ill be .available to make the 
g'...'aC'.!~tee.d · ro~n f!,a.i'~.ent-. The .\ssociati:on,-i'S verr reli.!ctznt 
t.o .. i~<Hcate this plan 0:. 'action in anyt" ing but a:1 i.,!or:::a1 
l~tta-T st.:_c-h -as this .... aic;, '.li11 not be ~a'C't of tl::e ::er:::i!~e:1t 
loan file. In oreer for t:~e "sso:ciat-ion to ~collect this 
-1:ean, · it is .antici~ated ·- litisatien . ·.dll ce .invol':"d a::d r.o 
coJ't:ot t;:e con.tents of a lean file ...,111 be re ... ei_ed i:"l 
1icisation. Lf the ~s~cciatio~ indicates in its lea:! 
!;Q::.;::~.,til that it e.,teTed i:1to t1:a g1:.ar.a:1t~ed lc~"1 -;,oit;, t~ese 
·cct't"c '.·ers '.Iit~ ~t;;e sol~ i:lte:1t of collecting U.i! 
t :-:-';,=~ted~es.s -a-r.9 ·_t='eci'!a.[:·s r.~t <.;cr~ir..g · ... .it~ t~e ,JI it :-:ay 
; .~c ;.a;ci~i Z-~ cu r <; ca ra:"t tee. 
-
! ... ·culd also c.all to ~'c~r attentic:l four ;::e:r.ocoa::c..:;:;s, 
Sx~i~its 54, 7~, 13 a~d 74~ !~o~ ~oger Cra~e. ~~ t~e ra::-'J Cra~i~. 
::.li:.:':s c! _C~a::,a c.~a.Li!':g · '.Iit ~,. .C;C:1 ·:.ar-satic.n3 · ... it;, .Jor::l ",~l1i"11 .! 
'l!c~ ~!~3ie.~t of t~e ;c~. · ~n t~ose ~e~crane~~sl :o~~ ~~11i~gt 
~s ~' ,,- :c~ ?C';;;s~,:e;'Jt of r·C.;, ~ in::ii.cate-s tj~.at t~e:e '.'as ?::-c=a::,ly f-:a;.:d 
In t~e Ca'l!~.S3 lean a~d 1:1 fi!toe:! ot;,er Fc~A leans fr ~ t~e 
S'J.~t:' :C.:::t:~_ !c"'a ?C.~. T ~ (! :ar::'l Ccedi t aa:lks of C~ah3 _did .a.:l 
. i('\\'~s~ ·:'g{d~!l ~oE the C.aviness lo~n a~d tr:e al!e<;atio.1s of fra<.:.d. 
!;:ric:::~ ';~~t ,~'l':'l I co r.ot ~a':e ~ CO?! of t~a t re~crt. -Z ·;.?:l t:-:c~ .:;:, 
'.'e ~:::)~c(!_~.!,=d tha r>'!ocrt. ?rC30 {.and ?Ci\) r.c· ... assert t~at it is 
~rot~ct;;d by t'l':.e att~r~ey-clie:lt !?ci'Jilec:;e. r ti::d t ;,a t _':'OS:: 
.s~ r;:d s i .-.. ; i1 . , i e~ ., f t!':~ s to! t:.: to:'7 a::d ~C'e<;\J !.Hc ry 0':: l! S'.! ~ ic, 
t~:l t.;:,} r.:::-,.3il: :?!::~ ~.!S ~t:;) ~:1 ':~sti:;ate ~ll ~ll;:C;~ti-:-, s cf t!:'a '~d 
cr- - j ~c •. : ·:-"",;ct l: ~1 ;:C~:J ·..Jjt ~, c.:: ~it .~ ·~t 3:l attcrn~/ i,\"~l".·:d b'.; t 
t1:~f ~"l ': l c': ."1 "i:-: t:1; !j tl,} 3!:=<!rt t::~ ";,-t'i ")ileStJ
lf
" !:i1 -.-:t cert,Ji .. i 
~.~~ :~ : ':?f!l t ::·l r~!=ort ~c ·.;!j ':~I ~t: · ... ~ .'!·.~~r, si .C~ t~. ~ i:-.': '~5t~ ·:a":rl 
Source: Randy Caviness, Farm Credit borrower 
i j . 
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~~n~tcc C~acles ' Gra~sl~1 
:~:='j' 5, 1?37 
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~ r. 7Q~Ef.ldt , i ~di cated d~ri~g 'his ae~osition t hat ~e did not 
t~i~f: t !-: ~ Ca· ,ir:esses ''''I'e ~~ hat'r.:~d 1:~e3U!o! they could nct have ~e~ 
tr·~ir ;'!Y~Ents i!n'j·.:ay. !'i!edless t.o say, '.·e diffeC' ,!;l!bst.!:ltially 
frc:1 :'X . ~vj".sfe ldt's c~:-. .;l..!sic:'\ in th-at c.<;ar,j, 'bIJt it S.?,,~ ,; to 
t~ i ~Jici!ti~e of t~e c311;~s ~ttituee of the Fer~ Credit Syste~ 
t) ~!'i11 f!C~er5. 
!.1 aeci ticn, i'C~ ~i!r!o1:r.:ed i!:l i:tt.~t'nal .study crf t.h~ fifteen. 
C3ses of alleged feC!ed. - ~ c~py of t~at report is also i~clceed - • 
f ce Yo'o;-: re vi .... · ... ~;ic!-a is entitled ""Conficl!::ltil!l ~e?ort·" E:xhibit 
2. PC.\ ~ad eXJ::isedportion.s ot the CCCI.:~i!t\.t prier, to giving r.!e a 
CCFY · 
I have encl'l:;.:d CCC!!!:.e:'lt::s re-<;~t:'di:rg one other ~re3 fcr ¥'O-.:.r: 
in :cr::13tiC1. ' =:xhibit 32 is .a copy ot t::~ running notes irc;;) Jcr.:l 
:'t'c:::::::el, t'1e fot'::;~r Adair' County Sup:p.t:'/isor of t:-te F:n:; .~. 
S~ecific~lly, I ~ould call your: ~ttentio~ to tr.~ ~eve~ccc 3, 19S5 
r:vte i . dicating ' that -l?p.H·an,tly ?CA ha-d ,proviced incQrrect 
infcC':::aticn 'to f'l'\;;~ ~t tr.e t'i::le the g'.!c.C'.!:1t>!ed loa-n '.'/!s e:1ter.ed 
i~~o cr had provieed i:1correct , in!orcation ~e ven , ~ont. s l~ter 
:..-:"en it ~epo::ted to :~~.; en t'he ccn(l-iticn of th>! lean. 
Sf:::ilul '!f ci ,Cctober 25, 19a5, ?CA ha-d told :1:l~A t hat t~e _can 
.. ·..!s ~J?:"f::""::l:~~ · ... ~.~11.. !:x;,ibit ~l. .:.:ithi:t fi',.: ;a ~ay-sl l:c~.;~vt?r, ?C~ 
"i!, .l c~ci..:!.ad tb,at t r.e C~·Ji:"le~se.s ~.!<! lest l:lur.drecs of t~cus.!!1ds of 
;::xhibit 73. 
!t stri~~s ~e as ~O!!t un!Jst! .. \t tha~ ,~ i:rl · ... ould p!Jrs~e far!!':ers 
fcc 311~~~d fraud ~hen it s ho~s r.o inter~s~ in in~estisatinq s~cn 
cc::_~ct '::,1 t!:e ?CA. :;~e:'l : c-'!'J'i,. '.;qd t~-=s~ cr.cu:::o!.')ts ',J it, st.lt..:! 
.. ".:. .. ,. 
:::-:;:.; c:i':'ci.ll:3, t~ei: -5id ~.ct: ~ .~.~ ~, ..as:< !CC .c"'pi"s of t h ~ ~r~ t:er 
-": -:". C::::!:-:~l ~hic!l 3t:.a:~ t~!.t t;~i!re ·~·~ s i=,"'::ab!e fca;,:,d in -:"l'/i::g tr:-\! 
:"7';': '\ lea, ·;r.:at'..!:tt€i!. I '. ' !S gi\' e .') the i-;::~t'i!s.s:on t~ct ';:::::.~ · ... culd 
'"';c:!':.~ C' ,,~.2 -;,C 1 g-..:~~::~::t~, a::d ;;ay f: ~:,,:cree'S of thc;,J~.l::cs of r::oll:srs ' .. .,. 
t:J ;':A, ::-·~·-·..!r:ji-.-1 ?C~ : t:r t!:<! c·,;"Crs~ of ,cr.·:~ct it has ~ f~t~~.t! !:l 
-; : O!. !t::i of t~~ i:1::erasts .of . Ot1 :~ :~:, ~-:d ;;'1 cli~:1~3.· 
~" "I ': -:- CC~il S~_ and! '.;ctJld b~ ~c ce t :-;i:, ha~c .. r to cii!c ';=$ t~i!3 
-~::~r ~i~~ ~~~ r affica c: ~it~ : he a~~~c~riat~- ~~~~ral 
i~~~~ti;!~~~1 ~f!ic~. ! ~5~a ~=~ i~clc~~d all o~ t~~ ra:~~ant 
r:,=c '~- '::::-3 i>?c ~1:s ·~ c: t~~i!' :-.lt ~t: -: -.·vl..!'""li ."1~';s ;"!.3t~r~ . :;¢'= I'a':~ ! 
~~~;r~:;r~~ ';)<:~~;~i~~, \~~ ;'~'~~l~ ;'~: ~.O~;-~~3~ 'J~;~;; ~,~ ~;:" iC~ 
!~~ !!'~!-!:~!l . ~ate~ills re~~a~t~d. 
Source: Randy Caviness, Farm Credit borrower 
·'cS (! n3 t~c. Ch; ~ le:3C~.~:S·.Sf:~1~~; . 
:1;3/5, l?a7 
... ?a.ge . F~1!t" · . ": 
';',;: 
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c;nbehali ·"f .· bOth,··'t:l :: c.l1eo·t 3 a.:;d · ~1~~~1 :1'}~~':l~ <!9.U .fcC'.: yo;;t" ·· 
'a!; !;~;; t: i.c:1 ·.to ·this · ~atter. ".:': . ..... " . ".::; .... <,.;..,..... . .... ';":'." :"~" ..... , . 
.: ..... . 
'. 5 i~cere li'YcU r:! ' .. 
. ,' '." 
,:.' 
';~ .. 
" ' " 
~.:~.:~: ;>~~~:t :?':"~ :":; 
'. -<~. '." 
.. ' ~ . 
: .~ . 
. :, ' . :~ 
.~ . :.'-
.:'. ',' , 
~-". 
, . 
• h:~ _ 
',:; . 
Source: Clerk of Court Northern District of Iowa, Cedar Rapids. 
H;ty 14, 1 ~9 7 
Robert Pim, State Director 
Far:r.ers Hor.lC ;\Joinhtrntion 
813 feJ~ral auildl~g 
210 ~alnut Street 
Des l:oi:tes. Io.,..a SOlli9. 
'ue3T ~!r. rio: 
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Enclosed is a copy of a llettc.:r rccafieJ from 1ft. Ihlp-n CIlII, 
:1 consti tucnt anI! :IIIJattorncy froJ:! i}cs :·foine~$ I believe 
yeu will finJ the lctter sclf-explanaoory. 
I "'emJ.1 npprc,iitc it if you w01l1,1 look intn the tI,ucrat!ons 
raised in his letter and advise ~e so that I ~11 respond to 
hh •• 
Please respond to oy office' in Des lIoines. 
Sincerely, 
ellA :tI.ES E. r.:USS LD 
U~itcd St~tes Sen3tOt 
EEG/fs 
enclosures 
Source: Randy Caviness, Farm Credit borrower. 
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... ;,t "1-,, f ..... :n..:. r",: •• .n 'lft'&I (k.· .... U ,,,,, ... J:t .... ! • ." ~~~;; ~;~i::t :'1" I·t •• c~. "' "tCt 
\1I:/lU-'Ul ~:, rl",,!. .• ""', ..... 
'1dnitcd ~tatfs ~rnJtt ::~ It ..... , .. 'WiII'" 12. CU •• ,., .... II'", 
.... ...... : •• ;It !=:Ct 
"':'llJl·tl17 
;1: A· ........ , .... , 
:., .,: ....... ~ .. f()(. 
, ,'I :It ••• " 
::1 h: ... , t ....... 
·U :n I! .. ". I L 
CHAP.LES E. G~':'SSl£Y 
,., '., ...... .,... .... 
'H "n. s! •• " :.: ....... ". ~ ... e. C' ....... ..pr. lA t:tCt 
,);'.U ... ;UI 
:·fay U. 1937 
:'fr. HUsh J. Cain 
DU~C~~, JOXES, lILEY 5 FI~LEY, ?C. 
~th Flo~r- Equitable Building 
Des :'foines, IO:~3 ?0309. 
Dear :.(r. Cain: 
IS:tr J:Z-4JJ, 
Thank you for :it'iting gy office in Des ~roines cOnCer!llng 
the CaYinesses and their FmK\ guaranteed loan with the 
PCA of the ~idlands. 
I have written to :·Ir. Bob Piiil, State Director of the F;::HA. 
concerning the allegations,in the letter. As soon as I 
have a response, I will be in touch with you. In addition 
I would like to ~ake ~1 office available to you. if you 
~ou]d like to discuss in further details, this matter with 
the Office of Inspector General in \\'ashington. D.C. 
If yo~ should ~3ye any questions concerning the status of 
tne ir.q~irl. ple3se feel free to call wy office. 
Sin.cerely. i 
CH.l.~LES E. G:t.~~::L'cy 
United States Senator 
CEG/is 
. 
I 
! \ 
Source: Randy Caviness, Farm Credit borrower. 
-' 
E=-c." b 1 a C;Lr IIVJ !. c:r ~-".l.ty 
thit.od 5t-&.t.u S=..ac~: .. r 
]21 E~e.ra.l ?.l,jUd~ 
HO \"~t: St.r~t: 
iA.c ",,!;;~. I~'3 5 0lC9 
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_ en re.lcral 3.uUd.i=!( 
H' Vi.lZlt:Str~t: 
:-.,.,. -Y.,;t::.e,,_. I..,,,",, - ~~JC9 
_Jc.:l/l 9.. 1937 
~ !..:t !:l re.~...;a · tt1 ]'iX% ~.Ir7 !n ~ cif ~. Ea.6~ CaUl of -r..u _Q:)ilu:.#. ~. CU:I. !.Is t""9~!::le ~~. St;-re.r 1'1. :and '1 ~ ';~- Cl:~~!.::1:s ~ ~ ho<!c.ec~ Credit ~~u­t!.co. -:;-! t::!l4 V4.p r:"'::. a:!:J 1.c.tt..e:l: ~!.u;:.c.a i':s!U ~=-.e.d \L:I.COo.c,.:.r--ed 
-=4 =.!:ltL..--eetd !:1 a.l.!..q..d !al..Do !.::I~t~ c~c __ a ~.l:OrtCed lay Pc.&. (Qr ~ ?'t;2A r;--c.r~~ .l.:~ tIl 'l>c..:w:Uf o-! r!:.c Cct-!.ne..se. :U.s l .. t.t:.e:r ! .... rt~ c:.&!:~. "I =.a a~'N::l t.he ~r~-tl t..:.c.c ~ ~1;:1- !>o~rt..'-..e T<:l 5"".;.e..:c::£.a c:;i ~1 of e~~G o-! ~.a t::J ? C!.. re>o-a:-t:-
'i.::..g"?C!. f= tb. c:.or-U'G4 of c:o~.::ct- u: ~ ~r=ed !:1 ..,~~t1.:l11 of r~ b t v:u toG 0 t l'IO t.A ~ ~ .q c..l.!.c:1 t: •• ...- _ ~ 
Lt. .t.!:;.!.a ro!=.c, tb=e ~ ~ :)0 l.o1:~ e!..a!n r-1!:=it"t~ ~1 ?CA for ~.A t.:;l -u.:c.e a t.et.tH"="!.!:.l.t~ l:6d~~ ie v1.ll b::l-..or tl::.a ~tc:e or :lO~. ;'"0 ua =t LlMt.re ~tl: ~ t.!x;;o t!:.lo-l: tOO 'C.Il.T!;CJ:"a' La;...~"I:.t: t:...s ~ H,..1t!..iuo;j~ ~. ~f =rc~ =U ~nl b 'tJI..hs t'~ U o:-:!er (-0.: a t"""~t~ ~l"-4 c:..!..a.!.n t:;) ~::l ~ =x:Uc.:rc.d. If it CoC1 boo c!i1t~u t~l: ?CA d!J ~l: h...-=r t~ t== ot ti:::z r;:-..s.=tCA -cL/or fa..!GC .b.fo=-t!.= ~ 17 • !;:.~.. ~ p:"C'T!Ld. t~ v.:o::.l.:! . c: e:r'"-Il!..:.ly L- f .... c: r <= ?:::..!... IJ r!~!...s~40 
J..r. -t~ t.!.:..e-. ~ L4 ~t r=~-cd t:.o b-; ~o !.:4r.Jl..-tl-d fA tt.e d.is?=t:e ~ ~~. ~<l nUl r~t.!-~ c.-N1e .Luc<:!.4c!:-.J. '''1! 'Will. "X:---=~. '~-!::.4 C"ury e!!c tt to ;r:I!"u..~7 e:::rl !A..!I17 r -cviev all rertin<=e !:I';'::"IU:t~-:l r-...;!.ch a.;>rl..!..e::2 l!.!...~tl,. rlQ r~'a .,.u.r&.:>t:~ vit!l ?CA. 
It. 4, ?~ 
SutQ :i.=e..:~;: 
C - " ~= :1 S'l-erv~..,r C:e=ILe.1.:i ~40._!"!.C ~ _ ~ !..re:c~t'. ~ !..£:::.ol...c 
:': \..--. .!~ . '=? 
1 
Signatures have been redacted for privacy 
Source: Randy Caviness, Farm Credit borrower. 
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TILED 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT C.S. OISlP.ICT WI'H 
IOWA 
'HOiiiliEE:N r:m::.:r OF I::\,:'\ FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 
~TE~ .DIYISION ~2 !.?R 27 PH 4: 52 
UNITED STATES 
a..dcr Npl-ts 
OF AMERICA, ) CIVIL ACTIOU:RWt ~lY"l~8a,FI,.r-) ~ ~~ 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THREE MILLION DOLLARS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
} 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MOTION TO .APPROVE 
MONETARY SETTLEMENT 
IN LIEU OF FORFEITURE 
AND TO DISMISS FORFEITURE 
COMES NOW the United States of America, Plaintiff in the 
above-entitled action, and files this motion with the Court 
respectfully requesting-this Court's approval of a monetary 
settlement in the above-entitled action in lieu of forfeiture. 
In support thereof, the United states states as follows: 
1. On April 27, 1992, a Verified Complaint for Forfeiture 
was filed in the above-entitled action. The complaint 
seeks the forfeiture of Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000) 
as the proceeds of alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. S 1014. 
2. On April 24, 1992, an agreement involving this matter 
was reached between the United States and Production Credit 
Association of the Midlands and Farm Credit Bank of Omaha. 
The parties agreed that the amounts paid under the 
settlement would also be in lieu of any forfeiture 
proceeding. This agreement was reached by the parties to 
avoid litigation and without an admission of liability. 
3. 19 U.S.C. S 1613(c) permits the settlement of 
forfeiture cases without the completion of the forfeiture 
case. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. S 1613(c), applicable to this 
case through 18 U.S.C. S 981(d), if parties agree to a 
Source: Randy Caviness, Farm Credit borrower. 
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